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New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Call for Articles

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship (NEJE), published twice a year by Sacred Heart University’s College of
Business, is intended to be an invaluable forum for exchange of scholarly ideas, practices, and policies in the field of
entrepreneurship and small business management.
The Journal is currently seeking original contributions that have not been published or are under consideration elsewhere. The scope of the articles published in NEJE ranges from theoretical/conceptual to empirical research, with
maximum relevance to practicing entrepreneurs. The Journal tries to appeal to a broad range of audience, so articles
submitted should be written in such a manner that those outside of academics would be able to comprehend and
appreciate the content of the material.

Format

Please submit four typed copies of your article, on separate pages, include an abstract of the article (100 words
maximum) and a biographical sketch of the author(s). A title page should precede the article and should list the
name(s) of the author(s) as well as their full address (including phone and fax numbers and email address). Papers are
to be double-spaced with one-inch margins. References should be included on separate pages at the end of the paper.
Manuscripts should be no longer than 20 pages of text and 25 pages total, including abstract, text, tables or illustrations, notes and works cited. Please consult APA style guidelines for all formatting details.

Copyright

The copyright of published articles will belong to the publishers of NEJE. Authors will be granted permission to
reprint or otherwise use portions of their articles published in the journal upon written request.

Review Process

All articles will be double blind refereed. Authors will receive reviewers’ comments and the editors’ publishing decision in approximately 90 days of submission.
All prospective authors are required to include a $20 submission fee with each manuscript sent in for consideration,
payable to “NEJE.” The fee will be used to cover administrative costs and will also provide the author with a year’s
subscription to the Journal.

Submission

Authors are encouraged to submit articles for the Fall 2004 issue by April 15, 2004. Papers received after the due date
will automatically be considered for future issues of the Journal.
All submissions and correspondence should be addressed to:
Editor, New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
College of Business
Sacred Heart University
5151 Park Avenue
Fairfield, CT 06825-1000
(203) 371-7854 (phone)
(203) 365-7538 (fax)
Please visit our web page at www.sacredheart.edu/cb/neje or email us at shuartj@sacredheart.edu.

Sample Copies

Sample copies of the previous issues will be available from the Editor on a first-come, first-served basis.
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From the Editors
In a departure from our usual practice of interviewing one or two entrepreneurs for the Journal, we are providing five
interviews in this issue. In another departure, these entrepreneurs are not U.S.-based; rather, these business people are
all from New Zealand, a spirited country where independent thinking, homegrown solutions, and their own Kiwi take
on innovation makes their stories both interesting and varied.
The opportunity to meet and interview a total of nine entrepreneurs representing five different organizations from
both the North and South Islands of New Zealand (see map) came about when our Editor spent his Spring 2003 sabbatical touring that country. Over a seven-week period, Laurence Weinstein, starting in Auckland and ending his trip in
Christchurch, sought out New Zealanders who had intriguing stories to share with our Journal’s readers.
• TeWhau Lodge near Auckland: Gene O’Neill and Liz Eglinton both left high-paying corporate jobs to start their own
upscale lodge on Waiheke Island. Their income is much less than it used to be, but they could not be happier as they
now control their own destiny.
• Raconteur Productions in Christchurch: William De Friez serves occasionally as the company’s director when they are
filming documentaries. Veronica McCarthy is the full-time producer. Their views on the how, what, and when’s of
making these documentaries often clash, but their highly respected productions reflect the value of melding their creative energies and intelligence.
• Bay House Café in Westport, near Greymouth: Dudley-Anne Thomson manages this out-of-the-way gourmet restaurant
that is a destination for travelers from around the world. Brian Finlayson and Michael Varekamp started the restaurant despite strong local government resistance to their business concept.
• Philip King Booksellers in Christchurch: Philip King started his business in his home as an after-hours hobby and turned
his passion for books into a huge pay-off.
• Jade Software in Christchurch: Although Sir Gilbert Simpson is considered a software development genius in his own
country, Jade Software applications are just now making a splash outside of New Zealand. His goal: “Invade” the
United States.
To round out the issue, we are pleased to present, in addition to our regularly peer-reviewed articles, a special
“Practitioner’s Corner.” In this segment, we offer the entrepreneurial musings of Joe Levangie, a very successful venture capitalist for the past twenty-five years.

Dr. Laurence Weinstein
Editor

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2003

Dr. Joshua Shuart
Associate Editor

Christopher Sheehan
Associate Editor
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From Corporate to Entrepreneurial Life:
Risks and Challenges Along the Way
Gene O’Neill, Liz Ellington
Proprietors, TeWhau Lodge, Waiheke Island

G

ene and Liz were married in 1991 and have fulfilled
their dream of owning and operating their own business—TeWhau Lodge. The lodge is located on Waiheke
Island, a vineyard region just 30 minutes by ferry from downtown Auckland. Guests are provided lodging along with gourmet dinners and breakfasts for New Zealand $495 per night per
couple (about U.S. $235).
NEJE: Many folks in corporate life dream someday they’ll
start their own businesses, be their own boss, and set
their own hours and financial goals. You seem to be prime
examples of that.
Gene: I can’t say I started out thinking that way when I
joined Air New Zealand. I enjoyed corporate life and
stayed with the company for 27 years. At first, I was on
the union side but then moved over to management
where I had important responsibilities in aircraft engineering and maintenance.
Liz: I’m with Gene on that one. I was “all corporate.”
After university where I majored in fine arts and language, I went into human resources. I worked my way
up to HR director working for multinational organizations with thousands of employees based in the United
States, Australia, China, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. I
had direct responsibility for salary and benefit compensation programs, incentive plans, recruitment, and
training and development. Then, I specialized in helping expat managers bring their families and furnishings over to New Zealand. I loved the perks, the excellent salary, and the status of belonging to large companies.
NEJE: Yet here you are, far from corporate life and living on an island operating a lodge that provides gourmet meals for up to a maximum of eight lodgers a
night.
Gene: Yes, it’s been quite an adjustment, but one we are
both happy we made. The threat of redundancy, losing
one’s employment to corporate whim and whimsy is not
something we wanted to endure. Each of us felt a lack of

control over our destinies while in corporate life. Here,
at TeWhau, owning our own business at least gives us an
“illusion of control.”
NEJE: Why is it an “illusion?” That doesn’t sound positive.
Gene: Don’t misunderstand. We have control over how
we manage the lodge, but we still depend on suppliers; we
have no influence over the local economy, and non-New
Zealanders account for 40 percent of our business. Any
terrorist activity that threatens plane travel could impact
enormously on us. That’s what I mean by “illusion of control.” There’s a frightening amount of sheer luck that’s
involved in being successful when one runs this type of
operation. There are so many variables out of our direct
control.
NEJE: What about the “24/7” dedication you both need to
bring to the lodge? Do you find it’s difficult to wake up
each day and feel motivated to spend another 14- to 18hour day preparing meals, welcoming guests, and keeping
everything ship-shape?
Liz: No, actually we love this type of life. We were both
brought up in small country towns in New Zealand
where hard work was valued and expected.
Gene: I grew up on a dairy farm and had to milk the
family’s cows twice a day. I was part of a community
back then where everyone supported each other and
you learned to get along with all sorts of personalities. We see those early experiences as a real asset.
Being in isolation at work or at home doesn’t appeal
to me. I love being with people, and I really enjoy
food preparation. Learning to cook came from my
mother, who encouraged me to spend time in the
kitchen with her.
NEJE: Yet operating a lodge seems so removed from corporate life. What sorts of adjustments have you had to
make?
Gene: (Laughing) Well, one thing we’ve had to adjust to
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is the loss of our corporate salaries and perks. We aren’t
going to die rich by any means.
Liz: For me, it’s always having to be one step ahead of the
game. You have to be a lot more nimble as an entrepreneur. There’s no such thing as financial security, at least
not the kind I felt when I was getting a paycheck from my
employer every week. We’re only as good as the last person who leaves the lodge every day. We are in the business of pleasing people, of helping them de-stress, seeing
that they thoroughly enjoy their stay with us.
We are not unique in what we offer. It’s a typical New
Zealand experience. Yes, we own 16 acres of land; yes, our
lodge is beautifully situated overlooking a bay; but our
guests have a lot of similar lodges from which they can
choose, and we are very mindful of that. We only have
four guestrooms; that is a maximum of eight lodgers per
night. Being a small operation, we have to treat visitors
royally or else they won’t consider coming back.
NEJE: Why did you choose a small lodge operation versus
one that could have accommodated many more visitors
at a time?
Gene: If we had made TeWhau Lodge bigger, the whole
dynamic of what we wanted to provide here would be
very different. We would have lost a lot of customer contact, and the food portions would have had to be created
in so much more volume. We consider ourselves restaurateurs and see that as a way to make us different; it’s our
niche so to speak. We serve our guests around a table
where eight people can sit comfortably and make new
friendships that often carry over when they return home.
Guests don’t want to be dominated by their host so we’ve
learned what to provide, how to interact without being
intrusive, and then “disappear.”
I plan the menu each morning and evening very carefully, but I don’t see the lodge as a way to showcase our
cuisine. What’s important is whether our guests enjoy
their social experience around the table; the food we serve
is just one part of that memory. How we conduct ourselves, the ambiance we create, the sunsets over Auckland
that our guests photograph on the veranda each evening,
they’re all part of how visitors remember the lodge.
NEJE: You selected the building site and worked with an
architect to design the lodge. Wasn’t there a lot more risk
in starting from “scratch” rather than purchasing an
existing operation?
Liz: But if we had purchased someone else’s property, it
wouldn’t have meant the same to us. We would have
bought someone else’s dream instead of creating our own.

Gene: It was frustrating at first. We looked at other areas
but really wanted to build on Waiheke Island. Yet we
almost gave up because we couldn’t find the right building site. Finally, one day the realtor working with us
found out about this property being available and rushed
us out here to see it. One look told us this is where we
would someday build and run our lodge.
To create your own operation from the ground up
involves a lot of detail. However, we felt we were in a better position than most entrepreneurs because we had
saved up enough money from our corporate jobs so that
we did not have time constraints. Also, Liz continued to
work in her corporate job for another 18 months after we
opened the lodge as a way to buffer our start-up expenses from depleting our savings. We were focused on what
it would take to construct the lodge in a way that would
make it look distinctive. We had the money to do it without overleveraging ourselves with the bank. And we had
the time so nothing had to be rushed or short-changed.
NEJE: Did you put together a business plan?
Gene: Absolutely. We both had had exposure to business
planning in corporate life so we knew that a strong business plan was essential to our success. Once we slow
down after our summer season, around April, we take
time out from the business and analyze systemically how
we have done versus our original plan. We undertake a
complete financial review and update our SWOT analysis.
Last year, we hired a terrific consultant who stayed at
the lodge and whom we treated as a regular guest. His
stay lasted for 24 hours, and then he wrote a lengthy
report on what, in his opinion, we had done right or
where we had shown some lapses. It was enormously
helpful to get that kind of feedback.
Liz: We made sure that financial worries did not drive
our decisions. We do not have significant debt to pay
back. That means we don’t have to worry about how
many cars come down the driveway on a daily basis. We
focus on customer needs rather than how we are going to
meet the mortgage payment. We waited until a later stage
in life to start our business. With no young children to
raise at this point, we can put all of our energies into
growing the business.
It’s important to point out that our guests’ expectations about their experience at TeWhau Lodge keeps
going up. We need to be mindful of what our competition
is offering and how to keep ahead of the game. We’ve
heard a new lodge is opening up on the Island, and
we’ve done our initial homework on what type of lodg-
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ing experience they expect to provide and how that
might impact us.
There are other concerns. What if Air New Zealand is
not bought out by Qantas Airlines, as has been rumored
of late? For Air New Zealand to survive independently,
they might cut fares and a price war might ensue. If that
happened, Aucklanders who form the backbone of our
business might be tempted to vacation in Sydney rather
than just take the ferry to local Waiheke Island.
Gene: We can’t foresee everything that is going to happen
around us, but fortunately we can at least choose the
route the business will take and not have to go to some
committee or distant company CEO to ask for permission
to take certain steps to improve the lodge. Not so with
corporate life, where you have to seek consensus or constantly ask your supervisor if it’s all right to make decisions that carry some risk. We can move quickly and confidently because our corporate “boardroom” is just the
two of us.
NEJE: How did you divide up the responsibilities of running the lodge?
Gene: I take care of buying all of the food provisions,
preparing the meals and general maintenance of the
lodge.
Liz: I handle the inquiries and guest bookings by phone
and email and send out proposals when corporations
want to use the lodge for conferences and also when, on
occasion, we have a couple who wish to be married at the
lodge.
NEJE: Have you ever experienced dissatisfied customers?
Liz: In the four years we’ve been operating the lodge, we
have had perhaps 600 couples come and stay with us. I
can remember only one couple who went away unhappy.
They were truly beyond our ability to please. It was
unfortunate but, thankfully, very rare for us. For the most
part, guests are easy to deal with. They’re on holiday and
they’re using discretionary dollars. They want to have a
good time; and except for meals, generally they want to
be left alone.
Gene: We’re anxious to provide a “wow” factor to our
visitors, and we hope we succeed. I think we do. Big
hotels spend millions on decoration, marble, slate, and
other design appeal; but they seem to miss the “people
factor.” Their only interaction with their guests is when
someone behind a counter asks for the visitor’s credit
card.

Here’s a specific example. When I was with Air New
Zealand, I used to travel quite a lot. I went to the same
hotel nearly every week for years; and every time I registered at the front desk, the hotel representative would ask
me to fill out the same registration form. It was crazy and
I began to resent it, so I changed my lodging to a small,
family-run operation. After staying there just once or
twice, people working at the hotel would greet me when
I came in and say, “Hello and welcome, Mr. O’Neill.” That
simple way of personalizing my stay and making me feel
welcome and special meant a lot to me, and I haven’t forgotten that experience. That is exactly what we do here at
the lodge when visitors arrive.
NEJE: What was it like when you first opened up the
lodge?
Gene: We decided we didn’t want to overreach and
become inundated with eight guests every night right
from the beginning. So we opened the lodge and “softly”
got on our way by taking in one or two couples a night.
This made our learning curve less steep and reduced the
pressure on us to get everything just right at the start. But
I must admit that I tried to take on too much. I thought we
could get along without much staff; but I found certain
things to be too exhausting, like the grounds maintenance. We had to learn the economics of the lodging business and how many staff to hire for what kinds of tasks.
NEJE: How has your experience been as employers rather
than what you were previously—corporate employees?
Gene: The general employment picture on Waiheke
Island has been one of weak demand; so when people
find employment they like, they want to hold onto their
jobs. Our employees value their positions with us, and we
respect their contributions to the lodge. We seek their
ideas and suggestions and take them seriously. We work
alongside the staff so they see how hard we work and
how devoted we are to the business. That almost never
happens in corporations where employees never see the
leadership. Being an employer has been an experience
we’ve both enjoyed. Fortunately, our staff shares our
vision for TeWhau Lodge, and we get along famously.
NEJE: Does the government provide New Zealanders with
incentives to become entrepreneurs?
Gene: We have received no help whatsoever. If anything,
the government offers disincentives through their
employment policies. For instance, women continue to
get paid so they can take time off when they are rearing
their young children. If one of our employees has a
child, we need to pay for her and for her replacement.
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The laws are written in favor of large corporations that
can afford this type of social policy. It’s tough for small
operations like ours to take on that kind of added
expense.
The amount of paperwork involved in hiring and
maintaining a staff is immense. As a country, we are
moving away from a socialist economic model so taxation, at least, is no longer confiscatory. The top rate is
only 36 percent. And we don’t have a system of deductions so the tax form is all of one page. That’s all to the
good. Although the central government in Wellington
likes to promote itself as business-friendly, they heavily
favor the large corporations. Most of our politicians
were never self-employed. The government is made up
of career politicians, lawyers, academics, and trade
unionists, not small businessowners. It’s tough.
NEJE: What’s your “end game?” What happens when you
don’t want to dedicate long hours every day to your
enterprise?
Gene: I’m not sure yet. I’m 52 years old, and I don’t think
I’ll be able to keep up this pace when I’m 60. We get up at
6 AM, and we’re lucky to be back in bed by midnight during our busiest summer months from December through
April. I’d like some day to be able to employ a chef, perhaps another person to run the front end; but then our
profit would disappear. We’d have to price our lodging
much higher, and that would probably discourage the
local Auckland demographic from staying with us. We’d
be affordable only to international tourists, and that’s
something we don’t want to do. I suppose the trick is to
live at the lodge without being so involved in all the dayto-day details.
Liz: We don’t ever want to run a restaurant. Whatever we
do next will have to involve a lot of people contact and
have some sort of food element to it. It takes incredible
stamina to do what we’re doing at TeWhau, and we
understand we can’t do it forever. It’s easy to lose perspective, so we make sure we go away at least three times
a year even if it’s only for a few days at a time. We feel it’s
terribly important to keep some balance in our lives.
(For more information about TeWhau Lodge, visit the website
www.tewhaulodge.co.nz.)
—L.W.
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Documentaries: Both Informing and Entertaining New Zealanders
William De Friez, Veronica McCarthy
Raconteur Productions Ltd., Christchurch

W

illiam (“Bill”) De Friez and Veronica (“Ronni”)
McCarthy own and operate Raconteur Film and
Television Productions located in downtown
Christchurch. Bill serves as part-time director; his full-time
position is faculty lecturer in the Film Department of the
University of Canterbury. Ronni is the full-time producer for
their small business operation that completes an average of three
documentaries per year as well as a network children’s series and
other special projects. She won the prestigious Winston
Churchill Fellowship in 1995 to study children’s television outside of New Zealand.
NEJE: Ronni, you’ve kept your maiden name, but you and
Bill are very much married. Bill occasionally serves as the
film director on Raconteur projects, and you’re the full-time
producer. Don’t directors and producers often have antithetical ideas about movie production? How do you balance that along with your marriage day after day and year
after year?
Ronni: It’s not easy! Bill doesn’t always understand that I
have to represent the best interests of our clients, keep tight
tabs on the budget, and get our documentaries finished on
time. It certainly involves a lot of creative tension.
Bill: Please! Excuse me, Ronni; but what you really don’t
like is that directors, to be good at their craft, sometimes
have to take creative flights of fantasy to break new ground.
That scares you. Admit it.
Ronni: Bill, I understand your need for creativity, to get to
the core of the idea we are presenting in our work; but you
need to appreciate my job and how important it is for us to
stay grounded, to understand the constraints that exist in
delivering the product on time and within budget.
Bill: Believe me, I do appreciate what you and other film
producers accomplish. However, it shouldn’t always be
time and money that dictate what we do and how we do it.
Our work needs to inform and educate our viewers while
entertaining them and keeping them focused on what they
are seeing. That’s a huge challenge.
NEJE: How did the two of you meet?
Ronni: We both worked in the television production depart-

ment of TV New Zealand and started to work on similar
projects.
NEJE: What got you interested in film production in the
first place?
Bill: I first got into film with the Bristol Freighter documentary in 1984. I had become fascinated with the last flight this
famous plane was going to make before it was dismantled.
It was a hell of a story, but TV New Zealand did not want to
run it. I wanted badly to make it, so we raided the station’s
film inventory room, found enough unused film to make a
short documentary, “borrowed” one of the station’s film
production trucks, and did the whole thing on a shoestring
budget.
NEJE: Had you studied film in university?
Bill: No, I was an electrician by training and did a lot of
work for the forestry service before turning to film. But film
was always my passion; I love to make documentaries, and
I watch every film I can. It’s an amazing creative process.
NEJE: And you, Ronni?
Ronni: I have been involved in some type of television production from just about my first job out of university. To me,
television production, particularly the documentary format,
gives me the opportunity to bring new and helpful information to a wide audience. It’s the best way I can think of to
serve my community meaningfully, and I feel really good
about that. What we do gives voice to the average New
Zealander. I’m also passionate about creating high quality
children’s programs. They deserve the best we can do.
NEJE: What was your first successful documentary?
Bill: We achieved national recognition when we produced a
documentary called Scorched Memories in 1995 on the 50th
anniversary of the infamous Ballantyne retail store fire. I say
“infamous” because scores of employees died when a fire
started in the basement and quickly moved up to the
ground through five floors of the building. It housed the
retail floor operation as well as the administrative offices.
There were inadequate fire escape exits, and some of the
exits were inaccessible as they were blocked by merchandise and office supplies. Worse, the fire alarm was not
sounded for more than 10 precious minutes because man-
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agers did not want to unduly frighten store customers or
employees. Loyal to the core, many employees did not leave
their posts until given permission by management. For
many, it was too late to save themselves.
We asked to speak to the Ballantyne Executive Board or
the Ballantyne family before making the documentary, but
they declined to speak to us. We wanted their perspective
five decades after the tragedy, but this is a store management that did not formally apologize for its culpability in
the loss of life until 1990. There’s a strict hierarchy within
the store’s management, and Ballantyne family members
remain firmly in control. No one apparently dares speak out
about how the family felt about the fire and what they did
internally to correct operations after the fire.

or music. We usually approach at least three different funding sources with our concept for a new documentary and
see who “bites.”
NEJE: What funding level do you need to produce a documentary?
Ronni: It’s an average of $100,000 N.Z. (about U.S. $53,000)
for a typical 42-minute documentary. The networks require
18 minutes for advertising and other promotional considerations each broadcast hour.

NEJE: How do you receive initial funding for your documentaries?
Bill: The national New Zealand networks provide about 30
percent of the money we need; but most of our funds are
derived from “New Zealand on Air,” a of governmentfunded broadcasting commission with a mandate to tell and
show New Zealand stories.

NEJE: That’s all? It doesn’t sound like much money.
Bill: Our staff usually ends up making more money on
shooting the documentary than we do as the director
and/or producer. No one gets rich making films in New
Zealand unless your name is Peter Jackson. He’s a great guy
and I admire what he’s done with The Lord of the Rings trilogy, but Peter is the exception. By far. Many producers go
bankrupt. Just recently Larry Parr, a well-known filmmaker,
had to close his shop. Why? Because after a long and distinguished career, he made one film that didn’t sell very well;
and the bank cut off funds for his next project, which, by the
way, was almost finished. Larry desperately tried to find
other sources to back him, but everyone knows funding
movie production is a dicey proposition at best. So his operation went under.
Film production in New Zealand is a cottage industry for
the most part. Few folks work at it full time. Our country is
internationally famous for our short films; however, a lot of
people who have worked on those productions in the past
were not paid. They hired on at no pay hoping if the movie
somehow received international attention they might one
day get some compensation.
To Peter Jackson’s credit, he sold himself to the executive
producers as the best choice for director of The Lord of the
Rings project. This was based, in part, on several financially
successful movies he had made including Bad Taste and The
Frighteners. Peter insisted on New Zealand as the place for
the film’s setting, and this has really put New Zealand “on
the map” in the global film industry. The trilogy took three
years to shoot and edit, and Peter’s production company
employed as many as 2,500 local people at one time. Once
the project was finished, however, most of those folks had to
find jobs outside of the industry. We just can’t sustain that
level of activity on a regular basis in such a small country.
I must also point out that the trilogy has been fantastic for
tourism. There’s a boom going on right now due to the
America’s Cup race in Auckland and tours to all The Lord of
the Rings’ film locations.

Ronni: There are different funding groups depending on
whether you are seeking seed money for television, radio,

Ronni: Unfortunately, most of our films are never seen outside of New Zealand. Occasionally we sell our work to

NEJE: What other documentary topics have you tackled?
Ronni: Recently, we have produced films on topics as
diverse as eating disorders, teenage male fathers and how
they cope, men and women who have married multiple
times, gambling addiction, a behind-the-scenes look at our
emergency ambulance services, and a trio of documentaries
on body parts.
NEJE: Body parts? Can you be more specific?
Ronni: Sure. We’ve produced educational films on the breast,
vagina, and penis. The next one to come along, something
we’re working on right now, is going to be called The Bum.
We’re screening talent right now. Want to be considered?
NEJE: Ummm . . . no thanks. How have New Zealanders
reacted to the body parts series?
Bill: Extremely well. They’re the most widely distributed
films we’ve ever produced. Our agent tells us the documentaries are popular as far away as Israel. We didn’t make the
series to titillate our audience; it was all about educating the
public, dispelling myths and celebrating diversity.
NEJE: What about your work in children’s programming?
Ronni: We are currently involved in two quality children’s
programming, one called The Big Chair and the other,
Animation Station.
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Australian television, but it often stops there. We dream
some day of selling one of our documentaries to the United
States. Oh, my, wouldn’t that be lovely! The financial remuneration would be considerable.
NEJE: What would happen if you did reap a large revenue
stream?
Ronni: First thing, we would have to pay back the initial
seed money to the funding organization. The distributor
would take 30 percent off the top; then the funding organization would receive 70 percent of the remaining proceeds until the initial funding level, say $100,000, is paid
back. We don’t really see much money until after the film
distributor and upfront funds are all paid back.
The government helped put together a Film New
Zealand public relations effort, and representatives from
our local film companies started to attend a lot of international conferences to sell our country as a viable setting for
their film production. The goal was to attract three major
film productions per year. Currently Tom Cruise is in the
country shooting The Last Samurai, and Gwenth Paltrow
will be working with Peter Jackson on a reshoot of King
Kong. But that’s about it.
Bill: Many of the people who work in the film industry are
nonunion. This has the film unions in the United States
pretty upset. There’s a quiet movement going on right
now to make sure that when American talent is hired for a
New Zealand shoot that they use only union members. I
suppose the American unions are hoping this will rub off
on us. We’ll have to wait and see.
NEJE: Bill, since you teach film at the local university, do
any of your students ever end up working for you?
Bill: Absolutely. I have had the pleasure of working with
some top-notch students, and there are times when their
paths and mine cross again after they graduate. They often
are as passionate as I am about creating an entertaining
story and telling it well.
Raconteur is the largest, most successful documentary
maker on the South Island. Most film making of this type
is done up in Auckland or Wellington on the North
Island. An analogy to Americans would be, perhaps, us
being situated in Philadelphia whereas most of the documentary production would be occurring in New York
City.
People around the Christchurch area (population
200,000) depend on us for employment in the film industry, and that includes many of my ex-students. By hiring
them and other local people, I feel I’m giving back to the
city and to my film community. And I’m not the only one
who teaches in the family. Ronni teaches TV production at

the Polytechnic University in Christchurch, and she is currently mentoring three graduate students.
Ronni: Not a day goes by without someone sending in his
or her resume asking whether we are hiring. We are motivated to work hard and press ahead, in part, so we can
employ more people who need jobs in the film industry.
In fact, 2002 was our busiest year. We produced four
documentaries and several dozen “Animation Station”
programs geared for children at the 4:15 PM time slot on
our Channel 3. The shows are just seven and a half minutes in length, but putting together five new shows each
week takes a lot of coordination. However, it’s all been
good fun, and we hope to continue this pace for as long as
we can.
NEJE: Bill mentioned mentoring students earlier and getting them involved in current projects. What mentoring
work do you do?
Ronni: I’m currently an executive member of the Screen
Producers & Developers Association, representing producers and directors in New Zealand. I was a founding
member of Screen Canterbury, an organization formed to
promote film and television in the greater Canterbury
region. I’m also a member of the selection panel for the
Screen Innovation Production Fund, which has the
responsibility of allocating $230,000 New Zealand (U.S.
$122,000) to emerging film makers.
NEJE: Just like you were 10 years ago.
Bill: Exactly.

—L.W.

If you have any questions for Ronni or Bill, you can contact them at Veronica@Raconteur.co.nz.
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The Bay House Café: Against All Odds
Dudley-Anne Thomson,
Brian Finlayson and Michael Varekamp

D

udley-Anne Thomson is the current manager of the
Bay House Café, located10 kilometers from Westport,
South Island, New Zealand. She rents the space from
Brian Finlayson and Michael Varekam, who both started the
Bay House Café eight years ago and then moved on to open
restaurants in Sydney, Australia.
NEJE: Brian, the Bay House is located five hours driving
time from Christchurch, the only major city on the South
Island. The west coast of the South Island has a grand
total of only 35,000 residents from Karamea in the north
to Te Anu in the south. Many of the hundreds of kilometers of coastline are desolate. How did you pick this location?
Brian: I’m from the area originally, and I always thought
the town of Westport, even with just 6,000 residents,
could use an upscale café. We get an awful lot of tourists
coming through from October through March when it’s
our summer, and I counted on that business as well. We
typically closed the restaurant from April to September
because we needed a chance to rest from a hectic summer
season and to review our menu, promotional efforts, and
past business strategies to plan on what we wanted to
change.
The veranda we are sitting on and the inside dining
area were added on to my batch (beach home) when
Michael and I decided to start the café. I bought the batch
25 but decided only fairly recently to open up an upscale
restaurant. It seemed like we could make a go of it.
Michael: The location, while away from the town, is spectacular. We are right across from a surfing beach, and the
sunsets are a great selling point. Across the bay, we have
a view of the Seal Colony where tourists by the hundreds
walk every day to see the fur seals and their pups lying on
the rocks. Can you think of a more beautiful place to eat a
gourmet meal while looking out at the Tasman Sea?
NEJE: However, you have to admit, it must have been
tough to attract enough business at first to make a go of
it.
Brian: Actually, the tough part was working with the
local town council to give us the necessary permits to

open the café. It took six months to convince them to give
us the go-ahead.
Michael: Everyone in town knew Brian, but they didn’t
know me. Outsiders, people who have not grown up in
this area, are considered with great suspicion until the
local townspeople feel they can trust you. If you’re local,
the council will bend the rules and even change the laws
to help you out. However, I didn’t have that advantage
and the council, at first, interpreted the local ordinances in
ways that were meant to stymie us.
Brian: The legal part took half a year of wrangling, but it
took only three months to convert the front part of the
batch into a restaurant and then add the deck. Once the
Department of Conservation, which owned the land
around the restaurant, gave us the final approval to proceed, we moved rapidly to start the café.
NEJE: It’s one thing to get all the local town council
approvals and convert the batch into a café, quite another to generate a positive cash flow.
Brian: That’s true, but enough locals knew me from when
I managed a restaurant in Westport called “Mandala’s” to
follow us out here. I also spent two years managing a
bar/café in town called “Diego’s.” Originally, I had
apprenticed as a pastry chef, then moved on to main
courses, then eventually to managing the whole operation. I was ready to open up the “Bay House,” and there
was a built-in following.
Michael: In fact, there were so many people who wanted
to come to the café, we were booked solid for three
months and even had to turn people away.
NEJE: It sounds like you started making money right
away.
Michael: Actually, everything cost us so much more than
we had anticipated that we worked like dogs just to pay
off the $40,000 (New Zealand) we needed to borrow to
construct the dining area. The second year of business we
broke even and had all our debts paid off.
Our location has superb views, but the downside was
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we were on a dirt road with no electricity and no local
water, at least not enough to operate a café. We faced a lot
of up-front expenses before we even served our first meal.
Brian: We probably would have achieved break-even
sooner, but we underpriced ourselves in the marketplace.
We weren’t charging enough for our lunches and dinners.
Breakfast seemed okay, but we were not making sufficient
margin on the other meals. We had put together a business plan, this is something I learned how to do because I
worked for a U.S. firm as a product manager for several
years; but we made some costly errors in the beginning.
NEJE: How long did you own and manage the café?
Michael: Five years, and we became enormously successful at it. However, I’m from Sydney and I missed the city.
I convinced Brian to lease out the restaurant, keep the
batch, and move to Sydney. Brian agreed, and we opened
up the “Chocolate Dog Café” in the Rocks Section of the
city.
NEJE: After struggling to establish the Bay House Café,
you left it to start another venture? Why not just ride
your first success and coast for awhile?
Brian: We wanted to challenge ourselves and see if we
could establish a successful restaurant in a large, cosmopolitan city like Sydney. “The Chocolate Dog” was open
seven days a week. The café was well accepted by the
locals as well as tourists, and we did extraordinarily well.
I really like to create spaces where I can entertain people
and see them enjoying themselves. The experience was
very fulfilling. I loved it.
NEJE: And that’s where Dudley-Anne comes in. You sold
the business to her.
Michael: Hmmm . . . not exactly. I only wish we had.
Brian: What happened was we sold the café to an
Australian entrepreneur who made all sorts of noises
about all this experience he had and what he could do for
the restaurant to expand it and to make it even more profitable. Turns out, he ran up debt all around Westport,
never paid it off, and pretty much was an absentee owner
from the git-go.
Michael: We knew we had a serious problem within 60 days
of handing over the café to this guy. Our friends in town
called and told us the food quality and service were going
down rapidly. The fellow didn’t seem to care about the café’s
image, nor return phone calls about when he was going to
pay for the merchandise and services he had purchased.

Dudley-Anne: Now that’s where I come into the picture. Mark, who at the time three years ago was my
boyfriend and business partner, and I were looking to
move to the Westport area. Mark, and I’d rather not
provide his last name, grew up here and has close family ties around Westport. Neither of us knew much
about the Bay House Café. I had grown up in Hastings
on the North Island of New Zealand and hadn’t traveled much in the South Island. I did have restaurant
experience, and that’s to the good; but Mark and I did
not have a good enough credit rating to borrow the
money to buy the Bay House. That’s where our financial “angel” came in.
While in the North Island, Mark and I met an American
fellow who so took to us that he promised to put up
money for a business we might want to buy some day.
Well, when we found out the Bay House was up for sale,
we called him and told him we were ready to call him on
his offer to back us. He was surprised at first that we were
ready to take him up on his promise; but he followed
through just as he said he would, and we bought the business.
Brian: We tried to talk Mark out of buying it, though,
because we were ready to throw out the Aussie chap since
he wasn’t paying the monthly rent to us. We never got a
penny from that guy after he purchased the café. Nothing
in three months. But Mark wouldn’t listen to us and
insisted on buying the business outright from the owner
who charged him twice what he had paid us. What a
waste of money.
Dudley-Anne: I didn’t know anyone in town except Mark
and his family; they lived around the Westport area so I
just followed his lead. That proved to be unfortunate. At
the beginning, Mark was the chef and I took care of the
front operation. It took me two years just to get to know
the local market enough to where I was sufficiently confident to start making changes.
But talk about surprises. We went into the café
expecting to use the kitchen equipment only to find out
that some new equipment included in the sale didn’t
belong to the seller. They were never paid off, and some
people showed up ready to cart them away. It was a
tough start.
NEJE: What changes did you make?
Dudley-Anne: For one, getting rid of the tour buses that
would stop off, discharge dozens of passengers who
would monopolize the café, order a soda and perhaps a
scone, stay for an hour or two to fill out their postcards,
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and then move on. The buses were a nuisance, the margins on soda and scones low; and this discouraged local
trade from coming out here.
We are not a tea café. We serve gourmet meals at competitive prices, but this means attracting a market that
wants excellent food and service and a fairly quiet environment. The buses were ruining that.
Everyone in Westport thought I was crazy; but I had a
long-term vision of the business and where I wanted to
take it, and the tour buses did not fit into that vision.
Mark and I tried to stay open during the winter months
here, but after two years we gave up. We were serving too
few meals and lost a lot of money because we couldn’t
meet the overhead. Now, we close from May to August to
replenish our energies, conduct needed maintenance, and
get ready for the busy summer seasons.
NEJE: Did you also put together a business plan like
Brian and Michael did?
Dudley-Anne: Yes, we did; but it was more to please our
financial backer than to guide our everyday activities.
Recently, though, we put together a new business plan
because it was required by the government as part of our
application to win one of the national “Tourism Awards”
given out by the New Zealand Tourism Commission.
Mark thought the effort wasn’t worth it; but I was more
sensitive to the marketing value of the award, and so I
decided to go after it. We hired a consultant from
Christchurch, and he guided us through the planning
process.
To our great surprise, considering the commission representatives came to see the café during the winter
months when we weren’t serving meals, we won “Best
Café” for our size for the west coast of the South Island
out of 32 entrants. This award, and the other tourism
awards we’ve won since, has given us much greater visibility than we ever had before. We are now attracting an
international clientele.
NEJE: That must have convinced Mark you were right to
invest the time and money to apply for the awards.
Dudley-Anne: No, Mark and I ended our personal relationship 18 months ago because we just didn’t share the
same vision for the café and for our personal lives. We
continued to run the business for the next year together,
but it became really hard. Mark didn’t like sharing the
kitchen operation with anyone else; but as we got busier
and busier, he couldn’t manage it all. We needed other
chefs in the kitchen to handle the volume, but he kept
worrying about spending more money on additional
staff.

Mark saw his job as a “9-to-5” operation, and you
can’t do that when running a restaurant. It’s flat-out
7 days a week, an 18-hours-a-day job. You can’t
avoid it if you want to be successful. He only wanted to cook at certain times of the day, and that really limited our menu.
Mark left the business for good about four months ago,
and I must say, I couldn’t have been more relieved. I am
happier now than I’ve ever been; the business is completely mine to run, and I don’t have to check in with him
any more. No more hassles and fights about how the
restaurant should operate. I love it!
The café now has more of a “lady’s touch” to it and the
restaurant is much more tidy and attractive than it used to
be. I really look after the “front of the house,” so to speak,
and rearrange the lounge every other week to keep things
looking new and different to our regular customers. They
seem to appreciate that.
I’ve also increased the number of meals we can serve
on any given night by making sure the tables turn at
least twice; there’s a 6 to 6:30 PM sitting and another one
at 8:30 PM. If guests continue to linger at their tables
past 8:30, we ask them to take their dessert and coffee
to the lounge. That way we keep things moving. We
just had the best Saturday night we’ve ever had this
past weekend. The velocity of our business has picked
up considerably.
NEJE: What market research have you conducted? Have
you advertised regularly?
Dudley-Anne: We did conduct a survey of local motels
about who their clientele was and we asked our diners
how they had heard about us. We thought we should
provide incentives to the moteliers to send their guests to
us, but after a bit, we realized that the motels in the area
were getting calls from customers who first made dinner
reservations with us, then called around for a place to
stay.
We did not advertise the first two years we were in
business; we were depending on word-of-mouth. Now
we advertise in local publications, and we’re part of the
“pure New Zealand” website. We also have our own
website (dine@bayhousecafe.co.nz).
NEJE: Do you have trouble keeping staff?
Dudley-Anne: Not at all. We’re all pretty close.
Communication is key, and I ask my staff on a regular
basis to “yarn it out”—to tell me what is bothering them,
what concerns they have, and what suggestions they have
to increase business. Listening is a skill that every small
business owner should have.
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NEJE: How long do you want to continue managing the
Bay House?
Dudley-Anne: I’ve built it up through a ton of hard work,
and now it’s my baby. It’s me. If I leave, what will happen
to the Bay House and to my customers? As we’ve gotten
more successful, I’ve left more and more of the day-to-day
operations in the hands of the staff. That gives me more
freedom to relax and not feel as much anxiety and tension
as I used to. I can travel a bit more during the summer
season and that’s nice, too.
NEJE: What keeps you fellows in the restaurant business
in Sydney?
Brian: Well, actually right now we’re taking a breather.
We’ve sold the “Chocolate Dog Cafe,” and we’re thinking
about what to do next. For me, though, being in my own
business means I don’t have a boss looking over me. I like
to take on the challenge of creating a new business from
scratch and seeing if I can make a lot of folks happy by
entertaining them and serving good food at the right
price.
Michael: For me, I like seeing customers enjoy what I’ve
been able to create. I love receiving compliments on what
we’ve designed either from an original concept or from
taking an existing business and moving it from “point A”
to “point B.” The fun is in the process. Once we achieve
our goals, I’m ready to move on. I look forward to the
next project and the next success. That’s what keeps me
motivated.
—L.W.
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Turning a Hobby into Millions
Philip King
Bookstore Entrepreneur

B

efore Philip King sold his five bookstores in Christchurch
roughly 10 years ago to Whitcoulls, a large Australianowned bookstore and office supplies operation, he hardly
fancied himself as an entrepreneur. Books were his passion: He
loved to read. However, his first job was selling barbeque charcoal to New Zealand’s South Island residents.

a risk at the time. In fact, the first time I approached the
local bank for $400 (New Zealand) for start-up money,
they turned me down because I hadn’t put anything in
writing. With some coaching, I learned how to put together a business plan; and it was then that the bank gave me
the money.

NEJE: Philip, it sounds a bit strange to be talking to such
a successful entrepreneur who got his start in selling barbeque charcoal.
Philip: I suppose it does, but it was my father’s business,
and it was a place for me to start after university. I grew
up in Christchurch and loved studying the liberal arts,
especially political science and English literature.
However, right after graduation, I got married and had to
start working for a living; it was easy enough just to go
into my family’s business.

NEJE: Apparently your bookstore did quite well.
Philip: My very first effort was a modest success, but I
realized I could never make much money in such a lightly populated area. I sold the bookstore; and we moved to
Auckland, North Island, the largest commercial city in the
country. I found the equivalent of 4,000 square feet of
commercial space, gutted the area, hired an architect, and
came up with a new look to selling books.
Borrowing from what I had learned by working at
Nabisco, I knew that the way I presented my books and
used every available meter of wall space would be paramount to my success. Movable flat tables were used to
highlight best-selling authors and to move bargain lots.
Signage, which was typically poor in many bookshops,
was another opportunity to do something different.
Fixtures were also critical. Everything was rethought,
from the floor to the ceiling. I wanted my store to be userfriendly, bright, and very welcoming.
The first year we generated $286,000 (New Zealand) in
sales. By the third year, we topped $1 million. My theories
about how books could be better merchandised paid off.
We were growing exponentially. That’s not to say everything in the store reflected just my concepts. I visited hundreds of bookstores throughout the world, and I always
looked to take back the best ideas I came across.

NEJE: What came next?
Philip: I started corporate life at the bottom, so to speak,
by working for Nabisco in its Sales and Merchandising
Department. I spent several years filling supermarket
shelves with product. It was humbling compared to what
my friends were doing with their university degrees!
However, this turned out later to be invaluable experience. I learned all about how to present product to its best
advantage on the shelf, what it took to improve market
share, and how to compete effectively against other manufacturers.
NEJE: Is that when you started your own bookstore?
Philip: No, not right away. I decided to leave corporate
life and become a teacher. I took a position in a small town
with just 20,000 residents. I was put in charge of 30
youngsters who were disciplinary problems; many of
them could not read or write at a functional level. It was
an enormous challenge.
Several years into it, I found that my hobby of collecting books was getting a bit out of hand since our home
could only hold so many. I decided to set up a bookshop
where I could share my passion for reading and collecting
books with others. I took a punt and borrowed all the
money I needed to get the store going. It seemed like quite

NEJE: Just out of curiosity, what do you consider to be
the best bookstores? Borders Books? Barnes & Noble?
Philip: No, it would be Waterstones in the United
Kingdom and Powell’s in the United States. I am especially impressed with the Powell’s website.
NEJE: When did you open the second store?
Philip: Not in Auckland. In fact, the family missed being
in Christchurch so much that I sold the Auckland store,
and we all moved back to my hometown in the South
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Island during 1985. I started my first store there under the
name of “Paper Plus.” It was part of a robust association
group of 80 independent booksellers with a strong combined buying power that one individual could never hope
to match.
NEJE: “Paper Plus?” What happened to the bookstore?
Philip: Oh, it was a bookstore, but you have to understand, in relatively low population density areas, you
need to sell stationery as well as books. It’s not like in the
United States.
NEJE: That’s when you opened a second store.
Philip: Yes, in 1987, but it was in Dunedin, several hundred kilometers to the south. Dunedin is a big university
town. I knew I couldn’t effectively manage both locations,
so I decided to hire someone whom I could trust and delegate much of the managerial functions. It was a great
decision all around. In our first year, we generated $2.3
million (New Zealand) in sales, and we never looked
back.
NEJE: You eventually opened a total of five different
bookstore locations.
Philip: Yes. In 1988, we opened a third “Paper Plus” in a
new Christchurch mall. We no longer needed bank loans;
our cash flow was so good we were able to fund our
expansions internally. By then I had learned how to read
a balance sheet with great care, and I always randomly
checked on vendor invoices to make sure we were being
treated fairly.
I wasn’t enthusiastic about the mall location. I only
considered it because one of my staff members was so
enthusiastic about the location. In fact, my feelings were
that bookstores should be freestanding buildings with as
much walk-by traffic as you can muster. At first, I rejected
the mall developer’s offer and walked away. Three hours
later, the developer called me back and put a much better
offer on the table.
By 1989, we had four stores operating in the
Christchurch area and the one in Dunedin. By growing to
this level, we finally had the merchandising and advertising synergy I had always wanted. Things really started to
click. I left the “Paper Plus” association umbrella and
renamed the stores “Philip King Booksellers.” It was
uncomfortable at first to see my name on the stores and in
our advertising. I am not by nature a person who is selfpromoting, but it seemed to be a good idea because it was
time to break away from the association. Putting my
name on the business gave us credibility both with our
suppliers and with the buying public.

By 1993, we had a staff of 100 employees, and we were
selling in the neighborhood of $10 million (New Zealand)
annually.
NEJE: With all this success, with the rapid growth and
company expansion, you could have sat back and just
watched the dollars roll in. But you decided to cash it all
in. How come?
Philip: Sometimes there are business offers you simply
cannot say “no” to. But let me provide the context for my
decision to sell.
Christchurch may be the renowned jumping-off point
for ships and planes to explore Antarctica, but the city
actually has a temperate climate because it lies between
the Southern Alps to the west of the city and the Pacific
Ocean to the east. Snow, while not rare, is usually light
and melts the next day.
In 1993, I was leaving on a business trip; but everything
closed down, including the airport, for two days because
we had the equivalent of a four-inch snowfall. Four inches! That’s nothing to many Americans, but to folks in
Christchurch it was practically a blizzard.
The newspapers made a big deal of this two-day citywide shutdown, and I was intrigued with the idea that
somehow there was a book in all this. Imagine the number of people who took photographs those two days and
the memories everyone had! So I called up the local newspaper publisher and suggested that he should take all of
his staff’s photos and make it into a book.
He turned me down. He said he was in the newspaper
business, not the book business. So I called the business
page editor and got the same results. No way.
I wouldn’t let go of the idea. I put an advertisement in
the newspaper for local folks to send in their photos,
promising to publish the best 100 or so of those submitted. We received thousands of photos in response to that
one display ad. We were so overwhelmed with them all
that I had to set up an editorial team with the directive to
pick enough snapshots to fill up a 60-page book. Each person who sent in a photo we published received $100 (New
Zealand) and two free copies of the book. The rest of the
photos were returned.
We called the book The Big Snow, and the editorial team
turned the project around in five weeks. We saved a lot of
time by having the books printed locally even though it
was more expensive. Timing was critical. I went way out
on a limb and authorized a run of 7,500 copies.
NEJE: The book must have been very popular.
Philip: Sure was. Word spread like wildfire. We sold out
all of our copies in one week. Eventually, sales totaled
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28,500 copies. That’s huge for Christchurch; our total population is only 200,000. Everyone who sent in a photo that
was included in the book must have purchased at least 10
books each to send to family and friends. It was the talk
of the town.
It was only natural that some of the book’s customers
would attempt to buy the book at Whitcoulls, our biggest
competitor. An N.Z. entrepreneur owns them and they
are much, much larger in New Zealand than we ever
were. When one of their staff called over to us to order
books, I refused to sell them The Big Snow. We considered
it an exclusive since we had published the book on our
own and I had sole selling rights.
Word got back to Whitcoulls management, and they
were furious. They threatened to sue.
NEJE: Wasn’t that intimidating?
Philip: Absolutely not. In fact, I ended up begging the
owner to sue us. Can you imagine the newspaper headlines?
“BIG NEW ZEALAND BOOKSELLER SUES PHILIP KING
STORES OVER RIGHTS TO SELL KING’S BOOK.”
The publicity would have been priceless, and I doubt they
had a legal right to force us to sell them the book anyway.
The fellow hung up on me; he was angry at my hurting
the credibility of his bookstores. Can you imagine what
happened in all the Whitcoulls around Christchurch?
Every time folks came in to buy The Big Snow, the staff
had to admit they didn’t have the book; and they either
sent them to us or made believe they didn’t know where
the book was being sold!
Let me tell you, it was one beautiful feeling. We went
on to publish other books about the Canterbury region,
Auckland, Wellington, and the Otago Peninsula.
Not long afterward, the Whitcoulls owner called and
said he wanted to meet with me. I had no idea what he
wanted. We met in Auckland and that’s when he offered
to buy me out.

el for pleasure and not just for business. I bought a 2,200acre farm with some of the money, and I’ve enjoyed the
good life.
NEJE: What happened to the bookstores?
Philip: They changed the name to “Books & More.” The
stores seem to be doing just fine.
NEJE: And you?
Philip: I’m having fun “working” 10 months a year as the
University of Canterbury’s bookstore manager. I don’t
need the money. But they called me last year and said
they were desperate to improve the store’s operation. I
came by, and I was aghast at how poorly everything was
being merchandised and presented. So I took this job on
as a hobby. We changed the bookstore around completely,
and now sales revenue has shot up.
NEJE: How long will you stay here at the university
bookstore?
Philip: It’s hard to say. I’m thinking of subdividing the
farm and possibly developing parts of it for upmarket
housing. Who knows? I’ll find something to keep me
busy.
—L.W.

NEJE: You didn’t have to sell.
Philip: They made me a generous offer.
NEJE: Yet weren’t the bookstores all about following
your passion and enjoying going to work every day?
Philip: After nearly eight years working what seemed
‘round the clock, I was tired. I needed a sabbatical. I
enjoyed mentoring my staff and watching employees
grow into their positions and gradually take over more
and more responsibility, but I also felt it was time to trav-
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Jade Software: Getting Ready to Tackle America
Sir Gilbert Simpson
Founder and CEO

S

ir Gil Simpson is one of New Zealand’s pioneers in software development, having started in the field in 1967. He
holds steadfast to his dream that one day his approach to
software programming will take hold around the world. Simpson
has just opened up the company’s first office in the United
States; he expects his first significant foray into this country will
be a successful one.

entire staff is made up of program engineers. The rest are
in new product development, marketing, sales, production, and finance. With just 370 on our payroll, we don’t
compete at the same level; but we have a lot of extraordinarily bright folks who are well trained as engineers and
can perform competitively against anyone else in terms of
product performance.

NEJE: It must be daunting to be in the same competitive
arena with companies like Microsoft, Linux, Oracle, and
Sun Microsystems.
Sir Gil: It certainly is and, I must say, a bit frustrating
because very little progress has been made within the software industry in the past 30 years.

NEJE: What makes Jade Software so much better?
Sir Gil: Our software gives the user the ability to adapt it
to his or her own business needs. In a way, we are genetically related to Excel. Excel is a financial spreadsheet package that you program to sort, calculate, and present data
for your specific needs. It’s a transitional system.
Operators first learn how to relate it to their business, then
they program our platform accordingly. Once this is
accomplished they have pretty much customized the software to do whatever the requirements dictate.
For instance, Peoplesoft is a popular student enrollment
program used by many colleges and universities.
However, it is someone else’s idea of how you should run
your business. There’s little to no flexibility built into the
program language. In contrast, Jade Software provides
users with enormous flexibility and opportunities to customize our programs to their specific needs. All operators
have to do is provide a few simple statements in answer to
the program’s queries, and they are ready to go.

NEJE: That sounds a bit like hyperbole. Computers seem
to be able to do more and more with far smaller hardware
components and at ever increasing speeds.
Sir Gil: Yes, your perceptions are accurate, but it is in the
hardware end of the business where the gains have been
made, not the language that computers use to “speak” to
one another. The pace of computer language development
has languished compared to the breakthroughs in hardware. Not much new has been developed and made available since around 1965.
NEJE: Why is that?
Sir Gil: I don’t want to lay this all at Microsoft’s door; but
suffice it to say, a distinct lack of competition in many
areas of software development explains most of the situation. Once commercial and individual users get used to an
operating system, they tend to stay with it even if the system itself is inefficient or has serious limitations.
I’ve been aware of this situation since 1973 when software packages were just being developed in large volume
as commercial use of computers started to soar. I believed
then, as I do now, that programming languages were fundamentally flawed and much too difficult for the average
person to understand or to use comfortably. It seemed
there had to be a better approach, and that’s why I started
my own software company.
Our competitors are entrenched, but I think we can best
them. I would estimate that only 2 percent of Microsoft’s

NEJE: Well, if your software is good, how come . . . ?
Sir Gil: . . . we haven’t knocked the socks off everyone?
NEJE: Yes, exactly.
Sir Gil: Changing an industry that is so resistant to new
ideas is an awfully big challenge. We have taken on that
challenge; and, hopefully, we will succeed. We’ve just
entered the U.S. market by opening up our first marketing
and sales office in Atlanta in May 2002. I think that once
customers see how competitive our products are to Linux,
Unix, and Macintosh that we will do very, very well.
NEJE: Why did you wait so long?
Sir Gil: We’ve worked closely with several U.S. companies
for some time now, but we needed to build enough
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momentum behind our products to rationalize having a
physical presence in America. We now have that presence,
and things should really start moving ahead rapidly for
Jade. Don’t forget, compared to Microsoft and Oracle, we
are small potatoes. Opening up a branch office in Atlanta
is a big step for us.

it can build up a lot of forward momentum. The U.S. software market is just like that elephant; only many times
larger in terms of the energy required to get it to start moving in our direction. We’re ready now to put the energy
and money necessary to do what we need to in order to be
successful.

NEJE: Are your sales mostly in New Zealand?
Sir Gil: No, for the year just completed in 2002, our overseas revenue was greater than domestic revenue. We are
making great strides in the United Kingdom where we
have had enormous success recently with the country’s
railroad system. I don’t know if you’ve been following
transportation news in England, but part of its commercial
rail system was a shambles. On-time performance had
slipped precipitously, particularly in the electrical generating industry that depends so much on fossil fuel plants
that burn coal. Power outages were becoming a real threat,
and the electric utility owners were desperately trying to
find a way to get coal in the right amounts to the right
plants at the right time. It was a logistical nightmare for
them.
After considerable efforts using other systems, the electrical utility managers came to us and challenged Jade to
provide solutions to their myriad problems. We came in,
beat the time they gave us to get on top of the learning
curve, and within the first full operating month using our
software, the utility companies’ management saw a 40 percent increase in operating efficiencies. Why? Because each
fossil fuel plant manager could decide for himself or herself how much coal was needed, when it was needed, then
order the coal from the mine provider, authorize the rail
shipments, and finally track these shipments from the time
they left the mine to the time they reached the electrical
generating facility. Our software provided total information at all times with complete transparency.
We have had other successes in fields as diverse as
healthcare management, container terminal operations,
payroll management, and student enrollment management. We’re confident we can duplicate those positive
developments in many other arenas.

NEJE: It sounds risky.
Sir Gil: It absolutely is. I’m personally putting a lot on the
line financially, but it’s been my life-long dream to change
the industry. I can’t do that from New Zealand. I have to
do it in the United States.
NEJE: Are you planning to do this alone?
Sir Gil: It probably is unrealistic; we’ll need to find a U.S.
partner. If we can find the right fit with an American company, we can put our plan into motion.
—L.W.
Addendum
The writer attempted to communicate numerous times
with Sir Simpson after the interview was completed, but
no response has been forthcoming. According to a local
Christchurch newspaper, The Press, the company has been
hit hard by the recent downdraft in Information
Technology spending. About 25 percent of the worldwide
workforce of 373 lost their positions with the company in
August 2003. Further, several Jade corporate properties
around Christchurch have been put up for sale to help
raise between $10 to $25 million N.Z. (roughly $6 to $15
million U.S.) in order to maintain a positive cash flow for
the company. Further investment from current shareholders is also being sought.

NEJE: Are companies that sell Linux, Unix, and other software programs aware of you? Or will Jade Software be a
big surprise?
Sir Gil: No, we won’t be able to use surprise as a tactical
tool. We’ve had a history of coming up against Linux and
Unix users for some 20 years and having to prove, time
and time again, why our system is better. It’s like getting
an elephant to move. It takes a lot of hard work and energy at the beginning; but once you get the elephant moving,
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The Region and the Smaller Enterprise:
A Discussion of Appropriate Investigative Methodologies
Ian Pownall

R

egional policy instruments are typically driven by economic rationales, from either a firm or industrial perspective. Yet too often, these rationales are taken as ex
ante to the contexts within which firms and industries compete.
Recent regional development research has urged a better link be
developed between the individual, the firm, and their context, so
as to understand the role of regions in supporting effective competitiveness of organizations. In this article, recent research
themes are explored that may shed light on the nature of this
relationship and that can be developed into an investigative
methodology that could aid policy practitioners in generating
policy instruments that reflect differing societal constructions of
SME reality.
This article reviews the nature of the relationship between
a region and a small enterprise. In particular, it examines
recent approaches to regional development theory that
address this relationship that have as their common focus
an interest in the shape of knowledge used competitively
by smaller organizations. Despite the desirability of
regional economic development to governments, there is
no simple linear relationship between support for small
enterprises (in whatever resource form) and the outcome
of development for the region itself. Instead the relationship is one of a complex interplay between technology,
economy, society, and polity (Skolnikoff 1993). To better
understand this relationship, the article takes as its starting point, the argument outlined by Anderson (2000), that
knowledge in a region maintained and used by individuals and small enterprises (as collections of individuals) is
not an object–subject relationship, but a subject–subject
one defined in practice. It is similarly reflected in current
debates within geography, where discussion on the nature
of competitive knowledge focuses on the interplay
between culture and economy (Simonsen 2000). In this latter case, it is a clash between determining the dominance
of a regional culture or the regional economy that also
drives this article to use Simonsen’s (2000) theme of connecting the two concerns through a social ontology. Hence,
this article posits that regional knowledge used by small
organizations is viewed as socially constructed and highly
localized. A key focus for this research is, therefore,
reviewing current methodologies that seek to develop this

subject–subject relationship and the ways they may aid the
development of policy instruments.
The article has four major sections. In the first section,
the nature of knowledge and regional development is discussed, with a focus on changing research interests and
methods. The second part narrows the focus to consider
the nature of the relationship between organizations and
their context from a social interaction and cohesion basis.
From this discussion emerges the concept of a cultural
province to describe a coherent agreement and collection
of small business practices and values. The third section
seeks to bring these arguments together under the banner
of a modified participant research methodology and
derive a series of potential research questions and themes
to explore the location of cultural provinces and differences in the perceptions of small business managers and
their staff to their environments. The final section presents
the conclusions derived from the research.

Knowledge and Regional Development

Following Skolnikoff (1993), the relationship between
technology and knowledge is often confused, but technology in its broadest sense can be defined as the development and application of improved technical knowledge
and procedures (Holmén and Jacobsson 1998). The effective use of knowledge, codified, tacit, and applied in this
sense, by individuals and small enterprises is partly a
function of the extent to which they locate, identify with,
and can use such knowledge forms from their environment. In this sense the development of the economy and
the context of that economy as often viewed by policymakers cannot be effectively separated and developed
into specific policy arenas (Simonsen 2000).
Recognition of the importance of understanding the
relationship between knowledge development and use in
both national and regional development policies has
become a focus in both policy and academic circles. Yet the
causality between the two activities remains poorly understood. There are certain interests that have been more
developed in policy circles, such as high technology
investment, training and provision, which have attracted
the lion’s share of research and funding interest (Oakey
1995; Scott and Storper 1986). They do so precisely because
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of perceived externality benefits to the environment and
supply chain that such investments bring (Fontes and
Coombs 1997). They are also those that Lash and Urry
(1994) cited by Simonsen (2000) claim would be the activities most likely to see blurred boundaries between a
regional economy and its culture by virtue of the increased
level of communication and transmission of information,
knowledge, and associated meanings as business practices
in these knowledge-rich policy instruments. Yet it can be
equally argued these investments tend to be in specific
narrow technological arenas that only have limited relevance to a large number of regions with less specific technological and knowledge-intensive endowments.
On the other hand, there is evidence that suggests that
rural firms exhibit higher employment growth levels than
their urban counterparts in the UK (Smallbone and North
1994). They also tend to maintain higher levels of innovative activity (Keeble 1997). Technological and knowledge
intensity in a region does not, therefore, seemingly preclude
successful regional development opportunities, although
we should be wary of reading too much into these observations. For example, measures of employment growth could
simply refer to the labor intensity of the good/service being
manufactured/delivered in a region, while innovative
activity can arguably also be spurred by the lack of a supportive environment, necessitating greater reliance on internal firm resources and local environmental factors.
However, there does seem to be evidence for both
regional development driven in what are both normally
termed as classically advantaged and disadvantaged environments. Perhaps this should not be a surprise given
Cox’s (1989) observation on the nature of the production
system and power within it as being fundamentally based
on the social relations constructing that system.
Advantaged and disadvantaged environments can then be
viewed in terms of social relations and power structures in
those regions. As a result, research methodologies that
consider the relationship between the small firm and their
environment have embraced this social relations argument, viewing small firm development as both an instituted and socially embedded activity. Methodologies of
investigation have become quite eclectic and shaken off
the shackles of the limited dialogue of nature vs. nurture
or push vs. pull arguments (see Stokes 1995 for a summary of those arguments). Grégoire, Dery, and Bechard
(2001), in their review of trends in entrepreneurship
research from 1981 through 1999, identified five themes
that have underpinned research into small firms:
1. Personal characteristics of the entrepreneur
2. Factors affecting new venture performance

3. Venture capitalists’ practices and their impact on
entrepreneurship
4. Influence of social networks
5. Resource base of the enterprise
Tilley and Tonge (2003), however, criticize such approaches, as they seek to either itemize important factors or focus
on one aspect of small firm development. They do not
therefore, offer a broad enough canvas to consider the heterogeneity of small enterprises and their activities such as
including the two polarized examples of small firm success in advantaged and disadvantaged areas, described
earlier. The development of an appropriate integrative
model that can pull together the strands listed above is a
goal (Tilley and Tonge 2003), but it is apparent that a more
effective understanding of the relationship between
regions and small firms will aid understanding of causality in regional development policies, by helping to provide
linkages between some of the disparate five themes listed.
For example, some of the more relevant “new regionalist”
research methods derived from a social networks and
resource-based perspective have included:
• semiotic (Hill 2002 citing Feldman1995), metaphorical (Koirenan 1995; Nonaka 1996 cited by Hill,
2002), and pragmatics analysis (Thomas 1995)
derived from a focus on language, dialects, and
social construction in different environments;
• focus on the “cogito” fit of employees or their
mutual identification with their varied environmental context (Garrick and Rhodes 2002);
• addressing the impact of particular critical events
in the lives of individual’s that reshape their interpretation of the environment (Chetty 1997, Chell
1998, Anderson 2000);
• consideration of the role and function of social and
egocentric networks for the continuing performance of established high-technology ventures
(Bakstran and Cross 2001);
• examining the historical trends behind knowledge
development in a localized region, as important
factors shaping the perception and openness of
entrepreneurs of their environment (Jørgensen
1999);
• reviewing the entrepreneurs’ personal histories
and their identification with varying regional narratives (Beattie 1999); and
• examining the psychophysiological responses of
entrepreneurs to business opportunities (Craig and
Lindsay 2001).
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One particularly strong driving impetus for developing
integrative approaches between the range of investigative
methodologies was made in 1988 and has continued to
remain a key focus for analytical methods. This was the
statement that what is important is “what the
individual/organization does” rather than what it is
(Gartner 1988). Gartner’s call was instrumental in altering
the focus of the debate to behavior of entrepreneurs and
small organizations and their social context. However, while
authors such as Wickham (1998) have stressed the process
dimension as an integrative bridge between the classical and
more “new regionalist” methodologies, contextual factors
have been somewhat neglected in this capacity (Cooney et
al. 2001). It is, therefore, somewhat paradoxical that these are
also the factors that have been argued to be most important
in shaping the long-term competitiveness and longevity of
small organizations (Nooteboom 1999; Bierly III, Daly, and
Wigginton 2001). Phrasing this more succinctly: “… research
is done with people not on them” (Rigg, Trehan, and Ram
2002, p.363; italics in original).
In essence, such research methods embrace the importance of knowing from experience, rather than knowing
without reference to experience. These methods reject the
classical Cartesian view of the subject as a unitary being
comprised of disparate and separable parts. Along with
other methods of social inquiry, therefore, the subject is
derived in practice (Simonsen 2000). Business is conducted by individuals and firms without recourse to a text of
how to conduct business, it is their activities that constitute the practice of business. Simonsen (2000) described
this viewpoint by using Bourdieu’s phrase of firms “having a sense of the game.” We could also borrow Benzon’s
(1996) terms and suggest that the “schemas” of business
activity vary because of their societal construction. He further suggests that schemas compete with one another
according to their capacity to satisfy intrinsic individual
needs—in this case effective small business operations in a
given market arena that may reflect different individual
goals.
Competitive knowledge is then more likely to be
sourced from the spatial context and proximity rather
than from codified sources such as journals or trade literature. Central to this discussion is the belief that only by
addressing the knowledge of how and why small firms
operate in their contextual and social resources environment will an understanding emerge about how to construct more appropriate policy instruments that actively
consider this broad resource base of the smaller enterprise. In doing so, the environment would not be treated
as a passive resource but one that can actively support a
firm’s competitive positioning.

Enterprise and Context

In an attempt to develop a broader investigative model for
inquiry, a more primary perspective is required. Simonsen
(2000) reaches a similar conclusion in his paper, that by
simply “adding” culture as another variable into a classical analysis does not encompass the ontological nature of
an individual’s and firm’s environment, that transcends
the distinction between subject and object. The “new
regionalist” methodologies discussed above move the
debate forward toward a more encompassing analytical
position but in of themselves pursue distinctive concerns.
How, for example, would understanding of an entrepreneur’s personal history aid the policy-maker in framing
more appropriate policy instruments for other entrepreneurs in a given region?
One place to start to consider this question is with Tilley
and Tonge (2003) who, for example, in their broad introductory review of competitive advantage in SMEs, comment that because of the heterogeneity of the SME sector
the first step in developing a more universal understanding of how SMEs compete is to examine what sustains the
competitive advantage of smaller businesses in a more
individualistic manner described in both classical and
“new-regionalist” based research. Banks, Elliot, and Owen
(2003) argue that creativity in smaller organizations exists
as an array of contextual and unique company resources
and relationships. In their view, creativity can have both
behavioral and social and communication aspects. A fruitful place to start to answer the question we have set ourselves is to adopt Jørgensen’s (1999) and Simonsen’s (2000)
methodological position. Jørgensen, from a largely economic perspective, and Simonsen, from a geographic perspective, both suggest an appropriate starting point for an
answer is through a consideration of the recognized meanings and practices in a given region.
Jørgensen suggests a geneological approach that does
not attempt to develop metanarratives of knowledge
development and propagation but is instead focused on
the issues, practices, and knowledge that are taken for
granted in a region. It is a surface focused approach to
understanding the environment, cogniscent that the outcome of such a research approach is dependent on the historical investigative depth pursued. For Simonsen, the
firm is a set of overlapping practices, where a joint understanding and a shared body of knowledge are the both the
prerequisite and precursor for firm activity. For smaller
firms with fewer individuals, it can be argued that a smaller set of known and agreed practices will be maintained
through the activities of the firm. Recalling our earlier
question then, by knowing for example about an entrepreneur’s personal history, a researcher will have an insight
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into the likely dominant form of accepted routines
employed by the smaller firm. These views are, therefore,
in keeping with the observations of Banks, et al. (2003),
who from a resource-based perspective, argues that creativity and competitive advantage are routines of activity
that are emergent, involve many other actors, and reflect
tacit knowledge.
For a policy-maker though, constraints of action need to
be recognized. Policy instruments span information to regulatory activities, dependent on the objectives and ideologies of the policy-makers. Typically there may also be a
spatial or sectoral constraint to consider. What can be said
of how a region is understood for policy terms, if we adopt
Jørgensen’s (1999) position? With a surface approach
examining mutually acceptable business practices as the
focus, this could give rise to particular regions, the interest
of which lies on the mechanisms of cohesion among individuals in a given environment, which then define the
region. It can be expected that there may also be mereological contributing factors that shape both the spatial and
societal boundaries of regions (Smith and Mark 1998). As
an example, Popper and Popper (1999) in their research on
the economic development of the Great Plains of North
America identified the utility of matching policy support
initiatives to a common regional destiny through the use
of unifying narratives. In this case they used the banner of
“Buffalo Commons” to both identify and bind disparate
subcultural contexts and peoples within one large regional context.
This focus on cohesion and performance of activities is
a common thread in research that addresses regionality
and actor identification through a view of social ontology.
Mackinnon and Phelps (2001), for example, stress the
importance of “geographic closeness” of actors in a region,
while Jones (2002) cites the importance of individuals considering themselves as “belonging” to a particular lifestyle
or even that regions can promote themselves with one
voice by offering the “authentic” to consumers in search of
an identity they can recognize. More evidence comes from
Dyer (1997), who emphasized the importance of a shared
institutional participation in regional development by
individuals that also reinforces a regional consciousness.
Jenkins (2000), citing Smith (1990), similarly also refers to
the role of developing a common destiny to increase collective energies involved in economic development, while
MacLeod (1998), citing Paasi (1997), refers to the role of
regional “naming” as important in shaping the intensity of
interaction and the learning acquired by those actors (as
learning by localizing). Finally, from a firm competitiveness perspective, Maskell (2001) and Desrochers (2001)
focus on the agglomeration economies derived from geo-

graphical proximity as a competitive benefit for transmitting certain kinds of knowledge between organizations.
Overall, therefore, investigative techniques have
approached the relationship between regions and small
firms through a focus on constructed knowledge based on
variations of the “talk of the individuals in small business”
(Cohen and Musson 2000; Koirenan 1995), oral histories of
regional pioneers (Neth 2001), the impact of particular critical events in the lives of individuals that reshape their
interpretation of the environment (Chell 1998), or the
entrepreneurs’ personal histories and their identification
with environmental narratives (Beattie 1999). There is a
complex creation of norms, values, and schemas that are
both dynamic and processual.
Given this constantly emergent knowledge focus, it is
not a surprise that a regional binding theme has appeared
in several regional development methodologies. Nielsen
(2002) and MacLeod and Goodwin (1999), for example,
cite different approaches to understanding contemporary
local development, which have as their focus social interaction that creates emotional and identity attachments
between individuals and organizations.
Talalay, Tooze, and Farrands (1997) have also focused
on a similar argument by examining the role and function
of technology in society. They suggest that it is technological factors that bind communities and regions together
where technological change and progress reflect the ideas,
values, and language of a given society. Where a uniformity in regional value and ideas is apparent, a particular
aspect of technological change will be reflected and
embraced by that society. Social constructionists would
point to the development of a regional “narrative” (Burr
1998). This narrative helps maintain and propagate the
dominant social ties, language, and awareness that will
structure the actors’ capacities in that region to engage in
public debates and developmental activities.
In support of the value of such regional narratives,
Popper and Popper (1999) suggest that narratives and
regional metaphors are primary tools for understanding
and creating alternative futures for regions. The identification of such a set of practices and meanings can engage
regional people who share those identities in developmental tasks that then influence policy making. Such narratives are open-ended, multifaceted, and ambiguous. Thus
subregional units develop and fix onto different locally
defined interpretations of the narrative. In entrepreneurship studies for example by Koirenan (1995), there is a similar focus on shifts in the use of metaphors to account for
different interpretations of entrepreneurship in Northern
Europe establishing an agreed narrative for enterprise discourse in those subregions. In periods of change and
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uncertainty, typical of entrepreneurial and innovative
activities, the use of a narrative through the development
of several metaphors can arguably create a focus and
explain meaning behind transformations occurring in
regions.
Holmén and Jacobsson (1998) and Maskell (2001) also
offer evidence of the benefits of a focus on regional narratives and potential subregional units. They suggest that
regionally focused SME clusters comprised of regional
firms with neo-market ties will disproportionately benefit
from spillovers due to the tacit nature of knowledge, the
local nature of labor markets, and the local evolution of
specific institutions. In other words, a shared regional narrative supports trust and an exchange of resources by
virtue of recognized meanings and identities. Policy
attempts to improve the economic conditions of a region,
should not, therefore, be solely focused on economic policy instruments but must implicitly address the issue of the
space to which they are aimed. They are part of a larger
context that needs explicit and, at the same time, ambiguous recognition.
As noted by Popper and Popper (1999, p.5), ambiguity
“… draws attention to the characteristics of a region, yet
allows a wide range of responses….”

Narrowing the Definition of a Region:
A Cultural Province
With this interpretation of a region based around a coherent and mutually identified collection of groups and individuals, similarities with the concept of a cultural province
can be made. This can replace the cumbersome phrase of
“subregional units” mentioned above. It is one approach
to quantifying the gestaltic bindings of a local context
within a greater spatial form (Steve 1996). For example, in
a discussion about the identity of the County of Yorkshire
and its Ridings, Neave (1998) suggests that broad stroke
use of the term region remains both inappropriate and
unhelpful in identifying coherent parts of that environment, which have common practices and shared constructed knowledge. In her case, concern was raised
between the different territories covered by county administration on the one hand and differing political and economic activities on the other. Instead of using a holistic
and encompassing term like region, an outlined alternative
was to develop a “cultural provinces” perspective, where
each province has a “… set of distinguishing cultural
traits, not the least of which will be a shared susceptibility
to the same outside influences….” (Neave quoting
Phythian-Adams 1998, p.184).
The interpretation of a region now, as perhaps a combi-

nation of cultural provinces, is focused on a cohesive and
shared identity with ideally, self-defined, and mutually
supportive social and institutional agencies that maintain
both a high level of embedded and external social relations.
Cultural provinces can be expected to have narrative
communities. By definition such communities are individuals or groups that self-consciously regard themselves as
members of a single community defined by believing a
particular story or interpretation of society (Shalizi 2000).
We could also look for schemas or routines, which impose
a form on perceptions, grammar, language, and individual
interpretation (Benzon 1996). This would aid the structuring of both the global and the local in context.
For Popper and Popper’s (1999) work, their story
focused on how different groups identified with the
Buffalo, via conservation, spiritual terms, or via economical necessity. This approach negates the singular and internally integrated concerns geographers such as Simonsen
(2000) may have with an explicit connection between
space and the idea of a culturally distinctive unit. It does
so because there is also a focus on what binds such
provinces across broader degrees of space. There is a
recognition on the one hand, of the artificiality of such
boundaries (although mereological boundaries may
rationalize this), yet also a pragmatic realization that policy instruments themselves are bounded (as noted earlier).
However, this province approach seeks to associate the
boundaries of policy instruments to the dominant collections of practice that can be identified within a space of
operation and is, therefore, not a metalevel approach to
this understanding. For the case of small firm policy support, for example, the stories of individuals who span various provinces and propagate modified or unmodified
values and preferred practices about the appropriate form
of social relations to adopt within the provinces they serve
could also be a policy focus. Civil servants, journalists,
university lecturers, business support staff, small business
bank advisers, accountants, and so forth would be such
important individuals within cultural provinces.
Neave (1998) also suggests that the location of important institutions in a province helps identify with the
development of a regional consciousness. Such institutions would include administrative operations, jails and
courts of justice, newspapers, workers associations, rotarian and horticultural societies, ecclesiatical boundaries,
and police forces. An examination of the location of such
institutions would also help indicate the diversity of cultural provinces in regions. The outcome would be a virtuous circle for the development of a cultural province, with
regional consciousness developing and being supported
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by narrative communities that themselves are further
embedded by locating administrative offices and authority within that province.
It has already been argued that positioning this article
within a social methodological line of inquiry necessarily
requires some historical review and context although, as
Jørgensen (1999) suggests, this should be limited and stated at the outset of the investigation. This is especially
important, given the youth of the small business support
service in the UK in general (from a standing 1978 start).
Small businesses, despite their economic significance,
have been politically difficult to capitalize on and hence
have been neglected both as economic and political actors
(Tilley and Tonge 2003).
From a surface level interest, it can be noted that an
“enterprise culture” was the label given to the particular
articulation of a diverse group of politicians toward the
value and status of self-employment during the 1980s in
the UK. The associated activities used to establish this collection of interests identified the preferred practice of policy-makers and hence a means of shaping the environment
in which individuals sought employment.
The implementation of these preferred economic activities relied on the creation of specific concepts and terms.
The use of the terms “small and medium-sized enterprise”
(SME) and “clusters,” for example, surround and stratified
these policy preferences creating knowledge applied to
cultural provinces and regions. This stratification is continually reflected and reconstructed in academic papers
and theories and governmental initiatives (Cohen and
Musson 2000). No particular thought, however, was
attached to the contextuality of the SME. Such applied
knowledge constrains some policy actors who are not recognized as being associated with such socioeconomic
labels and actions, yet who may be intrinsic to the development and growth of SMEs in a region or cultural
province. Such broad labels may also allow other dominant actors to tell the “story” of the policy problem and
just how to view the SME, their needs, and performance
requirements (Howlett and Ramesh 1995). The creation of
such an enterprise culture, is not just a political activity but
one that extends beyond this sphere, to the “… wider
world outside, where its meanings further multiply in
number, and fragment in effect….” Cohen and Musson
2000, p.32, citing Ritchie 1991).
The enterprise culture is a discourse, portraying one
understanding of the ways of thinking and producing
meaning in a society (Lenk 1996 , p.108). In this case it has
been predominately state focused. When an individual’s
or firm’s activities are viewed as an outcome of social relations, it is relying on certain knowledge attributes (which

encompass beliefs, practices, ideologies, and perceptions;
from Jørgensen 1999). These are not permanently fixed but
subject to change. As an example, Anderson and Jack
(1999), through their studies of entrepreneurs in the
Highlands of Scotland, are keen to emphasize that one
function of social relations in such coherent environments
is to establish cultural province knowledge attributes.
They argued from this provincial focus that the dominant
practices were local prestige and influence, which were
more important motivating factors than profit.
It may not, of course, always be the case that small
organizations will be comprised of mutually supportive
individuals, and Nooteboom (1999) has developed the
term of “cognitive distance” to describe the variance
between the objectives of individuals in an organization.
In terms of how knowledge is being used competitively by
those individuals, the concept could be adapted to also
account for the varying extent to which members in a
small firm share similar values and meanings (and have
small cognitive distances) or have divergent values and
meanings (and have large cognitive distances). As suggested previously, it can be hypothesized that small firms
that exhibit small cognitive distances between the objectives of individuals in those organizations would come
from the same/similar cultural provinces. Such organizations would have significant knowledge redundancy,
through an overlap of complimentary capabilities that are
mutually understood by members of the small firm
(Nooteboom 1999). Policy instruments that seek to build
on cultural provinces shared business practices would be
concerned with firms that have small cognitive distances.
Overall, as Neth (2001) states, giving meaning to a
region is an act of translation between past and present.
This association between regions, knowledge, and individuals, is largely the reason why attempts to simply
transpose the success of metaphors such as “Silicon
Valley” or “Route 128” to other regions and nations have
failed. They lacked a focus on this province—knowledge
association did not recognize the importance of local market demand pull for such activities and most importantly
failed to identify meaning with the narratives underlying
the choice of policy activities.

Developing a Provincial Methodology

In this section, some practical observations are made
based on the conceptual arguments presented so far. In
particular, this discussion addresses the statement that a
focus on behaviors and social processes, rather than market share or organizational structure, can inform the practical identification of cultural provinces and cognitive distances in smaller organizations.
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May (2001) describes the complete participant approach
to research as one in which the researcher fully engages in
the activities of the individual or organization under
investigation. This is an action research agenda, in which
the researcher is working with research participants on
matters of genuine concern to them (Rigg et al. 2002). A
key problem with this intensive form of observation is the
time required for the researcher to become an accepted
part of the context within which observations take place
and hence ensure the collected data has validity. The
increased access to the rich social data though is viewed as
a worthwhile compromise and is often a balanced compromise in small firm research (Curran and Blackburn 2001).
Lesser levels of organizational immersion, such as
observer as participant and complete observer, are also
outlined by May (2001) as viable ethnographic approaches to collecting data, although their outcomes depend on
the depth to which the investigation proceeds and the
researchers’ goals with the investigation (following
Jørgensen 1999; Rigg et al. 2002). As was suggested previously, this depth of analysis requires a clear stated conceptual position, especially when our concern is with values and practices in a cultural province where the
researcher may not be able to directly identify or intuit the
value of a given observation for the competitiveness of
the smaller organization. An appropriate methodology,
therefore, is not pure action research driven (Rigg et al.
2002) but is concerned with adopting a participant
observer position. This seems a reasonable compromise to
extract meaningful and relevant contextual data within
the practical constraints of fieldwork in this sector of the
economy. Rigg, et al. (2002) further cite Lewin’s (1946)
original action research cycle and the Chicago School’s
view, to outline changes in the knowledge of a social system—as part of a cycle of action and reflection. However,
the surface focus of this methodology is only concerned,
therefore, with steps 1 through 3 of the 6 original research
action steps, which helps maintain an ambiguity in constraining the location and shape of the province :
1. Problem statement
2. Diagnosing the problem
3. Devising actions for the problem
4. Taking actions to resolve the problem
5. Evaluating the outcomes of the problem
6. Redefining the problem
If we recap on the discussion so far, the key reason discussed for the eclectic development of investigative
methodologies into small firm research is that they represent a highly heterogeneous collection of human activities,
either individually or in groups, where formalized proce-

dures and activities from the more familiar large enterprise have little immediate benefit to bring to our understanding. It is no surprise, therefore, for Hill (2002) to state
that there is no such thing as a “typical” small firm. The
phrase “business as usual,” which could be argued as the
driving focus behind small firm operations, both hides the
nature of contextual practices and explains them, which
are typically problem and survival oriented for the small
and micro business (Hill 2002; Pownall and Skinner 2003).
So while The Chicago School tradition of action research
suggests that social relations between individuals in
organizations and in the region may and do differ, they
also take forms that display similarities, which have been
argued here to form cultural provinces.
A second key reason for the development of a range of
investigative approaches to researching small firms not
discussed earlier lies with the level and degree of access
the researcher has to the individuals that constitute the
small firm. Hill (2002), citing Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and
Lowe (1993), acknowledges that often there is a compromise between maintaining academic rigor while facilitating access to rich data sourced from multitasking individuals in small firms. Rigg, et al. (2002), for example, offer
ample evidence of how they had to balance this compromise when working with second-generation Asian entrepreneurs who were keen to use the external “consultancy”
of the researchers, in preference to the academic “twaddle” of the proposed research. Both Rigg, et al. (2002) and
Hill (2002) state that flexibility in the chosen methodology
is a key requirement of a successful small firm research
strategy. This is an issue that May (2001) argues is also a
key strength of longitudinally based ethnographic data
collection, in which the length of time over which data is
collected, allows the research to be flexible in its approach
and context, especially when documentary evidence can
be very hard to locate and when the research questions
driving the analysis may themselves initially be vague or
unclear.
Research investigations that are short, repetitive, and
do not interfere with organizational direction and pace
provide a solid basis for collecting rich data and differentiating between similar and dissimilar practices in small
organizations that establish cognitive distances and the
location of a cultural province. An important analytical
point from May’s (2001) discussion that can be incorporated into this emergent methodology, is to focus the research
questions on the collections of social meanings. These collections of social meanings rest on observed practices and
meanings and their rules of propagation. The collections
of meanings approach considers observations that encompass the social relations and resource based perspectives
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discussed previously. As a methodology, we can use the
themes discussed in May’s (2001):
• Meanings focused—Identify cultural norms. What
are people’s definitions of the situation and variations in the scope of rules at work in the social context?
• Practice focused—What are the recurrent categories of talk and action that are apparently significant in the current context (but aware of the reflexivity of the researchers choices)? How, for example,
are differences dealt with inside the organization
(cognitive distance)?
• Episode focused—What are the collections of activity that are out of the ordinary and unexpected
events in the individual and organizational environment? This can include illness, marriage, business acquisitions, or significant changes in the environment for example.
• Encounter focused—These describe social patterns
and rules of behavior that emerge as individuals
work together, either formally or informally, to
achieve a mutually satisfactory goal.
In the earlier discussion, May’s (2001) themes would constitute the schemas of business practice within SME
provincial business operations. Within these four collections of social meanings evidence of cognitive distance
and cultural provinces can be identified. May also then
describes the different levels at which these collections of
meanings arise. It is a perspective that is very similar to
that of Johanisson and Dandridge’s (1995) dynamical systems approach but instead focuses at one level beneath the
interest of their model to consider the inputs into the individual, the organization, and an organization as a collection of individuals. Thus, the construction of tacit knowledge of an individual is the context within which meanings, practice, episode, and encounter focused observations are made. These four social meanings of a cultural
province reflect
• Roles—These are the labels used by people and
organizations to undertake their own activities and
describe those of others. They are a form of the
symbolic character of social capital.
• Relationships—Changes in the form of the interaction of people over time.
• Groups—Individuals who have mutually recognized themselves as a social entity with hierarchies, cliques, and mutually supportive mechanisms.

• Organizations—Are one step beyond groups and
reflect what was discussed as the provincial affiliation of individuals to a particular group set of values, practices, and norms that they then sustain
and practice. They constitute an important element
of the individual’s habitus.
• Settlements—Are typically groups and organizations that exist and operate within a defined geographic territory.
Some research questions that can then be derived from
these themes and be asked of small business managers
and their employees are shown in Table 1.
The list of themes and questions discussed above represent a first attempt to qualify the concepts (schemas, cognitive distance, routines, and cultural provinces) discussed
earlier in this article. It is, therefore, far from an exhaustive
list; and given the nature of the methodology, it can be
expected that additional questions would arise. Answers
to these questions, would allow the researcher to interrogate policy instruments and determine their cultural fitness, cognitive relevance, and distance and their appropriateness for the region and cultural province under analysis.

Conclusions

This article has explored the literature on the relationship
between the firm, the individual, and its contextual environment. It is a desirable goal especially for policy practitioners and the development of an integrative model of
small firm development but one that necessarily involves a
multiplicity of factors and interests; for example, where the
competitive interpretation of areas are termed advantaged
or disadvantaged is too broad to fully describe the potential for regional development. Indeed, it has been argued
that contextualized and localized knowledge, is an important source of competitive advantage for the smaller enterprise. Similarly, the argument in this article preferred to
adopt the concept of cultural provinces as a narrower and
more effective term to describe particularly cohesive areas,
which share business values, knowledge, and practices.
This was the key methodological argument of
Jørgensen’s (1999) discussion of avoiding meta-narratives
to account for different levels of practice in knowledge
development. Instead, only surface observations derived
from conceptual positions are viewed as acceptable to
understand knowledge development and propagation.
The conceptual position of this article has argued that surface observations are narrowly defined to cohesive areas—
cultural provinces—and these are the source of narrative
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Table 1
Research Questions Derived from Identified Themes
Theme

Participant–
Observer Goal

Research Questions Arising from Four Social Meanings Themes

Source, definition and
meaning of cultural
province and textual artifacts.

Meanings focused

A. How is the region defined by self-identified entrepreneurs? (RELATIONSHIP). Are these component(s) reflected in the targeted policy instruments ?
B. What is the role of towns and cities in these definitions by the self-identified entrepreneurs?
(SETTLEMENTS). Is there a symmetry with the location of the service provider? Is this identified with by the entrepreneurs?

Identification of regional
narratives in cultural
provinces.

Practice focused

C. What are the operative regional narratives articulated by identified and self-identified entrepreneurs and regional actors? How do these differ/reflect those constructing the targeted policy
instruments? (SETTLEMENTS and SOCIAL WORLDS)
D. What is the physical evidence supporting textual forms of regional knowledge? How are “stories” reported in local press? What is the relationship between different levels of
regional/provincial administration? (GROUPS and ORGANIZATIONS)
E. What are the apparent themes and their periodicity in the textual evidence (e.g., newspaper
stories, court reports, minutes of Parish Councils, and so forth)? What is the construction of
that information? To what extent do targeted policy instruments embrace those themes?

Construction of regional
narratives in cultural
provinces.

Meanings focused
Practice focused
Encounter focused
Episode focused

F. To what extent are self-identified entrepreneurs open to “new” knowledge flows? What is their
provincial status, access, and scope of personal contacts? What are their impressions of alternative routines and business practices? (RELATIONSHIPS and GROUPS)
G. What are the given rationales for involvement with other self-identified entrepreneurs/actors in
the region? What are the key motivators shaping the formation of business schemas?
(RELATIONSHIPS and GROUPS)
H. What is the level and scope of technology used by self-identified entrepreneurs? Is this use
contingent or externally sourced (outside any province)? (RELATIONSHIPS and GROUPS)
I. What are the processes employed to identify opportunities and what key (re)sources are utilized? To what extent is this OR process a cognitive/schema based activity? (RELATIONSHIPS and GROUPS)
J. What are the meanings given to self-identified significant events in the histories of the actors
concerned? Is this shared by other members of a small firm? (RELATIONSHIPS and
GROUPS)
K. What is the level of awareness of the self-identified entrepreneurs of the strategic impact of
their environment on their activities? (RELATIONSHIPS and GROUPS)
L. What is the evidence of a desire/need for the creation of supportive socioeconomic infrastructures both at the individual and institutional levels? (SETTLEMENTS and SOCIAL WORLDS)
M. Is there evidence of a balanced culture of self-belief and self-reliance for the self-identified
entrepreneurs? What are the boundary support points for this balance? (RELATIONSHIPS and
GROUPS)
N. How effective is the perceived imagery of the statistical/administrative region, as a supportive
context for technology-based entrepreneurs? (RELATIONSHIPS and GROUPS)
O. How are entrepreneurial failures handled in the environment? (RELATIONSHIPS and
GROUPS and SETTLEMENTS and SOCIAL WORLDS). What are the processes involved and
arising perceptions?
P. What is the level of vertical integration of business support activities in the region? To what
extent does this hierarchy dilute societal constructions for targeted regions/provinces?
(ORGANIZATIONS and SETTLEMENTS)
Q. What is the cognitive distance between policy determination, relevance, and promotion of
small firm policy instruments and the small firm/entrepreneur? (ORGANIZATIONS and SETTLEMENTS)
R. What is the perception of known policy instruments addressing the competitiveness of small
firms? (RELATIONSHIP)
S. What is the representativeness and openness of local governance to challenges from its community? (SETTLEMENTS and SOCIAL WORLD)

communities, which generate localized learning and sustainable and idiosyncratic competitive advantage for
smaller enterprises.

While it has been argued that narrative communities in
cultural provinces will generate and sustain a level of
mutual conformity on agreed business practices, the idea
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that there will still be different opinions and attitudes
between owner managers and staff in smaller organizations was focused in the concept of cognitive distance.
Arguably, smaller enterprises, which maintained smaller
cognitive distances, would be more likely to reflect a distinctive cultural province.
To bring these ideas and concepts together into a
methodology that might help in identifying particular
groups and clusters on cultural provinces in regions, elements from action research methodology were developed. This was viewed as an appropriate vehicle to
develop a methodology as at one level of participant
research; it does address surface observations and social
processes. It also will include the potential heterogeneity
of the small firm sector and be reliant on the observations, rather than imposing a particular framework of
understanding on the data. The emergent methodology,
therefore, drew heavily on the idea of looking for collec-

tions of social meanings in a region that would allow the
identification of cognitive distance in organizations and,
as a consequence, the location and development of cultural provinces in a region. A series of suggested research
questions were finally identified from this methodology
that the researcher could develop and use to explore the
relationship between the individual, the smaller firm,
and its context and, as stated at the start of this conclusion, support the development of more appropriate policy instruments. It is possible that such emergent
improvements could include
• different use of language in policy publications;
• different formats of dissemination of policy instruments;
• the location of service providers; and
• the roles of service providers in the province/region targeted.
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Collective Entrepreneurship in Family Firms:
The Influence of Leader Attitudes and Behaviors
Jun Yan
Ritch L. Sorenson

C

ollective entrepreneurship is the synergism that emerges
from a collective and that propels it beyond the current
state by seizing opportunities without regard to
resources under its control (Stevenson and Jarrillo 1990). This
study provides a conceptual model of collective entrepreneurship
and its relationship with leadership and team dynamics in the
context of a small family business. It proposes two types of prerequisites for collective entrepreneurship: attitudinal and behavioral. The attitudinal prerequisite is family business members’
commitment to the family business. The behavioral prerequisite
includes collaboration and task conflict among family business
members. Further, the article argues that leadership behaviors
directly affect the attitudinal and behavioral prerequisites, and
indirectly affect collective entrepreneurship. Specifically, relations-oriented and participative leadership have positive, indirect effects on collective entrepreneurship. Task-oriented leadership has both positive and negative, indirect effects on collective
entrepreneurship. An empirical study of 271 small family businesses in the United States confirmed most of the hypotheses.
A very important concern of family businesses is to sustain
entrepreneurial capability (Hoy and Verser 1994).
However, practitioners and researchers seem constrained
by the following individualistic assumptions about entrepreneurship: The entrepreneurial competence of the firm
is equated with that of the owner (Miller 1983; Man, Lau,
and Chan 2002), and the owner is the only source of a
firm’s entrepreneurial competence (Slevin and Covin 1995;
Stoner 1987).
An individualistic view of entrepreneurship (Reich
1987; Tiessen 1997) fails to recognize that in many cases
entrepreneurship is a collective effort. Missing from most
literature is the important role of collective entrepreneurship—the collective entrepreneurial capability to innovate
and create (Reich 1987; Stewart 1989). Collective entrepreneurship may be especially important to sustain the continuity and growth of family firms. Owners who develop a
culture that promotes collective entrepreneurship may
instill an entrepreneurial spirit that enables them to
achieve the hope for a firm that lasts for generations.
This study examines the contribution of owners’ leadership to the collective entrepreneurial capability of small
family firms. Here, we view owners as being potential

“organizing geniuses” (Bennis and Biederman 1998) who
transform their family firms into “great teams” that are
highly and collectively entrepreneurial.
Entrepreneurship is a process in which entrepreneurs
pursue opportunities without regard to resource currently
under control (Stevenson and Jarrilo 1990). Two core components of this process are recognition/identification of
opportunities and getting use of the resources needed to
exploit these opportunities (Block and MacMillan 1993;
Kilby 1971; Stevenson and Gumpert 1985). Recognition of
opportunities includes such activities as scanning both
external and internal environments for new markets,
unmet needs, existing problems in work process, and new
product ideas (Sandberg 1991; Sayles and Stewart 1995).
Obtaining resources includes such activities as leveraging
resources through “running hot,” creating collective synergism, fostering and using collective creativity (Stewart
1989), borrowing or coopting resources (Jarrilo 1988, 1989),
designing and implementing strategies (Stevenson and
Jarrilo 1990; Tiessen 1997).
Here, we define collective entrepreneurship as synergism that emerges from a collective and that propels it
beyond the current state by seizing opportunities without
regard to resources under its control (Stevenson and
Jarrilo 1990); the collective capability of both identifying
and responding to opportunities are important components of collective entrepreneurship. Collective entrepreneurship may exist in teams (Reich 1987; Stewart 1989),
organizations in the form organization-wide “Kaizen” (continuous improvement involving all members of an organization; Imai 1986), and networks of organizations (Nonaka
1988; Mourdoukoutas 1999).
The focus of this study is small family businesses,
which have made great contributions to the U.S. economy
(e.g., Duman 1992; Kets de Vries 1993; Hershon 1975).
However, relatively little research attention has been given
to the nature and function of these family firms (McCann,
Leon-Guerrero, and Haley 2001; Morris, Williams, and
Avila 1997).
Hoy and Verser (1994) viewed leadership as the number
one issue for future research in the interaction between
family business and entrepreneurship. However, leader-
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ship research has given disproportionate focus to the role
of the founder/entrepreneur in the process of transition or
succession (Handler 1994). Some researchers have
addressed the impact of owner leadership styles on both
family-related and business-related outcomes (e.g., Dyer
1986; Sorenson 2000), but almost no attempt has been
made to study the relationship between the owner’s leadership styles and family firm’s entrepreneurial capability.
Hoy and Verser (1994) advocate studying the implications of team leadership in family business. Moreover,
studies indicate that small family businesses function like
work teams (Riordan and Riordan 1993). An advantage of
treating small family firms as work teams is that much
research attention has already been given to teams (Cohn
and Bailey 1997). For example, Stewart (1989) studied
entrepreneurship in a work team environment, which he
called “team entrepreneurship” and which we refer to
here as collective entrepreneurship. Researchers suggest
that collective entrepreneurship is a source of competitive
advantage not only for teams (Reich 1987; Slevin and
Covin 1992) but also for other types of organizations (Imai
1986; Jelinek and Litterer 1995; Nonaka 1988;
Mourdoukoutas 1999).
Based on previous research in small family businesses,
work teams, collective entrepreneurship, and leadership,
we propose and test a model of collective entrepreneurship for small family businesses, businesses that are family-owned and that have no more than 20 employees. Such
firms are likely to function like a work team (Cohn and
Bailey 1997; Riordan and Riordan 1993 ) and potentially to
engage in collective entrepreneurship.

Collective Entrepreneurship
and Small Family Business

Today more and more successful organizations draw
their competitive advantages not from the major initiatives of CEOs and mavericks but from continuous, incremental innovation and refinement of ideas by teams in
the form of collective entrepreneurship (Reich 1987).
Collective entrepreneurship draws on everyone’s talent,
creativity (Stewart 1989), knowledge, and experience,
which is diffused throughout the team, to create a whole
that is greater than the sum of individual contributions
(Reich 1987, p. 78). The entrepreneurship in small family
firms likely results from countless small innovative
ideas that help members to “stretch past their previous
abilities” to meet the demands of customers, which
Stewart (1989) calls “running hot.”
Below, based on previous studies (Haskins, et al. 1998,
Slevin and Covin 1992, and Stewart 1989 provide an extensive discussion), we propose (1) an attitudinal followed by

(2) a behavioral prerequisite for collective entrepreneurship (see Figure 1). The attitude prerequisite provides the
energy, and the behavior prerequisite transfers the energy
into synergistic outcomes (Hackman 1987); like the engine,
transmission, and wheels for a car, attitude and behavior
are the “energy” and “essential mechanisms” that result in
collective entrepreneurship. We argue that both of these
prerequisites are influenced by the nature of leadership in
the family firm.
“Energy”
Organizational
Commitment

Family
Business
Leadership

Collective
Entrepreneurship

“Mechanism”
Collaboration
& Conflict

Figure 1. Leadership, “Energy,” and
“Mechanisms” Underlying
Collective Entrepreneurship
An Essential Attitudinal Prerequisite for
Collective Entrepreneurship: Organizational
Commitment

Organizational commitment is a collection of feelings
and beliefs within organizational members (Mowday,
Porter, and Steers 1982) that consists of belief in the
organization, a sense of pride, and a feeling of loyalty
that provides a sense of conscientiousness and stewardship (Haskins et al. 1998). Committed organizational
members are likely to act above and beyond the call of
duty and are less likely to quit (Mathieu and Zajac 1990).
As a result, they should devote effort to detecting and
diagnosing organizational problems, identifying defects
and weaknesses in current work, and searching for better
ways to do their work and to serve the organization. We
argue that family business members’ commitment to the
family business is an essential attitudinal prerequisite to
the collective entrepreneurship of a small family business. To test the effect of collective entrepreneurship, we
offer the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1: Family business members’ commitment to
the family business is positively associated with its collective entrepreneurship.

Essential Behavioral Prerequisites for
Collective Entrepreneurship:
Collaboration and Conflict Management

In collective entrepreneurship, skills, intelligence, and
experiences of individual family business members are
integrated, forming a strong collective capacity to create
and innovate. Over time, as family business members
work through various problems, they learn how to help
one another perform, what each can contribute, how best
to take advantage of other’s experience, and when and
how to make mutual adjustments. However, we believe
that, without effective collaboration and conflict management, collective synergy will not occur.

Collaboration Among Family Business
Members

Collaboration is an internal process that is positively related to business performance and effectiveness (e.g.,
Sorenson 1999, 2000). We believe that collaboration may be
the most important mechanism that transfers the “energy”
of attitude into interaction that produces collective synergy.
Collaboration is most extensively studied in conflict
management research (e.g., Sorenson, Moore, and Savage
1999) as a process that fully satisfies the concerns of
involved parties and creates integrative solutions
(Eiseman 1977). Effective collaboration reflects the ability
of people to work together for their mutual benefit (Scott
1999). In collaboration, individuals strive to understand
the talents, thoughts, and emotions of one another; such
interpersonal understanding is the wellspring of the creation, preservation, and enhancement of collective excellence (Haskins et al. 1998). Stewart (1989) uses the analogy
of soccer team members working together to score to
explain the importance of mutual understanding and collaboration among team members to produce collective
outcomes. Similarly, we argue that collaboration enables
family businesses to engage in collective entrepreneurship. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a: Collaboration among family business
members is positively associated with the collective
entrepreneurship of the family business.

Conflict Among Family Business Members

Conflict management has long been an important research
subject in organizational studies (e.g., Sorenson 1999;
Thomas 1992; Wall and Callister 1995). How conflicts are

managed directly impacts organizational performance
and outcomes (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995). Appropriate
conflict management can help to reduce unnecessary consumption of resources, increase synergy, and build relational resources (Stevenson and Gumpert 1985). Family
firms should effectively manage two types of conflict. The
first is task or functional conflict, which consists of disagreement among organizational members about task content;
the second is relationship or dysfunctional conflict, which
refers to interpersonal incompatibilities, tension, animosity, and annoyance (e.g., Amason 1996; Jehn 1995; Priem
and Price 1991).
Studies show that task conflicts are beneficial to organizational and team performance, adding to creativity and
decision quality (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995). Task conflict
contributes to an organization’s cognitive diversity, which
has been found to be related to innovativeness and ability
to solve complex and nonroutine problems (Bantel and
Jackson 1989; Murry 1989).
However, relationship conflicts are divisive and detrimental to performance (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995), resulting in poor relationships, limiting synergy, and if not
solved, destroying collective entrepreneurship (Stewart
1989). Thus, we argue that task conflict should promote
and relationship conflict should hinder collective entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis 2b: Task conflict among family business
members is positively associated with the collective
entrepreneurship of the family business.
Hypothesis 2c: Relationship conflict among family business members is negatively associated with the collective entrepreneurship of the family business.

Essential Leadership Characteristics
Underlying Team Entrepreneurship:
The Effect of Leadership on Attitude and
Behavior

Collective entrepreneurship does not eliminate the need
for leadership in family business. Leaders help cultivate
both the attitudes and behaviors that create a favorable
context for collective entrepreneurship.
To illustrate the potential impact of leader influence, we
discuss three types of leadership styles (Bryman 1996) or
behaviors (Likert 1961, 1967) and their impact on the attitudes and behaviors of family business members. In this
article, we use leadership styles and behaviors interchangeably. The three leadership styles are (1) relationsoriented, (2) participative, and (3) task-oriented (Bass
1990; Yukl 1998).
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Relations-Oriented Leadership

Studies show that relations-oriented leaders (e.g., Bowers
and Seashore 1966; Likert 1961, 1967; Sorenson 2000) are
concerned about people and relationships, which tends to
increase collaboration, teamwork, and subordinate identification with the organization or team. Key component
behaviors of relations-oriented leadership include supporting, developing, recognizing, and consulting with
individuals (Yukl 1998).
By showing consideration, acceptance, and concern for
the needs and feelings of their subordinates, family business leaders help build and maintain effective interpersonal relationships and help subordinates reduce and cope
with stress, which can help to reduce unnecessary interpersonal conflicts, especially relationship conflicts that
may damage collective entrepreneurship (Amason 1996;
Jehn 1995). In addition, subordinates may imitate their
leaders’ supportive behaviors (Weiss 1977) to further support positive interaction and working relationships, very
likely leading to creative collaboration (Haskins et al.
1998).
The tendency of relations-oriented leaders to develop, recognize, and reward subordinates increases the
likelihood that subordinates will be committed to the
family business. Therefore, we offer the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a: Relations-oriented leadership is positively associated with family business members’ commitment to the family business.
Hypothesis 3b: Relations-oriented leadership is positively associated with the collaboration among family
business members.
Hypothesis 3c: Relations-oriented leadership is negatively associated with relationship conflict among family business members.
Thus, in our model, relations-oriented leadership
should have indirect positive impact on the collective
entrepreneurship of a small family business.

Task-Oriented Leadership

Studies show that task-oriented leaders do not spend time
working with their subordinates. Instead, they concentrate
on task-oriented functions such as planning and scheduling work, coordinating subordinate activities, and providing supplies, equipment, and technical assistance. Taskoriented leaders define and structure their own roles and
the roles of their subordinates. They closely supervise sub-

ordinates in setting and achieving formal performance
goals (e.g., Likert 1961, 1967). This helps to reduce task
conflicts among subordinates.
Task-oriented leaders coordinate the activities of their
subordinates instead of helping subordinates to coordinate among themselves. Task-oriented leaders can help
subordinates collaborate by designing work, coordinating,
and managing interaction. However, collective entrepreneurship will be limited to those interactions directed by
the leader, resulting in minimal synergy.
Based on the previous discussion, we offer the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4a: Task-oriented leadership is positively
associated with the collaboration among family business
members.
Hypothesis 4b: Task-oriented leadership is negatively
associated with the task conflict among family business
members.
Because task-oriented leadership potentially has both a
positive and negative influence, we suggested that the
total effect of task-oriented leadership on collective entrepreneurship is at best indeterminate.

Participative Leadership

Participative leaders encourage and facilitate involvement
of subordinates in making decisions. Involving subordinates promotes approval and commitment. The highest
level of participative leadership is delegation of decisionmaking or encouraging subordinates to assume responsibility for their own work. Thus, participative leadership
includes power sharing, empowerment, and reciprocal
influence processes (e.g., Vroom and Yetton 1973).
Participative leaders increase interpersonal interaction,
mutual obligation, and accountability, making the family
firm more “groupy” (McGrath 1984). In meetings, participative leaders encourage diverse ideas and opinions from
team members, which may promote task conflict.
We assume that, similar to relations-oriented leaders,
participative leaders will influence family business members to be open to one another’s opinion, ideas, and suggestions (Wiess 1977). A family business leader who opens
the domain of decision authority to the entire family business team may also encourage them to open their domain
of work to others, making the entire business more integrated and holistic. Similarly, power sharing by a leader
may also encourage team members to share power
(Leavitt 1975; McGrath 1984). Participative leaders clearly
have the potential to positively influence family business
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members to have constructive attitudes toward their job,
the family business, and their leaders. Thus, we suggest
the following relationships:
Hypothesis 5a: Participative leadership is positively
associated with family business members’ commitment
to the family business.
Hypothesis 5b: Participative leadership is positively
associated with the collaboration among family business
members.
Hypothesis 5c: Participative leadership is positively
associated with the task conflict among family business
members.
Hypothesis 5d: Participative leadership is negatively
associated with the relationship conflict among family
business members.
Similar to relations-oriented leaders, participative leaders should have a positive impact on building cooperative
interpersonal and working relationships, which will help
collective entrepreneurship to grow in a small family business.

Methodology
Data Collection

To examine the collective entrepreneurship of small family firms, we use secondary data from the “Survey of
Family Business,” collected by the Center for
Entrepreneurship and Family Business at a Southwestern
University between 1997 and 1999. The “Survey of
Family Business” is a 199-item questionnaire, which asks
respondents about a wide variety of activities, practices,
and values/policies in family businesses. All of the
respondents were members of the owning family. Since
all of these businesses had 20 or fewer employees and
most business decisions were kept in the family, family
members exerted considerable influence. Most of the
respondents (77%) listed themselves as the owner, CEO,
president, or administrator of the business. Some (17%)
indicated they were vice presidents or managers. Others
(6%) listed a variety of roles, the predominant of which
was secretary/treasurer.
Riordan and Riordan (1993) found that small family
businesses with 20 or fewer employees function like
workgroups or teams. Thus, we treat each small family
business as an independent work team. This study limited the sample to businesses with from 3 to 20 employees,
resulting in a sample size of 271 family firms.

Responses to the “Survey of Family Business” questionnaire were gathered in two ways. First, a national
sample was obtained by identifying the Chambers of
Commerce in various communities in the United States
from their sites on the Internet. Membership directories
were accessed and businesses were randomly selected to
be a part of the study. Owners of those businesses selected were called and asked if their company was a family
business and, if so, whether they were willing to participate in the study. Of the questionnaires that were sent, 20
percent were completed and returned (n = 158). Second,
students at Texas Tech University were invited to ask family business owners to complete surveys. These surveys
primarily were obtained from businesses in Texas (n =
113). The response rate for this data collection was more
than 70 percent. Background characteristics of selected
small family businesses used in this study are summarized in Table 1. Multivariate analysis showed that there
was no significant difference between samples.

Table 1
Numbers of Small Family Businesses Located
in Different Regions in the United States
Region
Number

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

26

34

18

69

44

48

24

Notes:
1. I: WA, OR, ID, MT, WY
II: CA, NV, UT, AZ
III: ND, SD, MN, CO, NE, KA, OK, MO, IA, IL, WI
IV: West TX, NM
V: East TX
VI: MI, IN, KT, OH, PA, WV, VA, NY, MD, MA, ME, NY
VII: AR, LA, TN, MS, AL, GA, NC, SC, FL
2. The regions of 8 companies are not identifiable.

Measures

Task-oriented Leadership Style (TL). The measure for
this construct consisted of three items measured on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items
were “Top-level leadership in our organization…”
(1) “maintains clear control over the business,” (2) “is very
directive,” and (3) “retains the authority to make almost
all decisions.”
Relations-oriented Leadership Style (RL). This construct was measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree) by two items that were reverse scored.
These items were “Top-level leadership in our organization…” (1) “sometimes strongly persuades/manipulates
employees” and (2) “is very dominating.”
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Participative Leadership Style (PL). Four items were
used to measure this construct. The scale ranged from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree); the items were
adapted from the Michigan Organizational Assessment
Questionnaire (Cammann, et al. 1983). These items were
“Top-level leadership in our organization…” (1) “encourages subordinates to participate in important decisions,”
(2) “keeps informed about the way subordinates think and
feel about things,” (3) “encourages subordinates to speak
up when they disagree with a decision,” and (4) “provides
goals and gives employees freedom to achieve them.”
Organizational Commitment (OC). The three items
for the measure of team commitment were adapted from
Camman, et al. (1983) and were answered on a scale of 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items were
“In general, employees in this business…” (1) “like
working here,” (2) “feel like they are really a part of this
business,” and (3) “are satisfied with their role in the
business.”
Collaboration (CL). Five items were used to assess collaboration. Possible responses varied from (1) strongly disagree
to (5) strongly agree. Three of the items were from a conflict
measure developed by Rahim (1983). The items read as follows: (1) “We try to bring all our concerns out in the open so
that the issues can be resolved in the best possible way,” (2)
“We try to exchange accurate information to solve the problem together,” (3) “We try to ensure that all the employees
have access to more information than the minimum required
to perform their job,” (4) “We try to work with one another
for a proper understanding of the problem,” and (5) “We try
to meet the expectations of one another.”
Task Conflict (TC). Task conflict was measured with
three items on different scales: (1) “How many different
solutions do members of your organization consider when
making decisions” was measured on a scale from 1 (none)
to 5 (a great deal); (2) “We encourage diversity in people
and ideas within our organization” was measured on a
scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very great extent); and (3)
“The following statements describe types of operating
philosophies and beliefs which may or may not exist in
your business…participation, open discussion” was measured on a scale from 1 (minimally valued and used) to 7
(extensively valued and used).
Relationship Conflict (RC). This measure used three
items developed by Amason (1996), and they were measured on a scale from 1 (none) to 5 (a great deal): (1) “How
much tension is there over different ideas in your business?” (2) “How much anger is there in your business during disagreements?” and (3) “How much personal friction
is there between members of your organization during
disagreements?”

Collective Entrepreneurship (CE). Three items were
used to measure collective entrepreneurship, and they
were measured on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very great
extent). However, due to the constraint of the available
data in this study, we could measure only one of the most
important aspects of collective entrepreneurship—the collective capability in identifying external opportunities and
internal working and processes for improvement.
Opportunity identification (Christensen, Masden, and
Peterson 1989; Hills and Shrader 1997; Long and
McMullan 1984) is considered one of the most important
entrepreneurial activities and capabilities. The items used
to measure collective entrepreneurship were: (1) “We are
good at scanning the external environment for opportunities and potential problems”; (2) “We are good at scanning
the internal workings and processes of this organization
for areas which may be improved upon”; and (3) “We try
to uncover and communicate all relevant facts, not just
those that are politically acceptable.”

Analysis and Results

Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used for analyses.
SEM was appropriate for this study because multiple and
interrelated dependence relationships involving unobservable concepts were simultaneously investigated.
The model was assessed with several statistics to examine its fit with the data. First, a c2 test was used to assess the
goodness-of-fit between the reproduced and observed
covariance matrices, an index that measures the absolute fit
of the overall model. As sample size increases, this measure
has a greater tendency to indicate significant differences for
equivalent models. However, when the ratio of the c2 value
to degree of freedom is smaller than 2, the model is considered to have an acceptable fit. Another index that attempted to correct for the tendency of the c2 statistic to reject any
specified model with a sufficiently large sample was the
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Two
other indices, which compare the proposed model to a
baseline model, often referred to as the null model, which
in most cases is a single-construct model with all indicators
perfectly measuring the construct, were also used. Two
such indices were the adjusted goodness-of-fit index
(AGFI) and the comparative fit index (CFI).
The initial model included 25 items intended to measure 8 variables. The c2 statistic was 499.13 with a degree of
freedom of 271 (p = 0.00). The ratio is smaller than 2.0.
RMSEA was 0.056. AGFI was 0.85, and CFI was 0.92. Thus,
the measurement model had an acceptable fit. The composite reliabilities of each variable are shown in the diagonal of Table 2. All values were above 0.60, which reflected
an acceptable degree of construct reliability.
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Convergent and discriminant validity were examined
with the significance of loadings to each variable (Table 3)
and the correlations among included variables (Table 2).

All the loadings were significant statistically and no correlation was above 0.80. The model had achieved an acceptable degree of convergent and discriminant validity (Hair,
et al. 1998). The means, standard deviations,
Table 2
and skewness are reported in Table 4.
Lisrel Estimates (Maximum Estimation Likelihood)
The same sets of goodness-of-fit indices used to
of PHI of the SME Model
evaluate the structural model were also used to
assess the measurement model. The c2 statistic
TC
RC
CE
CL
PL
TL
RL
OC
was 523.07 with a degree of freedom of 279 (p =
TC
(.68)
0.00). The ratio of the c2 value to the degree of free(.86)
RC
dom was less than 2.0. RMSEA was 0.057, within
-.14
the range of acceptance. CFI was 0.92, above the
-.34**
(.80)
CE
.71**
suggested acceptable level; and AGFI was 0.85,
CL
.58** -.37** .57** (.82)
which was considered acceptable. In general, the
.60** (.74)
PL
.76** -.32** .47**
model showed acceptable fit to the data.
-.12
.30**
.48**
.32** (.63)
TL
.06
The standardized path coefficients for each
-.29**
.07
.18*
.16
-.52**
(.64)
RL
.23**
hypothesized relationship in the theoretical structur(.92)
al model are displayed in Figure 2. The first hypoth.63**
.75** .32**
.06
OC
.57** -.38** .47**
esis (hypothesis 1) was not supported. Family busiTC = Task Conflict, RC = Relationship Conflict,
ness members’ commitment to the family business
CE = Collective Entrepreneurship,
(OC) was not significantly related to the family busiOC = Organizational Commitment, PL = Participative Leadership,
ness’s collective entrepreneurship (CE) (Beta = -.03,
TL = Task-oriented Leadership, RL = Relations-oriented Leadership,
t = -.38). Hypothesis 2a was supported.
CL = Collaboration.
Collaboration (CL) was positively and significantly
*.05 level of significance
related to collective entrepreneurship (Beta = .24, t =
**.01 level of significance
2.53). Hypotheses 2b and 2c were also supported.
Results showed that positive
and significant relationships
existed between task conflict
(TC) and collective entrepreneurship (Beta = .49, t = 4.85),
and a negative and significant
relationship existed between
relationship conflict (RC) and
collective entrepreneurship
(Beta = -.17, t = -2.62).
Regarding leadership
styles and family business
members’
commitment
and interactive behaviors
(CL, TC, and RC), most
hypotheses were supported. Participative leadership
style (PL) was found to be
TC = Task Conflict, RC = Relationship Conflict, CE = Collective Entrepreneurship,
positively and significantly
OC = Organizational Commitment, PL = Participative Leadership,
related to family business
TL = Task-oriented Leadership, RL = Relations-oriented Leadership, CL = Collaboration.
members’
commitment
*.05 level of significance
(Beta
=
.77,
t
=
8.16), to col**.01 level of significance
laboration (Beta = .38, t =
3.66), and to task conflict
Figure 2. Results of SEM Analysis of the Hypothesized Path Diagram
(Beta = .79, t = 7.21).
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Table 3
Properties of the Measurement Model
Constructs and
Indicators

Standardized
Loading

Task Conflict (TC)
(1)c
(2)
(3)

0.48
0.72
0.72

t-valuea

Reliability

Variance
Extracted
Estimate

7.20
12.37
12.44

0.68b
0.23
0.52
0.52

0.42

0.68

Relationship Conflict (RC)
(1)
(2)
(3)

0.82
0.80
0.85

15.50
14.88
16.08

0.86b
0.67
0.64
0.72

Collective
Entrepreneurship (CE)
(1)
(2)
(3)

0.67
0.85
0.75

11.52
15.76
13.26

0.80b
0.45
0.73
0.56

0.58

8.58
13.39
12.03
11.46
15.07

0.82b
0.27
0.55
0.47
0.43
0.65

0.47

17.56
16.50
10.21

0.92b
0.75
0.69
0.78

0.75

9.89
12.20
11.30
10.77

0.74b
0.36
0.50
0.44
0.41

0.42

6.92
9.17
11.17

0.63b
0.21
0.36
0.53

0.39

Collaboration (CL)
(2)
(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Organizational
Commitment (OC)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Participative Leadership (PL)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Task-Oriented Leadership (TL)
(1)
(2)
(3)

0.52
0.74
0.68
0.66
0.80

0.86
0.83
0.88
0.60
0.71
0.66
0.64
0.46
0.60
0.73

Relationship-Oriented Leadership (RL)
0.64b
0.49
(1)
0.50
7.12
0.25
(2)
0.85
9.91
0.71
a All t-tests were significant at p <.001.
b Denotes composite reliability.
c The numbers for each item correspond with item numbers provided in the text
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Skewness
Constructs and Indicators
Task Conflict (TC)
(1)a
(2)
(3)

Mean

S.D.

Skewness

5.37
3.50
3.43

1.43
1.17
0.92

-0.89
-0.82
-0.42

Relationship Conflict (RC)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Collective Entrepreneurship (CE)
(1)
(2)
(3)

2.82
2.38
2.40

0.98
0.93
0.96

0.39
0.59
0.72

3.26
3.31
3.46

1.17
1.12
1.27

-0.70
-0.62
-1.00

Collaboration (CL)
(2)
(1)
(3)
(4)
(5)

3.79
4.23
4.09
4.02
4.19

1.04
0.80
0.85
0.78
0.77

-1.10
-1.29
-0.91
0.63
-0.82

Organizational Commitment (OC)
(1)
(2)
(3)

5.62
5.68
5.87

1.11
1.15
1.02

-1.29
-1.32
-1.32

Participative Leadership (PL)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

5.25
5.41
5.58
5.58

1.39
1.25
1.36
1.27

-1.03
-0.79
-1.34
-1.29

Task-Oriented Leadership (TL)
(1)
(2)
(3)

5.96
6.16
5.20

1.22
1.05
1.36

-2.00
-2.00
-0.08

Relationship-Oriented Leadership (RL)
(1)
3.86
1.84
-0.84
(2)
4.13
1.91
-0.19
a The numbers for each item correspond with item numbers provided in the text.
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A negative and significant relationship was also found
between participative leadership style and relationship
conflict (Beta = -.27, t = -3.56). Thus, hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c,
and 5d were supported.
Task-oriented leadership style (TL) was found to be
positively and significantly related to collaboration (Beta =
.49, t = 3.51); thus hypothesis 4a was supported. The relationship between task-oriented leadership style and task
conflict was negative and significant as was hypothesized
(Beta = -.18, t = -2.17). Therefore hypothesis 4b was also
supported.
The relations-oriented leadership style (RL) was found
to be positively and significantly related to collaboration
(Beta = .33, t = 3.10), so hypothesis 3b was supported. A
negative and significant relationship was also found
between relations-oriented leadership style and relationship conflict (Beta = -.21, t = -2.83), thus hypothesis 3c was
supported. However, no significant relationship was
found between relations-oriented leadership style and
family business members’ commitment (Beta = -.07, t = 0.95). Thus, hypothesis 3a was not supported.

Discussion

Overall, the proposed model of relationships among leadership, attitude, behavior, and collective entrepreneurship
was supported.

Contribution of Attitude and Behaviors to
Collective Entrepreneurship

All the “mechanisms” (collaboration, task conflict, and
relationship conflict) tested in this study were found to
contribute to the collective entrepreneurship of small family businesses. Collaboration was a very important contributor to collective entrepreneurship. This finding confirms the arguments of researchers (e.g., Haskins et al.
1998; Bennis and Bierderman 1998) that collaboration contributes greatly to group creativity, collective excellence,
and organizational success.
Task conflict positively impacted collective entrepreneurship. Task conflicts promote diverse opinions and
ideas regarding a work team’s tasks (Amazon 1996; Jehn
1995; Thomas 1992). Importantly, task conflicts also contribute to expression of group or organizational cognitive
diversity (Amazon 1996).
Relationship conflict was significantly and negatively
related to collective entrepreneurship. Thus, just as it has
been found to negatively affect team’s decision-making
quality, affective acceptance among team members
(Amazon 1996), and team performance (Jehn 1995), relationship conflict can damage the collective entrepreneurship of a small family business.

The study failed to find a significant relationship
between family business members’ commitment and collective entrepreneurship. Results indicated that organizational commitment did not directly contribute to the collective entrepreneurship, even though a positive and significant correlation existed between them (r = .47, p < . 01).
This finding is not consistent with the views of other
researchers (Bennis and Beirderman 1998; Stewart 1989).
One possible explanation is that organizational commitment does not directly contribute to collective entrepreneurship. Mediating factors may exist between family
business members’ commitment and collective entrepreneurship. As previously discussed, commitment was
found to lead to organizational citizenship behaviors
(George and Brief 1992), which may contribute directly to
collective entrepreneurship.
Our results indicated that a positive and significant
correlation existed between commitment and collaboration (r = .63, p < .01) and between commitment and task
conflict (r = .57, p < .01) and that a negative and significant
correlation existed between commitment and relationship
conflict (r = -.38, p < .01). These findings suggest that commitment may directly and positively affect task conflict
and collaboration among family business members,
directly reduce relationship conflicts among them, and
then indirectly contribute to a small family business’s collective entrepreneurial capability. Moreover, without the
behavioral “mechanisms” of collaboration and task conflict, the “energy” of commitment alone will not promote
the collective synergistic entrepreneurial capability.

Contributions of Leadership to Collective
Entrepreneurship

Almost all hypotheses about leadership styles were supported. Participative leadership positively affected collaboration among family business members, had a positive
impact on their commitment, promoted task conflict, and
reduced relationship conflicts.
Results indicate that participative leadership helps foster collective entrepreneurship through at least three channels—high collaboration, high task conflict, and low relationship conflict. Participative leadership had the highest
joint and indirect effect on collective entrepreneurship
(Beta = .51, t = 5.60).
Task-oriented leadership contributed to collective
entrepreneurship through its positive impact on collaboration. However, such collaboration may be highly dependent on the leader’s coordination and initiation. Haskins
and associates (1998) call this type of collaboration “transactional collaboration” because it is not voluntary nor initiated by team members but is initiated, directed, and con-
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trolled by the leader. In contrast, relational collaboration,
which is initiated by family business members and
embedded in the culture of the family firm, is not dependent on a leader’s task-oriented behaviors (Haskins, et al.
1998).
Overall results also indicated that the joint and indirect
impact of task-oriented leadership on collective entrepreneurship was insignificant (Beta = .03, t = .44). Considering
its indirect negative impact on collective entrepreneurship, high levels of task-oriented leadership, especially
without accompanying relational leadership, is not a good
choice for leaders who want to create collectively entrepreneurial family firms.
Results revealed that relations-oriented leadership promotes collaboration and reduces relationship conflicts. Its
joint and indirect effect on collective entrepreneurship is
positive and significant (Beta = .12, t = 2.60) but weaker
than that of participative leadership. Like participative
leadership, relations-oriented leadership is likely to promote “relational collaboration” among family business
members instead of “transactional collaboration”
(Haskins, et al. 1998), contributing to the family firm’s collective entrepreneurial capability.
Inconsistent with the findings of other studies (Bass
1990; Yukl 1998), relations-oriented leaders were not found
to positively influence organizational commitment. The
measure used in this study may explain these findings.
The measurement of relations-oriented leadership, which
was based on the reverse scaling of leadership manipulation and domination, failed to reflect such important
aspects of this leadership style as developing, rewarding,
and recognizing (Yukl 1998), which are often found to be
positively related to subordinates’ attitudes (Bass 1990).
However, the measure of relations-oriented leadership
used here also has its own unique contribution in that it
captured a major characteristic of entrepreneurs. As indicated above, the measure was the reverse scaling of the
degree to which a leader maintains dominance and
manipulates employees. Researchers have found individual entrepreneurs to be dominating and manipulative
(e.g., Hornaday and Aboud 1971; Mitton 1989), especially with subordinates and successors (e.g., Handler 1994).
This study shows that entrepreneurs with such characteristics, even though they may personally contribute to the
business (e.g., Miller 1983), may ultimately hurt the
entire organization’s collective entrepreneurial capability
(Reich 1987). Thus it may be difficult for a family business leader to maintain a high degree of individual entrepreneurship and, at the same time, for the entire family
business to maintain a high degree of collective entrepreneurship.

Limitations

The static nature of the data made this research at best a
snapshot study of a very complex and dynamic multilevel
phenomenon. Plans for future studies of collective entrepreneurship should include longitudinal field and systemic studies. Research methods could include experimental and computer simulations that could help better
understand the pattern of the development of collective
entrepreneurship and its interaction with lower- and
higher-level dynamics.
Reliance on a single self-reporting source for each measure in this study could lead to two possible problems. The
first is the “key informant” (Mitchell 1994) methodology
used in this research. However, efforts were made to minimize negative effects by obtaining respondents who held
similar or identical positions in small family business,
which helped to reduce problems associated with lack of
standardization. A second problem is a possible perceptpercept inflation due to the single self-reporting source for
each measure. In this research, factor analyses revealed
variables prone to the impact of percept-percept impact—
commitment and some leadership behaviors—did not
load on the same factor, which suggests that the common
method was not a serious problem in this study
(Podsakoff and Organ 1986).
The tendency of respondents to provide socially desirable answers could contaminate the data for this study,
which may suppress and obscure relationships among
variables and produce artificial relationships among independent and dependent variables (King and Bruner 2000).
In future studies, statistical control techniques should be
included in the questionnaire design to reduce the effects
of social-desirability bias.
Caution should be taken when generalizing the results
to organizations other than small family businesses. We
studied family businesses with no more than 20 members,
which have unique characteristics (Sorenson, 1999; 2000).
Furthermore, due to the constraints of the data, we tested
only the collective capability of a small family business to
identify opportunities, not to act on them.

Conclusions and Implications

This study provides evidence that family business leaders
have an indirect impact on the collective entrepreneurship
of small family businesses. Different from other studies
that focused mainly on interfirm or interinstitutional relationships (Nonaka 1988; Mourdoukoutas 1999), this study
reveals the complexity of the concept and the mechanism
underlying its formation and accumulation inside small
family firms. Many individual and collective factors play a
role in the formation of collective entrepreneurship. The
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study also reveals that three behavioral factors, or “mechanisms”—collaboration, task conflict, and relationship
conflict—all have positive influence on the collective
entrepreneurial capability of small family businesses.
Because it positively impacts family business members’
attitudes, collaborative behaviors, and task conflicts, participative leadership is the most effective of the styles in
promoting collective entrepreneurship. Relations-oriented
leadership also contributes to collective entrepreneurship.
However, task-oriented leadership does not significantly
contribute to collective entrepreneurship and is the least
recommended to practitioners among the three types of
leadership.
Another important implication of this study is that in
some respects there seems to be irreconcilable conflict
between individual entrepreneurship and collective entrepreneurship. This is because individual entrepreneurs are
often identified with characteristics (Hornaday and
Aboud 1971; Mitton 1989) that may not help to build, and
may even destroy, a favorable environment for collective
entrepreneurship.
Unlike individual entrepreneurship that emerges from
a single “maverick,” collective entrepreneurship may possess more staying power since it does not rely on a single
person. This is especially important to researchers and
practitioners of family businesses because most family
businesses rely on the entrepreneurship of founders for
their success (e.g., Hoy and Verser, 1994; Miller 1983).

Two directions for future research are very important to
a holistic understanding of this collective phenomenon.
First, we suggest a systemic approach to study collective
entrepreneurship in which collective entrepreneurship is
viewed as a system-level or global property that emerges
from the dynamic operation (often involving nonlinear
interactions) of microlevel variables (McGrath 1997). This
study addresses some of those dynamics, such as attitudes, leadership, and interactive behaviors, within the
business system. Future research may consider more global and microlevel factors from the family system, such as
power sharing, affection, and conflict among family members on a microlevel, and types of family systems on a
global level (Constantine 1986; Kantor and Lehr 1975). The
interaction between the “family system” and the “business
system” (Davis and Tagiuri 1981; Hoy and Verser 1994;
Riordan and Riordan 1992) should also be considered to
better understand the dynamics and underlying mechanisms of family business’s collective entrepreneurial capability.
Second, we suggest more longitudinal studies to examine the effect of collective entrepreneurship on the durability of firms. In addition, longitudinal studies may reveal
the difference between the role of family business leaders
as individualistic entrepreneurs and as “organizing
geniuses” (Bennis and Bierdman 1998) in that they promote enduring collective entrepreneurship within the
family firm.

References
Amason, A. C. 1996. Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict on strategic decision making:
Resolving a paradox for top management teams. Academy of Management Journal 34, 1: 123–148.
Bass, B. M. 1990. Bass and Stogdill’ handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and managerial applications, 3rd ed. New York: Free
Press.
Bennis, W., and P. W. Biederman. 1998. Organizing genius: The secrets of creative collaboration. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Bental, K. A., and S. E. Jackson. 1989. Top management and innovation in banking: Does the composition of the top team
make a difference? Strategic Management Journal 10: 97–112.
Block, Z., and I. C. MacMillan. 1993. Corporate venturing: Creating new businesses within the firm. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press.
Bowers, D. G., and S. E. Seashore. 1966. Predicting organizational effectiveness with a four-factor theory of leadership.
Administrative Science Quarterly 11: 238–263.
Bryman, A. 1996. Leadership in organizations. In S. P. Clagg, C. Hardy, and W. R. Nord, eds., Handbook of organization studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 276–292.
Cammann, C., M. Finchman, G. D. Jenkins, Jr., and J. R. Klesh. 1983. Assessing the attitudes and perceptions of organizational members. In S. E. Seashore, E. E. Lawler, P. H. Mirvis, and C. Cammann, eds., Assessing Organizational Change.
New York: Wiley, pp. 71–138.
Christensen, P. S., O. O. Madsen, and R. Peterson. 1989. Opportunity identification: The contribution of entrepreneurship to
strategic management. Denmark: Aarhus University Institute of Management.
48 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol6/iss2/1

48

et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Fall 2003

Cohn, S. G., and D. E. Bailey. 1997. What makes teams work: Group effectiveness research from the shop floor to the executive suite. Journal of Management 23, 3: 239–290.
Constantine, L. L. 1986. Family paradigms: The practice of theory in family therapy. New York: Guilford.
Davis, J. H., and R. Tagiuri. 1981. The incidence of work relationships between relatives in the family business.
Unpublished paper, Harvard Business School.
Duman, R. 1992. Family firms are different. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 17: 13–21.
Dyer, W. G., Jr. 1986. Cultural change in family firms: Anticipating and managing business and family transitions. San Francisco:
Jossey Bass.
Eiseman, J .W. 1977. A third-party consultation model for resolving recurring conflicts collaboratively. Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science 13, 3: 303–314.
George, J. M., and A. P. Brief. 1992. Feeling good-doing good: A conceptual analysis of the mood at work–organizational
spontaneity relationship. Psychological Bulletin 112: 310–329.
Hackman, J. R. 1987. The design of work teams. In Lorsh, J. W., ed., Handbook of Organizational Behavior. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hair, J. F. Jr., R. E. Anderson, R. L. Tatham, and W. C. Black. 1998. Multivariate data Analysis. 5th. ed. Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Handler, W. 1994. Succession in family businesses: A review of the research. Family Business Review 5, 3: 257–276.
Haskins, M. E., L. Jeanne, and R. John. 1998. Beyond teams: Toward an ethic of collaboration. Organizational Dynamics 26,
4: 34–50.
Hershon, S. A. 1975. The problem of management succession in family business. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Business Administration, Harvard University.
Hills, G. E., and R. C. Shrader. 1998. Successful entrepreneurs insights into opportunity recognition. Frontiers of
Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, MA: Babson College, pp. 30–43.
Hornaday, J. A., and J. Aboud. 1971. Characteristics of successful entrepreneurs. Personnel Psychology 24: 141–153.
Hoy, F., and T. G.Verser. 1994. Emerging business, emerging field: Entrepreneurship and
the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 19, 1: 9–24.
Imai, M. 1986. Kaizen: The key to Japan’s competitive success. New York: Random House Business Division.
Jarillo, J. C. 1988. On strategic networks. Strategic Management Journal 9: 31–41.
Jarillo, J. C. 1989. Entrepreneurship and growth: The strategic use of external resources. Journal of Business Venturing 4:
133–147.
Jehn, K. 1995. A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict. Administrative Science
Quarterly 40, 2: 245–282.
Jelinek, M., and J. A. Litterer. 1995. Toward entrepreneurial organizations: Meeting ambiguity with engagement.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 19, 3: 137–168.
Kantor, D., and W. Lehr. 1975. Inside the family: Toward a theory of family process. New York: Harper Colophon.
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 1993. The dynamics of family-controlled firms: The good news and the bad news. Organizational
Dynamics 21: 59–71.
Kilby, P. 1971. Entrepreneurship and economic development. New York: The Free Press.
King, M. F., and G. C. Bruner. 2000. Social desirability bias: A neglected aspect of validity testing. Psychology & Marketing
17, 2: 79–103.

COLLECTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FAMILY FIRMS 49
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2003

49

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 6 [2003], No. 2, Art. 1

Leavitt, H. 1975. Suppose we took groups seriously…. In E. L. Cass and F. G. Zimmer, eds., Man and Work in Society. New
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 67–77.
Likert, R. 1961. New patterns of management. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Likert, R. 1967. The human organization: Its management and value. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Long, W. and W. E. McMullan. 1984. Mapping the new venture opportunity identification process. In J. A. Hornaday, et
al., eds., Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research. Wellesley, MA: Babson College, pp. 567–590.
Man, T. W. Y., T. Lau, and K. F. Chan. 2002. The competitiveness of small and medium enterprises; A conceptualization with
focus on entrepreneurial competencies. Journal of Business Venturing 17, 2: 123–142.
Mathieu, J.E., and D. M. Zajac. 1990. A review and meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of
organizational commitment. Psychological Bulletin 108: 171–194.
McCann, J. E., A. Y. Leon-Guerrero, and J. D. Haley Jr. 2001. Strategic goals and practices of innovative family businesses 39,
1: 50–59.
McGrath, J. E. 1984. Groups: interaction and performance. NJ: Prentice-Hall.
McGrath, J. E. 1997. Small group research, that once and future field: An interpretation of the past with an eye to the future.
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 1: 7–27.
Miller, D. 1983. The correlates of entrepreneurship in three types of firms. Management Science 29: 770–791.
Mitchell, V. 1994. Using industrial key informants: Some guidelines. Journal of Market Research Society 36, 2: 139–144.
Mitton, D. G. 1989. The complete entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 13, 3: 9–20.
Morris, M., R. Williams, J. Allen, and R. Avila. 1997. Correlates of success in family business transitions. Journal of Business
Venturing 12, 5: 385–401.
Mourdoukoutas, P. 1999. Collective entrepreneurship in a global economy. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
Mowday, R. T., L. W. Porter, and R. M. Steers. 1982. Employee-organization linkages. New York: Academic Press.
Murry, A. L. 1989. Top management group heterogeneity and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 10: 125–141.
Nonaka, I. 1988. Toward middle-up-down management: Accelerating information creation. Sloan Management Review 29,
3: 9–18.
Podsakoff, P. M., and D. W. Organ. 1986. Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. Journal of
Management 12, 4: 531–544.
Priem, R. L., and K. H. Price. 1991. Process and outcome expectations for the dialectical inquiry, devil’s advocacy, and consensus techniques of strategic decision making. Group and Organizational Studies 16, 206–225.
Rahim, M. A. 1983. A measure of styles of handling interpersonal conflict. Academy of Management Journal 26: 268–376.
Reich, R. B. 1987. Entrepreneurship reconsidered: The team as hero. Harvard Business Review 65, 3: 22–83.
Riordan, D. A., and M. P. Riordan. 1993. Field theory: An alternative to systems theories in understanding the small family business. Journal of Small Business Management 31, 2: 66–78.
Sandberg, W. R. 1991. Strategic management’s potential contributions to a theory of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice 16, 3: 73–90.
Sayles, L. R., and A. Stewart. 1995. Belated recognition for work-flow entrepreneurs: A case of selective perception and
amnesia in management thought. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 19, 3: 7–24.
Scott, H. 1999. Our future requires collaborative leadership. Workforces 78, 12: 30–34.

50 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol6/iss2/1

50

et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Fall 2003

Slevin, D. P., and J. G. Covin. 1992. Creating and maintaining high-performance teams. In C. A. Kent, D. L. Sexton, and K.
H. Vesper, eds., Encyclopedia of Entrepreneurship, pp. 358–386.
Slevin, D. P., and J. G. Covin. 1995. New ventures and total competitiveness: a conceptual model, empirical results, and
case study examples. In Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research 1995. Babson Park, MA: Center of Entrepreneurial
Studies, Babson College, pp. 574–588.
Sorenson, R. L. 1999. Conflict management strategies used by successful family businesses. Family Business Review 12, 2:
133–146.
Sorenson, R. L. 2000. The contribution of leadership styles and practices to family and business success. Family Business
Review 8, 3: 183–200.
Sorenson, R. L., E. A. Morse, and G. T. Savage. 1999. A test of the motivations underlying choice of conflict strategies in the
dual-concern model. International Journal of Conflict Management 10, 1: 25–44.
Stevenson, H. H., and Gumpert, D. E. 1985. The heart of entrepreneurship. Harvard Business Review 63, 2: 85–94.
Stevenson, H. H., and Jarrillo, J. C. (1990). A paradigm of entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial Management. Strategic
Management Journal 11: 17–27.
Stewart, A. 1989. Team entrepreneurship. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Stoner, C. R. 1987. Distinctive competence and competitive advantage. Journal of Small Business Management 25, 2: 33–39.
Thomas, K. W. 1992. Conflict and negotiation processes in organizations. In M. D. Dunnette and L. M. Hough, eds.,
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc., pp. 651–718.
Tiessen, J. H. 1997. Individualism, collectivism, and entrepreneurship: A framework for international comparative
research. Journal Business Venturing 12, 5: 367–384.
Vroom, V. H., and Yetton, P. W. 1973. Leadership and decision making. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.
Wall, J. A., and R. R. Callister. 1995. Conflict and management. Journal of Management 21, 3: 515–558.
Weiss, H. M. 1977. Subordinate imitation of supervisor behavior: The role of modeling in organizational socialization.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 19: 89–105.
Yukl, G. 1998. Leadership in organizations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

About the Authors
JUN YAN (jyan@csulb.edu) is an assistant professor of management at California State University, Long
Beach. He received his Ph.D. in management from Texas Tech University. Dr. Yan’s areas of research
include entrepreneurship, family business, and international management.

RITCH L. SORENSON (ritch.sorenson@ttu.edu) is professor and area coordinator of management in the
Rawls College of Business at Texas Tech University. Dr. Sorenson received his Ph.D. from Purdue
University. He has published articles in a variety of journals including Group and Organization Studies,
Family Business Review, and The Leadership Quarterly. His current research interests include family business, entrepreneurship, conflict management, and leadership.

COLLECTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FAMILY FIRMS 51
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2003

51

New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 6 [2003], No. 2, Art. 1

52 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP

https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol6/iss2/1

52

et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Fall 2003

Propensity to Trust, Purchase Experience,
and Trusting Beliefs of Unfamiliar E-Commerce Ventures
Gregory B. Murphy

T

rust has become a major issue among online shoppers.
This underresearched subject will predictably determine
the success or failure of e-commerce vendors. The lack of
face-to-face interaction, the inability to inspect goods and services prior to purchase, and the asynchronous exchange of goods
and money all contribute to the perceived risk of purchasing
online and the resulting need for trust. Trust is particularly critical for small and new Internet ventures confronted by the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965). Lacking, among other
things, a name that is readily recognized in the marketplace,
entrepreneurial Internet ventures require trust if they are to
succeed. The research presented in this article addresses this
issue by building on the work of McKnight and colleagues and
considering the effects of propensity to trust on trusting beliefs.
Specifically, the author predicts that propensity to trust will significantly affect perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity but
only for those individuals with limited direct experience. Based
on a sample of web survey participants, the author found that
propensity to trust significantly impacted perceived ability and
benevolence for individuals with limited direct experience only.
No statistically significant results were found for the effects of
propensity to trust on perceived integrity.
Trust has been argued to be “the most significant longterm barrier for realizing the potential of e-commerce to
consumers” (Grabner-Kraeuter 2002, 43). This underresearched subject (Cheung and Lee 2001; McCole 2002) will
predictably be a “key differentiator that will determine the
success or failure of many Web companies” (Urban,
Sultan, and Qualls 2000). Hoffman, Novak, and Peralta
(1999) noted that many would-be customers lack the trust
in e-commerce vendors to go ahead and click the purchase
button. Trust is particularly important for e-commerce
ventures since, first, customers are usually not able to personally inspect the quality of goods and services or the
venture’s professionalism (McKnight and Chervany 2001;
Torkzadeh and Dhillon 1999) and, secondly, Internet purchases are typically viewed as being more risky (Lee and
Turban 2001) since the exchange of goods and money are
not simultaneous (Grabner-Kraeuter 2002; Warrington,
Abgrab, and Caldwell 2000; Yoon 2002). The lack of faceto-face interaction between salesperson and customer further inhibits the development of trust in online markets

(Chadwick 2001; Papadopoulou, Andreou, Kanellis, and
Markatos 2001; Yoon 2002). This lack of trust is particularly important for entrepreneurial ventures online as they
strive to overcome the liability of newness (Stinchcombe
1965), lacking, among other things, a name that is readily
recognized in the marketplace (Murphy and Smart 2000).
Previous research has shown that brick-and-mortar establishments with strong brand identification enjoy a considerable advantage when establishing an online store
(Cheskin Research/Studio Archetype 1999). The online
business is seen as legitimate and trustworthy as a result
of the previously established brand name awareness and
reputation (Yoon 2002). Entrepreneurial online ventures,
however, tend to have little or no name recognition even if
the business has a corresponding brick-and-mortar establishment (Murphy and Smart 2000).
Gaining legitimacy and trust is important for the nascent online ventures success and survival as it facilitates
the venture’s ability to attain needed resources (Murphy
and Smart 2000; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). The digital
economy does allow small entrepreneurial ventures to
quickly and inexpensively compete side-by-side with
industry titans (Joshi and Yermish 2000). Although entry
barriers are low in the digital economy, trust is desperately needed for the small entrepreneurial venture to generate sales sufficient to sustain and grow the venture
(Murphy and Smart 2000).
Recent research has begun to address this issue by
offering (Cheung and Lee 2001; Gefen 2002; GrabnerKraeuter 2002; Javenpaa, Tractinsky, and Vitale 2000;
Kimery and McCord 2002; Lee and Turban 2001;
McKnight and Chervany 2001; Murphy and Smart 2000)
and testing (Gefen 2002; Kimery and McCord 2002; Lee
and Turban 2001; McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar
2002a; McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar 2002b;
McKnight, Kacmar, and Choudhury 2003; Murphy and
Blessinger 2003) models of online trust development. Only
Lee and Turban (2001), however, tested the relationship
between propensity to trust and trusting beliefs.
Specifically, Lee and Turban (2001) found that propensity
to trust moderated the relationship between perceived
integrity (a trusting belief) and consumer trust in Internet
shopping. McKnight and Chervany (2001) proposed
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propensity to trust as an antecedent of trusting beliefs for
online shoppers but did not empirically test the relationship. This study seeks to extend this line of research by
investigating the effects of propensity to trust on the basic
trusting beliefs of perceived ability, benevolence, and
integrity (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; McKnight,
Cummings, and Chervany 1998). Information gained from
this study may be useful to e-commerce ventures in building a level of trust necessary to encourage online shoppers
to click the purchase button, an action clearly necessary to
survive and succeed as an online vendor.
McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) noted
that initial trust formation is based on either the individual’s propensity to trust or on information cues that promote trust in the absence of experience. Murphy and
Smart (2000) and Murphy and Blessinger (2003) consider
the effects of information cues but do not consider the
effects of disposition or propensity to trust. Rotter (1971)
stated that the impact of generalized expectancies
(propensity to trust) should vary from situation to situation, depending on the novelty of the situation. Context
and experience are, as a result, important when considering the effects of propensity to trust.

Trust

Trust is a complex construct and the definition of trust is
not widely agreed upon (McKnight and Chervany 2001).
McKnight and Chervany (2001) note that trust is a subject
of interest to several major disciplines (psychology, economics, sociology, and social psychology) and that functional orientations logically lead scholars in different fields
to adopt different definitions. There are, however, some
common elements of major trust definitions. Specifically,
there is a willingness to make oneself vulnerable under the
general conditions of risk and uncertainty (McKnight and
Chervany 2001; Rousseau, Stikin, Burt, and Camerer
1998). The need for trust increases as individuals have less
information and experience in dealing with each other
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994) and is considered to be a critical
element needed to facilitate most exchange relationships
(Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995; Ring 1996; Rousseau,
Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998) including Internet transactions (Gefen 2002).
Different disciplines tend to focus on different trust
relationships. Much of the management literature dealing
with the subject of trust tends to focus on trust within
organizations (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995;
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998) while other
parts of the literature focus on trust between persons and
organizations (McKnight and Chervany 2001; McKnight,
Choudhury, and Kacmar, 2002a; McKnight, Cummings,

and Chervany 1998). The focus of this study is person-toorganization trust. The within organization trust literature
will be used, however, to the extent that the concepts logically extend to person-to-organization trust.

Trusting Beliefs

Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) offered what they
termed factors of trust. McKnight and colleagues
(McKnight and Chervany 2001; McKnight, Choudhury,
and Kacmar 2002a and b; and McKnight, Cummings, and
Chervany 1998) referred to these same factors as trusting
beliefs. Both Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and
McKnight and colleagues extensively reviewed the trust
literature and identified common and important trusting
beliefs. Specifically, the authors identified ability, benevolence, and integrity as factors of trust or trusting beliefs.
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, 717) noted that these
factors are “not trust per se,” but they “help build the
foundation for the development of trust.” McKnight,
Cummings, and Chrevany (1998) and McKnight and
Chervany (2001) are also careful to state that these trusting
beliefs are part of a broader trust typology. These trusting
beliefs are extremely important, however, because they are
posited to directly affect trusting intentions (McKnight,
Cummings, and Chervany 1998; McKnight and Chervany
2001) and trust itself (Lee and Turban 2001; Mayer, Davis,
and Schoorman 1995).
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) defined ability as
“that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that
enable a party to have influence within some specific
domain” (717). They stress the specificity of the domain of
influence given the contextual applicability of specific
skills, competencies, and characteristics. McKnight and
Chervany (2001, 49) add that “in the case of the Internet
relationship, the consumer would believe that the vendor
can provide goods and services in a proper and convenient
way.” Benevolence was defined as “the extent to which a
trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside
from an egocentric profit motive” (Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman 1995, 718). “Benevolence is the perception of a
positive orientation of the trustee toward the trustor” (719).
In the context of e-commerce, McKnight and Chervany
(2001, 49) add that “a benevolent Internet vendor would
not be perceived to act opportunistically by taking advantage of the trustor.” Integrity is defined as the “trustor’s
perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles
that the trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman 1995, 719). In this particular context, the consumer believes that the Internet vendor will fulfill its ethical obligations (McKnight and Chervany 2001, 49). It is
important to note that these trusting beliefs—ability,
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benevolence, and integrity—are all perceptions of the
trustor about the trustee. McKnight and Chervany (2001,
46) commented that “trusting beliefs means that one
believes that the other party has one or more characteristics
beneficial to oneself. In terms of characteristics, the consumer wants the e-vendor to be willing and able to act in
the consumer’s interest, honest in transactions, and both
capable of, and predictable at, delivering as promised.”
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) conclude that
ability, benevolence, and integrity are related but separable and that together they explain much of the variance in
trustworthiness while maintaining parsimony. Gefen’s
(2002) study empirically supports the validity of ability,
benevolence, and integrity as trusting beliefs. Principal
component analysis revealed clean factor loadings, and
confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL confirmed the
validity of using ability, benevolence, and integrity as
important and distinct trusting beliefs, using two different
samples of MBA students. Goodness of fit indexes strongly supported the model. Likewise, McKnight, Choudhury,
and Kacmar (2002a) examined the factor structure of the
three trusting beliefs and found strong convergent and
discriminant validity.
Much of the literature on trust assumes the presence of
a prior relationship (Bigley and Pearce 1998; Garbarino
and Johnson 1999; Gulati 1995; Harrison, Dibben, and
Mason 1997; Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorderhaven
1997). However, there is evidence that trust can be present,
and in some cases strong, in the absence of a prior relationship (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998).
McKnight, Cummings and Chervany (1998, 474–475) note
that initial trust is not based on experience or prior knowledge but rather on “an individual’s disposition to trust or
on institutional cues that enable one person to trust another without firsthand knowledge.” Building initial trust is
precisely the dilemma faced by aspiring entrepreneurial
Internet ventures (Murphy and Smart 2000). Lacking
name recognition and exposure in the marketplace, new
and/or small Internet ventures are likely very dependent
on the consumer’s disposition or propensity to trust.

Propensity to Trust

Rotter (1971, 444) defined what he called interpersonal
trust as “an expectancy held by an individual or a group
that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of
another individual or group can be relied on.” Rotter
(1971) adds that such expectancies are generalized and
constitute a relatively stable personality characteristic.
More recently, trust researchers have referred to these
same generalized expectancies as propensity to trust or
disposition to trust (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995;

Bigley and Pearce 1998; Kimery and McCord 2002; Lee,
and Turban 2001; McKnight and Chervany 2001;
McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998; Cheung and
Lee 2001). Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, 715)
defined propensity to trust as “a stable within party factor
that will affect the likelihood the party will trust.”
Consistent with other definitions of propensity to trust,
Bigley and Pearce (1998, 410) comment that “factors exist
within individuals that predispose them to trust or distrust others, whom they do not know.” Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman (1995) note that at the extremes some people
are willing to grant total blind trust while others will not
trust regardless of the circumstances that make it relevant
to trust. This individual characteristic is said to be something akin to a personality trait (Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman 1995) that is the product of early life socialization experiences (Bigley and Pearce 1998; McKnight,
Cummings, and Chervany 1998).
In their reviews of the literature, Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman (1995) note that propensity to trust has been
found to be significantly related to important organizational outcomes in different contexts. Lee and Turban
(2001, 77) comment that “a consideration of consumer
trust in Internet shopping that did not examine trust
propensity, a personality trait of the concerned consumers,
would be quite inadequate.” Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman (1995) and McKnight and colleagues
(McKnight and Chervany 2001; McKnight, Cummings,
and Chervany 1998) also suggest that propensity to trust
should be significantly related to trusting beliefs.
However, McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998)
report mixed empirical findings and conclude that any
link has yet to be adequately proven. Bigley and Pearce
(1998) comment on the empirical literature and note that
many of the studies that have failed to find significant
results did not consider the novelty of the situation in
determining the salience of propensity to trust. In support
of Bigley and Pearce (1998), Rotter (1971, 445) does comment that “the more novel the situation, the greater weight
generalized expectancies have.” Rotter (1971, 445) adds
that “the situation partially determines the response, and
the theory predicts that situations of considerable familiarity are less predictable from a generalized tendency than
those involving more novelty.” McKnight and Chervany
(2001, 45) add that “disposition to trust will affect trust in
a specific other (interpersonal trust), but only when novel
situations arise in which the other and the situation are
unfamiliar.”
The effects of propensity to trust should be strongest
in the absence of previous experience. For the Internet
shopper in particular, a lack of online experience creates a
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novel and unfamiliar situation that should promote the
importance of propensity to trust on trusting beliefs
(McKnight and Chervany 2001). Since a potential Internet
customer is unlikely to have previously encountered the
website of a given new and/or small Internet venture, the
effects of propensity to trust are particularly salient. Given
such a novel environment, one’s disposition or propensity
to trust may be the only basis for trusting or not trusting
(Johnson-George and Swap 1982).
Linking the previous literatures on propensity to trust
and trusting beliefs, we posit that propensity to trust will
significantly affect evaluations of an e-commerce vendor’s
perceived ability, benevolence, integrity, and trustworthiness—but only for individuals with low Internet purchasing experience. Experienced online shoppers are likely
much less affected by trusting propensities. In such cases,
previous experiences tend to dominate perceptions of
trustworthiness (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany
1998).
Hypothesis 1: Propensity to trust will be significantly
related to perceived ability, but only for respondents
with low experience.
Hypothesis 2: Propensity to trust will be significantly
related to perceived benevolence, but only for respondents with low experience.
Hypothesis 3: Propensity to trust will be significantly
related to perceived integrity, but only for respondents
with low experience.
The theoretical model is presented in Figure 1. The
hypotheses add the effects of direct experience to the
model developed by McKnight and Chervany (2001). The
model presented by McKnight and Chervany (2001) was

Model of Propensity to Trust,

chosen since it has been previously adopted for research
on trust in e-commerce (McKnight and Chervany 2002;
McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar 2002a; McKnight,
Choudhury, and Kacmar, 2002b; McKnight, Kacmar, and
Choudhury 2002). Although McKnight and Chervany
(2001) did not explicitly include experience in their model,
they did comment in their paper that disposition to trust
will only affect trust when novel, unfamiliar situations are
encountered. The model is different from that presented
by Lee and Turban (2001) and Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman (1995) in that, first, propensity to trust is treated in this study as an antecedent of trusting beliefs, consistent with prior research by McKnight and colleagues
(McKnight and Chervany 2002; McKnight, Choudhury,
and Kacmar 2002a; McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar
2002b; McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998;
McKnight, Kacmar, and Choudhury 2002) rather than as a
moderating variable between trusting beliefs and trust;
and second, the effects of experience are considered in this
study. Although Internet shopping experience was not
included in Lee and Turban’s (2001) model, they did
report that 95 percent of the respondents in their sample of
405 business school undergraduates majoring in management information systems at the City University of Hong
Kong had no Internet shopping experience. Lee and
Turban (2001), did, however, assess the effects of trusting
beliefs on perceived trustworthiness. These relationships,
consistent with the model developed by McKnight and
Chervany (2001) are depicted in Figure 1 with dashed lines
since they will not be tested in this study.

Instrument, Sample, Methodology, and Results
Instrument

A web survey was prepared for this study. The survey presented a series of mock e-commerce web pages. All of the
mock web pages were identical except for the information
cue. Information cues are
used by Internet vendors
to try to communicate
their
trustworthiness
(Grabner-Kraeuter 2002;
Murphy and Smart 2000;
Warrington, Abgrab, and
Caldwell 2000) and are
particularly relevant for
inexperienced Internet
shoppers (Murphy and
Smart 2000). The pages
depicted a fictional eFigure 1
commerce
business
Direct Experience, and Trusting Beliefs
named
“Collectibles
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Inc.” and included a subheading (“Your one-stop shop for
collectibles”) and six pictures of collectible items (antique
furniture, Elvis Presley postage stamp, old comic book,
print of a classic painting, bell bottom jeans, and Yogi Bear
slippers). The collectibles industry was chosen because it
presents a relatively high risk of opportunistic behavior
and, as such, emphasizes the importance of trust and
trustworthiness.1 Doney and Cannon (1997) note that
some level of risk is needed for trust to be operative.
Sheppard and Sherman (1998) add that benevolence is
only relevant in the presence of considerable risks. Kimery
and McCord (2002) add that trust has the effects of reducing risk perceptions and increasing risk-taking behavior.
Each of the 16 mock pages contained a different information cue.2 The specific cues used are listed in Table 1.
The use of information cues is consistent with McKnight
and Chervany (2001) and others (McCole 2002) in positing
that web vendor interventions that are appropriately communicated to potential e-commerce customers (Chadwick
2001) have the potential to impact trusting beliefs. The
specific information cues used (from Murphy and
Blessinger 2003) and the specific intervention or trustbuilding strategy they are intended to measure are presented in Table 1. Murphy and Blessinger (2003) developed their cues from the work of Murphy and Smart
(2000) and focus specifically on the case of new and small
entrepreneurial Internet ventures that have yet to establish
a strong, readily recognizable brand name. The developed
cues focus on new and/or small businesses’ ability to
communicate similarity to trusted forms (isomorphism) as

well as their ability to strategically communicate transference or identification; competency, value, and goal congruence; the presence of structural assurances; and a history of fulfillment with other customers (Murphy and
Blessinger 2003; Murphy and Smart 2000). While communicating a history of successful fulfillment with other customers is not possible for completely new ventures, it is
possible and likely an important cue for a small business
seeking to expand its geographic reach by venturing
online (Murphy and Blessinger 2003; Murphy and Smart
2000).
Respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions
of the mock vendor’s ability, benevolence, and integrity
using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4= agree, 5 = strongly disagree) on the bottom of each of the 16 pages.
Respondents were asked in the introduction to the survey
and on each page of the survey to consider only the information available on the immediate page in answering the
questions.
To measure perceived ability, respondents were asked
to rate their agreement with the following statement: “I
believe this e-commerce vendor has the ability to deliver
goods as promised.” To measure perceived benevolence,
respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the
following statement: “I believe this e-commerce vendor
has my best interests in mind.” To measure perceived
integrity, respondents were asked to rate their agreement
with the following statement: “I believe this e-commerce
vendor follows acceptable business practices.” Each of

Table 1
Communicated Cues and Their Respective Strategies
Cue

Strategy Communicated

Certified compliance with all legal and regulatory agencies
Questions? Please call our showroom at 1-800-579-6548
Highest rating by MySimon.com
“We put our trust in Collectibles Inc.” —Mark and Mary Thompson
Member of the Chamber of Commerce and the Web Merchants Association
Over 30 years experience
We employ only the best trained and educated web technicians
Payment security assured
We promise to keep your personal information confidential
Your money back if not fully satisfied
All orders promptly delivered by two-day delivery. Order tracking available
Over 10,000 orders have been successfully filled
Make a purchase and a portion of the proceeds will go to the charity of your choice
We offer superior quality and service at competitive prices
Hello, I’m the owner, Cathy. Please e-mail me with your comments
Share your comments and read what other customers have said

Legal and regulatory compliance
Conforming to common expectations
Endorsement (trust broker)
Testimonial
Business alliances
Business and professional experience
Technical competency
Payment security
Information security
Product and/or service guarantee
Fulfillment process clarity
Fulfillment
General value and goal congruence
Clarifying value added
Personalization
Information sharing
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these statements was developed to reflect the definitions
of ability, benevolence, and integrity offered by Mayer,
Davis, and Schoorman (1995). The responses to the different information cues were combined for this study. The
coefficient alphas for the ability, benevolence, and integrity variables were .93, .94, and .92 respectively.
A pilot study was conducted using approximately 30
undergraduate students as subjects. The subjects completed a pencil and paper version of the web survey.
Immediately after the surveys were completed, a feedback
session was conducted to ensure that each information cue
and question was interpreted as intended. Responses indicated good matches between the subjects’ interpretation
and understanding of each question and the corresponding theoretical and methodological underpinnings of
each question.
The propensity to trust scale developed by
Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (1996) was used for this
study. The propensity to trust scale was also administered
online. Data for the scale were collected before the respondents viewed and reacted to the 16 trust-building information cues. Mayer and Davis (1999) used the same scale
and found the coefficient alphas for the two waves of their
study to be .55 and .66. This study found the coefficient
alpha for the scale to be .63. Nunnally (1978) recommends

a threshold of .70 in establishing reasonable scale reliability. Accordingly, the eight items in the scale were factor
analyzed to further investigate the relationships among
the items. Results of the factor analysis using Varimax
rotation are presented in Table 2. Table 2 also presents the
exact wording of each item.
Two distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than one
were found in the analysis. The two factors appear to
reflect two different propensities: a propensity to trust and
a propensity to distrust. This finding is consistent with the
work of authors who contend that trust and distrust are
different dimensions (Bigley and Pearce 1998; Koehn 2003;
Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998; McKnight, Kacmar,
and Choudhury 2003). Given the poor scale reliability and
the strong match between the factor analysis results and
existing theory, the two factors (propensity to trust and
propensity to distrust) were retained and used in the
remainder of the study.
Internet purchase frequency was used as an indicator of
experience and was measured by asking respondents to
indicate the number of Internet purchases they had made
over the preceding 12 months. One control variable was
used in the study: trust in the Internet. This was deemed
appropriate given the possibility that trust in the Internet
in general may impact the more specific trust in a busi-

Table 2
Factor Analysis Using Varimax Rotation of Propensity to Trust Items
Propensity to
Trust

Propensity to
Distrust

Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.

.67

.03

Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.

.64

.24

Most adults are competent at their jobs.

.61

-.10

Most salespeople are honest in describing their products.

.59

.19

Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.

.58

.06

These days, you must be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.

-.03

.81

One should be very cautious with strangers.

.04

.75

Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their specialty.

.33

.47

Eigenvalue

2.02

1.54

Percent of variance explained

25.29

19.26
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ness-to-consumer e-commerce vendor. Respondents were
asked, “In general, do you trust or distrust the Internet?”
Possible responses ranged from “trust the Internet a great
deal” to “distrust the Internet a great deal.”

Sample

A sample of potential e-commerce customers was sought
for this study. Initially, a two-stage process was used to
identify a sample. To begin, an equal number of male and
female names (100 each) were chosen from the Pregnancy
Today Random Baby Namer website located at
http://www.pregnancytoday.com/names. Each time the
page is updated, the site returns 10 randomly selected
male names and 10 randomly selected female names. The
site purports to contain more than 12,000 names in its
database reflecting all “flavors, colors and origins.” Each
name was then searched for in the World Email Directory
located at http://www.worldemail.com. The search was
limited to individuals in the United States to reduce language and/or cultural differences. Lee and Turban (2001)
note that propensity to trust may be heavily influenced by
culture. Although there is cultural diversity within the
United States, there is no doubt increased cultural diversity when respondents are sought from additional counties.
The World Email Directory reports to have more than 18
million e-mail addresses worldwide in its database and
claims to be the “fastest growing search engine for people,
businesses and organizations.” This process resulted in
548 nonduplicate, individual entries with verifiable3 email addresses.
Dillman’s (2000) recommended procedures for conducting a web and/or Internet survey were followed.
Each subject received a presurvey notice and three subsequent mailings (e-mails) prompting participation. Each of
the three subsequent mailings contained a link to the web
survey, which was hosted on a server at the researcher’s
institution. Contacts were organized into distribution lists
and invitation messages were sent out via blind carbon
copy (bcc) to increase efficiency and to avoid the presentation of multiple entries on the “to” line (Dillman 2000). A
total of 216 usable responses were obtained from this
process (39.4% response rate).
To supplement the responses, approximately 65 senior-level undergraduate students were asked to participate
and to invite their contacts to participate.4 Although the
exact number of persons contacted via this method is
unknown, an impressive 258 usable responses were
obtained from this process. Since this process was decidedly less random and less controlled than the initial collection method, analyses were initially run on the two samples separately. And, since the analyses yielded compara-

ble and consistent results, the two samples were subsequently combined into one sample.
Approximately 60 percent of the respondents were
male, and the average age of the respondents was approximately 27 years old (range of 18–80). The average number
of hours a week spent online was 14.89 (median of 8), and
the average number of Internet purchases over the 12
months prior to the survey was 6.1 (median of 2). When
asked, “In general, do you trust or distrust the Internet ?”
3.1 percent indicated that they trust the Internet a great
deal; 38.8 percent noted that they trust the Internet; 33.7
percent responded that they neither trust not distrust the
Internet, 11.8 percent reported that they distrust the
Internet, and 2.2 percent stated that they distrust the
Internet a great deal.

Methodology

To test the hypotheses that propensity to trust significantly affects perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity in
the absence of experience, the sample was divided into
three subgroups based on the frequency of Internet purchases over the prior 12 months. The first group (low
experience) purchased goods or services over the Internet
no more than once during the prior 12 months. The second
group (medium experience) purchased goods or services
over the Internet between two and five times during the
prior 12 months while the third group (high experience)
purchased goods or services over the Internet more than
six times during the prior 12 months. The hypotheses were
then tested by regressing the control variable, trust in the
Internet, and the two propensity factors on perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity for each of the three groups.
Support for the hypotheses will be found if significant
relationships are found only for the low experience group.

Results

Results of the analysis are presented in Table 3. Support is
found for hypotheses one and two. Propensity to trust was
found to be positively related to perceived ability for the
low experience group only, providing support for hypothesis one. For this sample, inexperienced individuals with a
general tendency to trust gave higher evaluations of vendor ability than those with greater relative experience.
Propensity to distrust was found to be negatively related
to perceived benevolence for the low experience group
only, providing support for hypothesis two. This finding
indicates that inexperienced individuals with a general
tendency to distrust gave lower evaluations of vendor
benevolence than those with more experience. Regarding
hypothesis three, no statistically significant relationships
were found for any of the three experience groups. This
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Table 3
Regression of Propensity to Trust Factors on Perceived Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, and
Trustworthiness for Low, Medium, and High Internet Purchase Frequency Groups
Benevolence

Ability

Integrity

Low frequency group (N=175)
Trust in the Internet

.14

.10

.09

**.26

.12

.04

-.07

*-.21

-.15

Trust in the Internet

-.10

-.03

-.14

Propensity to trust

-.10

-.08

-.08

.08

.02

.04

Trust in the Internet

.01

.05

.03

Propensity to trust

.08

-.16

-.01

-.03

.07

.07

Propensity to trust
Propensity to distrust
Medium frequency group (N=134)

Propensity to distrust
High frequency group (N=96)

Propensity to distrust
Standardized regression coefficients reported
*p<.05, ** p<.01

suggests that propensity to trust and propensity to distrust
may not significantly affect perceptions of integrity and
that differences in experience level may not be relevant in
clarifying the relationship.
Results of this study provide some support for the
proposition that propensity to trust will be most salient in
the absence of prior experience (Rotter 1971; Mayer, Davis,
and Schoorman 1995; McKnight and Chervany 2001;
McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998). No statistically significant relationships were found for the medium
and high frequency purchase groups. This finding suggests that propensity to trust is likely much more important for new and/or small Internet ventures than it is for
well-established Internet ventures that consumers are
more likely to have experienced.
The findings of this study add to the work of McKnight,
Kacmar, and Choudhury (2003). The authors examined the

effects of disposition to trust and disposition to distrust on
institution-based trust (perceptions of the structural assurances of the Web), perceived web site quality, willingness
to explore a web site, and trusting intentions in the web
site. McKnight, Kacmar, and Choudhury (2003) found that
disposition to trust was positively related to structural
assurance perceptions, perceived site quality, and willingness to explore, while disposition to distrust was significantly related to perceptions of deficient structural assurances and negatively related to trusting intentions. This
study also found disposition to trust and disposition to
distrust to be distinct and important to the cause of
Internet vendors. This study adds to the work of
McKnight, Kacmar, and Choudhury (2003) by including
the important variables of trusting beliefs (McKnight and
Chervany 2001) and by specifying the circumstances
under which disposition to trust and distrust are most
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salient (low experience). McKnight, Kacmar, and
Choudhury (2003) identify a contribution of their paper as
showing that disposition to distrust is stronger than disposition to trust in predicting high-risk behaviors. This paper
supports that finding by showing that while propensity to
trust was significantly related to perceived ability, propensity to distrust was found to be significantly related to perceived benevolence. Perceived benevolence, the perception that the trustee is considerate of and acts in the best
interests of the trustor, is likely viewed as being more risky
than perceived ability, which only requires that the trustor
view the trustee as being capable of performing the
required tasks. To believe that another is capable of delivering as promised is not the same as believing that the
other will necessarily do so.
Two of the trust-building cues taken from Murphy and
Blessinger (2003) and used in this study (“over 10,000
orders have been successfully filled” and “over 30 years
experience”), although possibly appropriate for ventures
expanding their existing business over the Internet, are
likely not appropriate for entirely new ventures. To assess
the generalizability of the results of this study to entirely
new ventures, the analysis was repeated without the two
cues that require business experience. The significant relationships were unchanged. Propensity to trust was found
to be positively related to perceived ability for the low
experience group only and propensity to distrust was
found to be negatively related to perceived benevolence
for the low experience group only. No other relationships
were statistically significant. These findings suggest that
the results of this study are generalizable to entirely new
ventures as well as to existing ventures expanding by
using the Internet.

Discussion

There has arguably never been more pressure on e-commerce businesses to gain the trust of Internet users. “When
it comes to using the Internet for business transactions,
gaining the trust of users has been a challenge” (Chapko
1999, 29). Despite the Internet’s rapid growth, there are
still millions of dollars lost everyday from Internet users
abandoning their “shopping carts.” Many web surfers
simply lack the trust necessary to go ahead and click the
purchase button (Hoffman, Novak, and Peralta 1999).
Problems that inhibit trust in e-commerce, such as the
inability to inspect goods and services before purchase
and the lack of simultaneous exchange, are partially overcome by third-party information providers (Ba, Whinston,
and Zhang 2003; Kimery and McCord 2002; Siyal and
Barkat 2002). MySimon, for example, provides ratings of
Internet stores that market products on their web site.

However, problems in establishing trust remain. Kimery
and McCord (2002) found, for example, that frequently
used third-party assurance providers did not significantly
influence respondents’ perceptions of web vendor trustworthiness. Koehn (2003) commented that while thirdparty information providers can help build trust, a favorable certification from a third party will not necessarily
cause the web vendor to be seen as trustworthy by consumers.
This article has sought to improve our understanding
of trust in business-to-consumer e-commerce by examining the effects of propensity to trust on consumer perceptions of e-commerce vendor ability, benevolence, and
integrity. As Rotter (1971) noted, context matters when
considering the effects of propensity to trust. Richness
and theoretical grounding are further added to the study
by including factors of trust or trusting beliefs (perceived
ability, benevolence, and integrity). A contribution is also
made to the literature by supporting Rotter’s (1971) position that propensity to trust is most salient when experience is low. Although trust is likely strongest when prior
experience is high (Doney and Cannon 1997; Garbarino
and Johnson 1999), the effects of disposition or propensity to trust on trusting beliefs are strongest when experience is low. Insight has also been gained on the dimensionality of propensity to trust by finding factors that suggest a propensity to trust and a propensity to distrust.
For the practitioner, the results of this study suggest that, when trying to attract new customers, business-to-consumer e-commerce vendors should focus
more effort on promoting perceived ability than perceived benevolence or integrity. Conversely, this study
suggests that a relative focus on promoting perceived
ability may not be needed when dealing with experienced customers.
Using mock web pages placed the study more in context and hopefully increased the realism of the study relative to conventional survey methods. The use of mock
web pages also allowed for greater experimental control.
By using mock web pages, the researcher was able to carefully control what the respondents were seeing and reacting to. Although a strength of the study, the use of mock
web pages also has its limitations. Specifically, we were
not able to simulate free navigation flow through different web pages. Also, by controlling the content, the mock
sites no doubt lacked the complexity of typical businessto-consumer web sites.
Some recommendations for future research are suggested. A study of the effects of propensity to trust using
real business-to-consumer web sites would be interesting.
Such a study would add further contextual richness and
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possibly increase the realism of the study. Considering
different industries may also influence study results and
may be another point for investigation. It is possible that
different industries present different real and/or perceived risks in type and intensity. Differences in risk may
consequently affect a potential online consumer’s willingness to trust. This study found that experience matters in
determining the effects of propensity to trust. However,
the rate in which experience supplants the effects of
propensity to trust has not, in this context, been adequately explored. Finally, Murphy and Blessinger (2003) found
that trust-building information cues significantly
improved trusting beliefs and perceptions of overall trustworthiness. Further research may find it useful to consider the combined effects of information cues and propensity to trust.

Endnotes

1. A pretest confirmed the perceived relative risk of purchasing collectibles online. Respondents indicated greater
perceived risk when buying collectibles online relative to
buying t-shirts online.
2. Applets were used to speed the loading of what
appeared to the respondent as successive pages.
3. Addresses that did not return a user unknown undeliverable message.
4. Although the use of student samples is often a questionable practice, it should be noted that college students
are, on average, relatively very heavy Internet users
(Anderson 2001). According to Anderson (2001), 28 percent of all Internet users are full-time students and the
typical Internet-using student is on the Internet for 100
minutes a day.
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Musings of a Serial Entrepreneur—
Reconciling Theory with Practice
Joseph E. Levangie

T

o reminisce about my entrepreneurial career with
appropriate self-importance, I might note that I have
helped create companies and jobs. This contributes in a
small way to economic growth. Economic growth is, however,
an often illusive concept to characterize. Job growth is an
essential component of a dynamic, innovative process. In the
late 1970s jobs growth research suggested that the vast majority of new jobs are created by small business formation. Such
empirical research is difficult to support with theoretical constructs. Classic macroeconomics analysis discounts size-offirm as irrelevant. Entrepreneurial contribution is therefore
difficult to assess.
If we cannot divine satisfaction from arcane macroeconomic treatises (e.g., the “creative destruction theory” of
shifting market structure crafted in the 1930s by Joseph
Schumpeter), perhaps we can understand, from a bottom-up
perspective, how these storied champions of small business
formation really think and operate: the entrepreneurs.
If the so-called “science” of economics seems difficult to
nail down, so too are the fundamentals and psychology of
the venturing process. The intrinsic entrepreneurial success
it occasionally spawns, from this practitioner’s vantage
point, represents a true mélange of conflicting views, often
mysterious in its very nature. Accordingly, I choose to study
this curious entrepreneurship process as a set of mysteries!

The Seven Mysteries of Venturing

Let me address the following seven entrepreneurial mysteries:
1. Are entrepreneurs made or born?
2. Does new venturing represent high risk or “measured” risk?
3. Is the business plan a selling document or an integrated and detailed guide?
4. Should entrepreneurs be fast-moving and act with
intuition or employ MBA-like analytical tools?
5. Should emerging companies stay clear of large
entrenched companies or try to work with them?
6. Should entrepreneurs focus on personal equity
control of their company or relinquish control in
exchange for adequate resources?

7. Is the ultimate raise-up of seed and growth capital
a logical fall-out of the entrepreneurship process or
a serendipitous miracle?
I will apply the lessons of my own successes and failures of the last three decades to interpret these dilemmas.

Mystery #1—Born Entrepreneurs

Are entrepreneurs made or born?
Entrepreneurship can involve mind-numbing risk taking and produce brain chemical rushes that defy description. The very nature of analyzing entrepreneurs can be
like trying to interpret the lifestyles of fuzzy, crawly alien
life. An integrating principle is often lacking. The “venturing addiction” can also produce anecdotal tales of entrepreneurs snatching defeat from the jaws of victory:
• I had an enraged entrepreneur throw an ash-filled
trash can at me (he missed) in London when he stubbornly refused to share, with other venture team
members, a meeting with institutional investors. I
persisted. The “team” prevailed. We executed a successful London IPO.
• I was sued by an entrepreneur advisee who was emotionally dismayed that I would not endorse the use of
either his wife’s name or image on a box of
biodegradable diapers.
• I was chastised by a “born again” Christian entrepreneur who challenged my very morality for not
endorsing a (“born-again” logo) venture for which he
intellectually or psychologically could not even craft
a sensible business plan . The lack of this critical document caused all his “born again” investors to walk.
Born or made? My own venturing proclivity is best
described as an acquired quirk, not a genetic or glamorous
gift. I have met just a few life-long, inveterate entrepreneurs. Almost idiot savants, they have been gifted lateral
thinkers in strategic thinking, market interpretation, product development, financial “engineering,” and the like,
while often lacking practical social skills such as tact, flexibility, open communications, team building, and operations savvy. But they’re certainly not idiots. I took the more
traditional route, acquiring academic and business credentials to establish both an economic safe haven and a
knowledge base so I could eventually figure out what I
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wanted to be when I grew up. My entrepreneurial learning
process is unending, and my own “idiot” issue remains
unresolved.
Given that we’re trying to reconcile certain theories
about entrepreneurship with the practical aspects of competing in the deal-making trenches, the notion of who is
attracted to small growth businesses—with what motivation, and what characteristics, and what external environmental influences—is an excellent trigger point to understanding what skill sets become manifest in the entrepreneurial world.
Perhaps a little historic context of regional venture
activity would help. The New England region has long
been a hot bed for entrepreneurs. As Sobel (1974) notes,
the region can boast the early 19th-century factory systems
guru Francis Cabot Lowell. His namesake city on the
Merrimac River once had 11 robust textile mills, using the
Jacquard loom invented in 1801. The use of punched cards
to control the new technology set the stage for later application to the computer industry. Ultimately over the span
of two centuries, all the textile mills were recycled to commercial high tech. Our region has transformed from
dependence on textiles to aerospace/defense, to minicomputers, to biotech, to artificial intelligence, to genomics.
Pumped with ideas from MIT, Harvard and a hundred
other colleges and universities, our regional economy
thrives on brainpower (and precious few state-sponsored
economic incentives!).
Entrepreneurs provide the requisite lubricant. Royal
Little ignored his uncle (Arthur D. Little), dropped out of
Harvard with his own entrepreneurial notion on textile
company roll-ups, and learned entrepreneurial finance
(find high margin companies with tax losses and modest
debt and low stock price; leverage the balance sheet to
borrow the bulk of purchase price; sell off nonperforming
assets; and repay loan). Textron, one of the region’s
biggest employers, was thus born of a guiding consolidation principle and entrepreneurial devotion to execution
of plan.
By the late 1960s, entrepreneurship in New England
was vibrant, but relatively much simpler than today.
General Georges Doriot was the reigning VC guru. A
Harvard Business School professor, he put his American
Research & Development (AR&D) firm in the VC Hall of
Fame for parlaying a $70,000 investment in Digital
Equipment into almost $500 million in less than a decade.
(Of course, the B-School case study revealed in the appendix that AR&D had a negative 9 percent return on the
remainder of its portfolio.) The net PR effect to young,
aspiring entrepreneurs like myself was addictively alluring. Building exciting new companies that create impor-

tant customer-satisfying product offerings was a possible
career choice. I caught the venture bug, big time, and
wanted someday to be an entrepreneur.
The high profile academic who then (and now is chairman of the MIT Entrepreneurship Center) analyzed venture dynamics was Ed Roberts at MIT’s Sloan School. He
penned a classic Harvard Business Review article (Roberts,
circa 1965) on venture spin-offs, showing how hi-tech
firms like Raytheon, Avco, Itek, and others created hundreds of start-ups along Route 128. He ventured across the
Charles River to visit our HBS class (the Management of
New Enterprises—MNE) and interacted with us snotty Bschoolers. Perhaps given that his own father was an owner
of a retail oil business in Chelsea, Massachusetts, a major
premise of Roberts’ research was an “environmental” profile of successful entrepreneurs, wherein he portrayed the
probability of success to correlate with one coming from a
“small business owner” family. Since my auto mechanic
dad was only an employee, I appeared to be entrepreneurially-challenged coming out of the box. Professor
Roberts took my rantings well, noting that my persistence
(read “obnoxiousness”) and analytical comments, peppered with objections to his research structure, significant
sample size, and loose correlation fits more than offset my
presumed environmental shortcomings for small business.
I wrote my second-year HBS paper on entrepreneurial
pursuits in oceanography. (I have yet to dip my big toe
into that marketplace!)
Counterbalancing the traditional business research
approach to entrepreneurship has been the provocative
theories of the psychoanalytical thinkers. Abraham Zaleznik
(circa 1965) and Harry Levinson (1970) attempted to analyze the internal wiring of managers and entrepreneurs.
Zaleznik is a neo-Freudian who smokes big Churchills
and has a symbolic leather couch in his office. As students, we watched psycho-drama movies in his class (e.g.,
The Caine Mutiny and Twelve Angry Men). We read Freud
and learned about the meaning of Dora’s dreams.
Zaleznik focused on how individuals mobilize and use
power derived from position, competence, and personality. Assumed harmony between position and competence
he viewed as naïve, because entrepreneurial position controls the flow of rewards. Disharmonies between an entrepreneur’s designated authority and his actual competence can engender psychological conflicts with his venture team.
Levinson points to venturing decision-making evolving
out of issues of fear and concern for obsolescence. He
analyses the impulsive motives, manipulation, and control
and disillusionment of the CEO (entrepreneur).
Manfred Kets de Vries (1985), an HBS classmate, joined
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the psychoanalytic camp in the 1970s. He views typical
good entrepreneurs as
• achievement-oriented;
• taking responsibility for decisions;
• disliking repetitive routine work;
• having high levels of energy, perseverance, and
imagination;
• willing to take calculated risks; and
• gifted in instilling contagious enthusiasm.
He also addresses the “dark side” of entrepreneurship.
The distinctive attributes of entrepreneurs seem to produce derived negatives in terms of less glamorous personality quirks:
• generating action for action’s sake; thoughtless decision-making;
• difficulty taking direction or advice from board of
directors;
• personality idiosyncrasies—“misfit” behavior;
• need for total control;
• suspicious, almost paranoid, tendencies—perhaps
derived from inner voices of inferiority;
• need for applause;
• hyperactivity; and
• feelings of suffocation.
Where do I come down on the “good” entrepreneur? Table
1 lists my desired attributes for myself, for my partner(s), or
for my mentee (s). I undoubtedly overanalyze entrepreneurs,
but I can only pursue two to three deals a year.
A word of caution. Don’t overly glamorize the entrepreneur. We did it with the American cowboy. Mostly, the
American cowboy was an illiterate, dusty grunt. The
entrepreneur is generally quite literate and often cleaner.

Table 1
The Good Entrepreneur
1. Drive and energy
2. Long-term commitment
3. Self-confident
4. Experienced and successful
5. Hungry
6. Persistent problem solver
7. Plans and sets goals
8. Intelligent risk taker
9. Learns from mistakes
10. Accepts criticism
11. Is Creative, takes initiative, makes things happen
12. Good at using available resources
13. Desires to win
14. Integrity
15. Superman (woman)

Just as the recognition, applause, and euphoria of
receiving a fancy parchment diploma from a prestigious
university only shrouds the years of tedious, occasionally
hopeless, toil preceding the glamour of the academic milestone, so too is the notoriety attached to a successful entrepreneurial effort. It’s real hard work. Only less difficult
than such impossible challenges as finding a cure for the
common cold, giving birth to a baby, or being a member of
Red Sox Nation. It’s 2 percent inspiration and 98 percent
perspiration. The former is extolled. The latter soon evaporates from memory.
The successful entrepreneur can and should be viewed
favorably. MIT’s Edward Schou noted, “Champions of new
invention display persistence and courage of heroic quality.”

Mystery #2—Venturing Risk

Does new venturing represent high risk or “measured risk?”
Like many of the best entrepreneurs I have known, I
firmly adhere to the adage “It is far better to be lucky than
smart, any time, every time!” We certainly acknowledge
the rigors of the Darwinian, survival-of-the-fittest law of
the jungle. But if you bump into a free lunch, enjoy the free
lunch! As a 23-year-old, fresh out of B-School, I was
assigned to take an analytical look at a modular housing
venture. Fortuitously, Business Week had that very week
published a 46-page cover story on the housing industry
that allowed me to quickly assemble a 60-page presentation and champion the opportunity, ultimately letting me
secure corporate backing in just seven weeks. How good is
that kind of good luck?
Why look for good luck? Because being an entrepreneur
in a dynamic, competitive market environment is so difficult. So many variables are in play. Some (independent)
variables, you may be able to control. Most (dependent)
variables, you hope you can influence your way. Like
USAF test pilots or barnstorming daredevils, entrepreneurs want to measure, control, and minimize risk while
getting the job done—successful small business growth.
Churchill and Lewis (1983) provide a framework for the
five stages of small business growth:
1. Existence
2. Survival
3. Success
4. Take-off
5. Resource maturity
Uncertainty is highest in the early stages. If lucky and if
the entrepreneur manages risk well, risk should diminish
across stages. But the nature of the numbers problem persists:
• 1 of 19 new products will succeed.
• Less than 10 percent of all new industrial products
will return a profit.
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• As much as 50 percent of present revenues in most
major industrial companies are accounted for by
products not in existence five years ago.
The first 98 percent of product development is relatively
easy. The last 2 percent is very hard. So imagine how risky
the marketplace is for a raw start-up with no long-term
customer base and no infrastructure! Short-term venture
sales are, therefore, critical. Revenues cover a variety of
venture sins. Cash flow is helped. Validation of the venture
begins.
And the entrepreneur may have no resources! Arthur
Rock (1987), an experienced venture capitalist, reports his
experience. Rock looks at more than 300 business plan proposals a year. At the end of the year, he has invested in only
one or two companies. Entrepreneurs can spend more than
half their time during stage one (existence) looking for
seed capital. And the odds are that they will come up dry.
What due diligence is required to vet the entrepreneur?
What questions do I ask myself, my partners, my advisers? Table 2 lists my typical sequence.
If—that’s a big “IF”—suitable answers are provided, risk
can be assessed and managed. And IF I don’t lie to myself
(the far too prevalent “self-deception”), and IF my partners
or venture incubators don’t lie to me. Due diligence really
means finding the right answer to these questions.

Table 2
Ten Questions to Ask a Small Business
1. Is the company in an area of emerging technology?
2. Is there a market for the technology or product?
3. Why didn’t an established company decide to
exploit and market the product?
4. Is there a natural product line or follow-on
technology?
5. Does management have corporate experience?
6. What are management’s goals?
7. Does management have a 10-year objective and
5-year plan?
8. Does management understand:
•Research & Development?
•Product Development?
•Manufacturing?
•Finance?
•Accounting?
•Legal?
•Marketing & Sales?
•Other?
9. Does management understand the nature and use
of money?
10. Does management have a competent, recognized
leader and decisionmaker?

Table 3
The Business Plan
1. Executive Summary
2. Description of Business & Industry
3. Features & Advantages of Products or Services
- Descriptions, Proprietary Position, Potential
4. Market Analysis
- Customers - Market Size and Trends
- Competition
- Estimated Market Share and Sales
5. Marketing Plan
- Marketing plan - Pricing
- Sales Tactics - Service and Warranty Policies
- Advertising, Public Relations, and Promotion
6. Product Development Plan
- Development Status and Tasks
- Difficulties and Risk - Costs
7. Operations Plan
- Geographic Location - Facilities & Improvements
- Strategy and Plans - Labor Force
8. Management Team
- Organization - Key Management Personnel
- Management Compensation & Ownership
- Board of Directors
- Management Assistance and Training Needs
- Supporting Professional Services
- Public Accounting Firm - Legal Counsel
9. Overall Schedule
- Incorporate Venture
- Completion of Product Development
- Sales Representation
- Dates of Displays at Trade Shows
- Build-up of Inventory - Start of Operation
- Receipt of First Orders - First Sales and Deliveries
- Payment of First AIR (Cash “in”)
Also:
- Number of Management Personnel
- Number of Operations Personnel
- Additions to Plant or Equipment
10. Critical Risks and Problems
- Price Cutting - Bad Inventory Trends
- Overruns in Product Development
- Overruns in Operating Costs
- Low Orders - Schedule Delays
- Long Lead Times in Procurement
- Credit Line - New Equity
- Lack of Availability of Trained Labor
11. The Financial Plan
- Income Statement - Balance Sheet
- Cash Flow - Key Ratios - Assumptions
12. Proposed Company Offering
- Desired Financing - Capitalization - Use of Funds
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Truth be told, no new venture at outset has a probability of success much above 3 to 5 percent. Why? If you take
the inherent uncertainty of each of the 6 to 10 functional
areas (e.g., finance, R&D, product development, sales, production, distribution, etc.), and lay out the sequence of a
simple decision tree, you generate hundreds of milestones
(events and decision points) that must be resolved in
stages to reduce the band of uncertainty. Intelligent execution of the daily plan is critical. Two friends/colleagues—
Baty (1974, 1990) and Brown (1980)—address execution.
God is in the details. Incremental progress against agreedupon milestones reduces risk. A successful journey
through the venture minefield results in the eventual
reduction of risk.
The entrepreneur, however intuitive, must remember to
show constant vigilance regarding those pesky land
mines. Managing that risk is something I highly endorse.
Perhaps the entrepreneur should consider the Serenity
Prayer: God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the
wisdom to know the difference.

Mystery #3–
Role of the Business plan

Is the Business plan a selling document or an integrated and
detailed guide?
Many of us, or our kids, invest considerable time and
energy playing fantasy baseball or fantasy football. It’s fun
but not real. So, too, goes the game of fantasy business
plan. The only certainty with a really comprehensive business plan is that what really eventuates will be substantially different from the scenarios presented in the plan’s
glossy pages. As the wag noted, “Forecasting is always
difficult, particularly when it’s about the future!”
The business plan is an integrated document that
embodies narrative and numbers. Long-winded, incoherent, poorly-written plans are common. Clear, well-written,
and concise plans that insightfully crystallize the crux of
the business concept are quite rare. My personal business
plan outline is listed in Table 3. One customizes the content appropriate to the company’s business.
Business plans must be
• concise,
• complete,
• consistent,
• powerful,
• easy-to-understand, and
• obvious as to how the application of funds reduce
venture risk.
My personal prejudice toward business plans is built
upon 35 years of being in their midst. Familiarity breeds

contempt. I would estimate that I’ve personally written 650
to 700 plans and reviewed, in depth, 2,200 to 2,500. I have
seen all kinds of attempts to communicate (or obfuscate in
the case of a bunch of dot.coms). As with most entrepreneur-investors, I’ve really been there; don’t try to BS a BS-er!
Theory v. Practice. White and Graham (1978) provide a
model for spotting technological winners. They identify 4
“merits”:
1. Inventiveness
2. Embodiment (e.g., miniaturization)
3. Operational
4. Market
These merit assessments lead to a sense of technological
potency and business advantage, which may then translate
into innovative success. I have found this theory helpful as
a checklist to dissecting the plan. My ultimate test is taking that great Internet-induced buzzword—”business
model”—and applying common sense:
• Perform extensive sensitivity analysis on the
spreadsheet projections;
• Test the assumptions for consistency, accuracy,
and completeness;
• Ask the really important questions:
- Who is the customer and what does he
or she want?
- What value is provided?
- What is the competition?
- How does the company actually
make money?
Business Models; Case Examples. Magretta (2002) cites
two examples of business models. In 1892, American
Express introduced the travelers’ check. The advantage?
Customers paid for the checks up front. It worked on float!
Great concept. Sound premise. In contrast, Disney opened
European amusement parks with a glaring error in one
assumption on restaurant utilization. Americans eat in
park restaurants all day long. Europeans have precise, set
eating schedules. Disney lost millions before fine-tuning
an acceptable solution. Understand what makes the business model really work.
Opportunity for Change in Direction. I use the business
plan more as a validation and communication device,
than as a management control tool. The plan can help
change strategic direction. On two major deals, I actually
convinced the venture team to change the end market:
1. Color-matching case example. Instead of the dental
market (enamel color matching) where dentists are
hard to access and nearly impossible to sell, we
switched over to the retail paint market where
40,000 retail paint dealers could be accessed
through 40 paint manufacturers.
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2. DC to AC Electric conversion case example. Instead of
attacking the residential solar electric market and
competing with large utilities, we convinced the
team to become an uninterruptible power source
(UPS) supplier for the then-emerging personal computer market. Having the right business concept
resulted in billions of dollars of created market value.
Depth of Analysis. Clopton’s law states: “For every
credibility gap, there is a gullibility fill.” With business
plans, you risk sudden death using this premise. Assume
all facts will be checked and assumptions questioned by
investors. Practical suggestions include looking at
• Customer purchase orders (POs) and letters of intent
(LOIs)
• Bill of materials authenticated by vendors
• Banking facilities showing working capital availability
• Useful comparative ratio information from recognized
sources:
- Dun & Bradstreet
- Standard & Poors Corporation
- Robert Morris Associates
- Value Line
- Various trade associations
On the color-matching “Greenfield” IPO placement on
the London Stock Exchange, my spreadsheet was actually
audited cell-by-cell by a then-Big 7 firm. I did everything
but put my first-born male in escrow! Assumptions were
cross correlated to the aforementioned documents (POs,
LOIs). By doing it “right” and completely, we successfully
raised $2.8 million in a precedent-setting deal.
Basis of Due Diligence. The business plan allows
potential investors to initiate due diligence. As an entrepreneur, you want this to happen well and efficiently in
order to attract the desired investment.
Linde and Prasad (2000) wrote the MIT
Entrepreneurship Center study on Angel Investors. While
some angels act intuitively, some conduct detailed due
diligence. They
• Read through the business plan.
• Speak extensively with the entrepreneur and the management team.
• Check the references and background of the team.
• Phone current and prospective customers.
• Discuss and introduce the company to prospective
customers and strategic partners to gain a better
understanding of market interest.
• Ask technology experts to evaluate the technology.
• Discuss the deal with targeted industry business associates.
• Understand product-specific market issues by talking
with industry consultants and investment bankers.

• Ask other angel investors or venture capitalists familiar with the industry to look at the deal.
A good business plan sets you on the right track.

Mystery #4—Intuition v. Analysis

Should entrepreneurs be fast-moving and act with intuition or
employ MBA-like analytical tools?
In a sense, this mystery in some circumstances is almost a
nonissue. With truly experienced, competent entrepreneurs,
their extensive knowledge base, intellect, and personal
insight from past successes and failures imbue them with an
analytical sixth sense that seems hard-wired into their DNA.
Perceptions of Analysis. Sixth-sense intuition may
seem nonanalytical to some casual observers. Many
investors, in fact, are critical of stubborn entrepreneurs
who might deem requests for supporting management
analysis (reports, forecasts, budgets, schedules, ratio
analysis) to be interfering and a “useless crutch.” Their
board of directors and investors (many with MBAs) may
well view such requested analytical oversight as “management religion” that needs appropriate devotion.
I have mediated this debate for years. The flip side
extreme, of course, was our MIT ScD CEO who, having
sold just his first three black boxes (UPS), wrote his own
customized inventory control system that could have
helped to run all of General Motors! It was overkill! We
substituted a $30 software package.
Three important points to the analytically-reluctant
entrepreneur
1. The board of directors and investors are really your
“customers.” If they want an analytical measure of
XYZ, they probably should get it. This marketing
approach eliminates a potential negative.
2. Creative use of analytical tools can create valuable
respect and trust. For example, Admiral Hyman
Rickover, father of the U.S. Nuclear Submarine
program, gained unprecedented independence
from his DoD bosses by adopting Program
Evaluation and Reporting Technique (PERT) controls for the management of the program. This preemptive approach creates a positive.
3. An ability to apply concepts like game theory (winwin, win-lose, lose-lose) helps in all phases of
growing a company. Win-win outcomes create a
bigger pie from which all players can share.
Need for Better Analysis. Sometimes, beyond issues of
perception, the entrepreneur actually needs the help of
MBA-like tools. Consider two examples:
1. Defensive: Investors, bankers, and auditors tend to
be analytical. Armed with their assessments, they
can kill the entrepreneur’s pet project as too risky.
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Hodder and Riggs (1985) report that under many
circumstances, the traditional risk assessments
overstate risk:
• Improper treatment of inflation effects
• Excessive downward ROI (DCF) adjustments
for risk, even when risk actually decreases in
later stages of the project
• Failure to acknowledge how management can
proactively influence the reduction of risk
2. Offensive: In one of our young public companies,
we closed on an $11.5 million secondary offering
only because we could schedule an M&A transaction in 75 days rather than the expected 120 days.
The secret? We used PERT to fast-track the closing
of the transaction. Without this analytical tool,
there would be no deal. The market capitalization
increased 150 percent!

Table 4
Warning Signals
• Financials and ratios ignored: Margin, market, debt,
capital, people
• Excuses: Lame and repetitive
• Inadequate control and information systems
• Projects delayed, over cost, behind on milestones
• Morale suddenly low
Consequences. Despite good intentions, ventures can
turn sour. Table 4 lists warning signs that repeat themselves all too often. Table 5 lists internal problems.
Entrepreneurs, self-styled as invincible, often ignore these
warnings. Compliant BODs become unwitting enablers.
Disaster looms.
Hamm (2002) addresses the classic shortcoming of
entrepreneurs’ ability to scale up operations.
Entrepreneurs who can scale must take deliberate steps to
confront their shortcomings and become the leaders their
organizations need them to be. What barriers do many
entrepreneurs subconsciously introduce to thwart their
own efforts? Consider these negatives:
• Undue loyalty to comrades.
• Task orientation rather than goal-orientation.
• Single-mindedness and insensitivity to others.
• Diffidently working in isolation.
The consequences to the entrepreneur of not adapting
to the needs of his or her growing company can be dire.
Consider
• I have led the firing of five CEOs of public companies
we have founded or cofounded.
• I have been fired three times.
• I have fired myself twice.

Table 5
Internal Problems
• Management factor
- Inadequate depth
- Limited experience
- One-person rule
- Inbred bureaucracy
• Weak finance function
- Lack of operating controls
• Nonparticipative board
Not all relationships last forever, even with the companies we start up ourselves. MBA tools can and should help
the venture relationship to be more robust and last longer.
But not always. Certainly not when other, stronger egos
are in conflict. In the end, the analytical approach to entrepreneurship can help the evolving small business immeasurably, as long as it isn’t preempted by the darker psychological underbelly of the entrepreneur.

Mystery #5—Dancing with the Big Guys

Should emerging companies stay clear of large entrenched companies or try to work with them?
Tales of Odd Couples. Even the most optimistic dealmaker acknowledges that the notion of a small venture
approaching a megacompany for a discussion or potential
strategic alliance is truly incongruous. The two entrepreneurs might typically sit in the oversized conference room
that comfortably seats 250, waiting for a battalion of 25 to 30
MBAs, PhDs, CPAs, and BMOCs to troop in. Their corporate staff of 2,700 oversees their 310,000 employees. “What
do you guys want to do?” they ask. They view this interruption as an “aggravation meeting” that must be dealt with
politely, but quickly. In contrast, the entrepreneurs aggressively approach the “big opportunity” like a flea climbing
the elephant’s leg with intent to rape. The circus act begins.
Occasionally, an alliance agreement with a Big Guy is
actually secured. For example:
• Our waste tire recycling company allied with a $1 billion liquid nitrogen vendor (vendor and equity agreements). Also, the company allied with a $3 billion
waste management company (which led to the $6 million acquisition of their tire-related assets).
• Our medical laser company allied with Massachusetts
General Hospital and funded (and received licensing
rights to) contract research for world-class medical
technology.
• London investors actually loved that our color-matching company had a seven-year office lease with a large
international can company; they liked the long-term
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security (and the presumed third-party endorsement
from a well-known company). We, of course, disliked
the lease’s long-term financial commitment.
• Our online investment bank/brokerage operation
allied with a $500 billion European bank. The snaillike Europeans picked our brains for a year, then
invested more than $60 million in equity. They promised to deliver one million “accredited investor”
accounts to our electronic platform over 12 months.
Their bureaucratic in-fighting over project control
delayed all milestone achievements and resulted in
their ultimate acquisition of our assets. The Big Bank
killed us with slow love.
Guiding Principles for Strategic Alliances. What does
practice suggest about theory in this partnering mystery?
Kuhn (1988) discusses negotiating skills and secrets that
can be applied to the strategic alliance deal-making
process. Relevant tests include
• Consistency Test: Do major variables hang
together (goals, cash flow, milestones)?
• Importance Test: Relevance, benefits?
• Structure Test: Are we biting the right bait?
• Smell Test: Is negotiation obstinate, disruptive, honest?
Many negotiating games are played: Big firms train their
representatives to low ball, high ball, bluff, bait-‘n’-switch,
sandbag, sting (lie, drop out), and refer to “unknown,
uncontrollable authorities.” Perhaps during these stressful,
direction-turning times, we need to recall the psychoanalytical teachings of Zaleznik (circa 1965), Levinson (1970)
and Kets de Vries (1985). I’d be crazy not to.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize my views on important conditions to ensure success and well-structured alliances.
The a priori conditions for success must be built into the
deal structure.
Strategic alliances can represent wonderful access to
markets, technology, and resources. Investors absolutely
adore the implied third-party endorsement of “an important player.” If one can get through the mating dance, due

Table 6
Joint Ventures:
Important Conditions to Ensure Success
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Style of operations
Time perspectives
Financial goals
Collaborative decision-making
Balanced strengths
Past work relationship
No takeover threats
Top echelon visibility and access

Table 7
Well-structured Alliances
1.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Strategic synergy
Positioning opportunity
Limited resource availability
Less risk
Cooperative spirit
Clarity of purpose
WIN-WIN
Positive third-party endorsement for investors

diligence (ideally, give them your IPO registration material!), and big company smugness (throw your MBA back at
them!), then all that is left is the 98 percent effort to execute
the alliance. The land mines start appearing.
What can go wrong dealing with the Big Guys? “I
thought my partner was responsible for that?” is a typical
lament of a failing strategic alliance!

Mystery #6—Control v. Funding

Should entrepreneurs focus on personal equity control of their
company or relinquish control in exchange for adequate
resources?
This is the easiest mystery to figure out. Cash is king.
Initially, most entrepreneurs answer incorrectly.
Reality Check for Control.
• In practice, entrepreneurs psychologically view the
venture as a “child.” Often they’re ignoring their
own family life, so the notion of being loyal to the
venture offspring has supreme import. Giving away
control of the child is often deemed to be total anathema to them. The reaction is remarkably visceral.
• In theory, the entrepreneur needs adequate funds to
fuel company growth. Accepting funding dilutes the
entrepreneur’s percentage ownership. The more
funds raised at initially low company valuation, the
more severe the dilution impact.
• The balancing act is a tradeoff. One “optimizes” the
coupling of resources with venture need; it is not a
“maximization” effort. Too much capital raise-up too
early causes unnecessary dilution at low valuations.
• The bottom line: Careful financial planning can be
effective. Many venture team members with 1 to 5
percent ownership stakes at IPO time can become
financially well-off. A sliver of a big juicy pie can be a
lot. Conversely, 100 percent of very little is very little.
Complexities of Equity Ownership. An analysis of the
resource-equity control mystery is a nontrivial exercise in
the trade-off of many variables. Several key variables
influence the assessment:
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• Cash needs/timing
Sales growth and working capital requirements
Profit margins
Investment requirements
Working capital line of credit availability
• Perceived valuation by sophisticated investors (prev. post- money) at important milestones
• Source of funds; different investors have selective
ROI criteria
• Impact (fully dilutive) of employee stock options (at
particular exercise prices).
Ronstadt (1988) devotes an entire text to entrepreneurial finance, wherein he articulates the end game as being
neither under- nor overcapitalized in fund-raising at any
point in time. The trick is to find a threshold band of capitalization at critical points in the venture’s growth cycle to
determine funding requirements. He emphasizes, rationally, comprehensive, exhaustive interaction of spreadsheet
values, conditioned by severe questioning of key assumptions, and heeding key industry ratio values. He advocates
worst, likely, and best case scenario analysis.
Hoffman and Blaky (1987) explain how to negotiate
terms with investors:
• Understand weighted v. full-ratcheted antidilution
provisions.
• Offset equity forfeiture for poor performance with
bonus options for good performance.
• Define employment control—severance values.
• Address shareholder control—voting-rights issues.
• Assure an ability to cash-out personally.
Simplifying Model of Dilution and Ownership. Years of
heated discussions with emotional entrepreneurs have
forced me to devise a simple, generic, integrated model to
accommodate the iterative aspects of this otherwise overly-complicated equity-bleed process.
Table 8 shows, with illustrative values, how the CEOentrepreneur can be diluted down to 27 percent ownership
and still make him or her worth (on paper until he or she
cashes out) more than $16 million. Hand-holding for the
entrepreneur, the venture team, and the investors is still
required. This interactive model helps with all these stakeholders.

Mystery #7—Funding: Logic or Miracle?

Is the ultimate raise-up of seed and growth capital a logical fallout of the entrepreneurship process, or a serendipitous miracle?
Views on Money.
“Go where the money is.”
—Willie Sutton (Brink’s Bank robber)
“Money is the resource to gain market share.”
—Japanese saying

“Money is not the goal; just the best measure of success.”
—Entrepreneurial saying
“Money is the goal; just ask the stockholders!”
—Investor saying
Financing Process. Siegel (1990) presents a synopsis
(see Table 9) that summarizes the financing process.
Timmons and Sander (1986) remind us of everything
the entrepreneur doesn’t want to know about raising capital; the process can take up to half the founder’s time over
the first six to nine months. He may have to guarantee
loans personally. The entrepreneur can get fired. His stock
can be appropriated. Control of the BOD can be wrested
from him. He can lose his “child!”
Resolution to Capital Raise-up.
• Persistence in selling the venture to investors is key.
The entrepreneur must work the capital raise-up 18
hours a day. Case example: Use reverse psychology.
In the tire recycling venture, most of the seed and
bridge capital came from people whom I initially
insisted couldn’t be in the deal. The more I resisted,
the more they wanted “in.” At IPO time, we submitted in sequence seven different registration statements to the SEC, with four different underwriters.
Desperate, driven people simply don’t give up. They
push until there is no more “push” left! We wore
everyone out. The professional support people
(lawyers, auditors, etc.) needed the deal to close so
they could get paid!
• Demonstrate the magic of the cap chart (Table 8) to
investors. They are looking for a 4-bagger or an 8bagger on their money. The brilliance is to show
these investors how they get their “vig” while keeping the deal terms favorable to the venture.
• The harder you work, the luckier you get.
Excruciating detail to investor follow-up, investor
group meetings with management, weekly updates,
daily calls—all create investor interest.
• In truth, this money-raising mystery is still pretty
much a mystery to me. Work the logical financing
process and gleefully accept good luck when it presents itself. The Law of Large Numbers generally is at
work. The more financial raise-up action that is in
play, the higher the probability of success. The higher the probability that you will get lucky!
Conclusions to a Magical Mystery Tour
• Entrepreneurship is not for most (read: 99.9%) people.
• Erratic income; minimum fringe benefits
• Highly cycling net worth
• Excessive work tension, pressure, impact on family life
• Long gaps before enjoying positive feedback
• 2 percent inspiration, 98 percent perspiration
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• Benefits are worth it to the truly addicted.
• For me, measures of success have outweighed the costs:
- personal financial gain
- helped create more than 5,000 jobs
- helped to create about 7 dozen
millionaires—2 dozen (first time);
5 dozen (already there)

-

helped create several dozen companies
with products serving thousands of
satisfied customers
• Issues of entrepreneurial theory v. practice; intuition
v. analysis; risk v. reward; individual drive v. team
building efforts—all can be reconciled. But only if you
work so very hard enough to get lucky.

Table 8
Simple Equity Model
[Co. Valuations in $000's]

Accounting for Stock Options
Dilution

Without Stock Options Dilution

Scenario / Stage
Pre-Money Value
Additional Investment
Pre-Money Stock Price
New Investment Stock Price
Post-Money Blended Stock Price

Initial

Angel #1

Employee
Options
Plan #1

$3,500
n/a

$6,500
$1,500

$8,000
n/a

$12,000
$3,500

$15,500
n/a

$45,000
$15,000

$3.50
n/a
$3.50

$6.50
$6.50
$6.50

$6.50
n/a
$6.50

$9.75
$9.75
$9.75

$9.75
n/a
$9.75

$28.31
$28.31
$28.31

Pre-Money No. of Shares [ I/O ]
Additional No. of Shares [ I/O ]
Post-Money No. of Shares [ I/O ]
Post-Money Value

1,000,000
0
1,000,000
$3,500

1,000,000
230,769
1,230,769
$8,000

1,230,769
0
1,230,769
$8,000

Issue of Employee Stock Options
[ as % of I/O ]

Employee
Options
Plan #2

IPO
@ $ Valuation

1,230,769
358,974
1,589,744
$15,500

1,589,744
0
1,589,744
$15,500

10%

No. of Stock Options Issued

$60,000

158,974

$5.20

Fully Diluted No. of Shares
Fully Diluted Post-Money Value
Fully Diluted Blended Stock Price

1,589,744
529,915
2,119,658

10%

123,077

Exercise Price [ @
80%
of Pre-money Stock price ]

Fully Diluted Holdings:

VC or Pvt.
Placement # 1

$7.80

1,230,769
$8,000
$6.50

1,353,846
$8,640
$6.38

1,712,821
$16,140
$9.42

1,871,795
$17,380
$9.29

2,401,709
$61,880
$25.76

%'s, Nos. of Shares, & Values

CEO

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

65.0%
650,000
$2,275

52.8%
650,000
$4,225

48.0%
650,000
$4,148

37.9%
650,000
$6,125

34.7%
650,000
$6,035

27.1%
650,000
$16,747

SVP

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

35.0%
350,000
$1,225

28.4%
350,000
$2,275

25.9%
350,000
$2,234

20.4%
350,000
$3,298

18.7%
350,000
$3,250

14.6%
350,000
$9,018

Angel #1

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

18.8%
230,769
$1,500

17.0%
230,769
$1,473

13.5%
230,769
$2,175

12.3%
230,769
$2,143

9.6%
230,769
$5,946

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

0

21.0%
358,974
$3,383

19.2%
358,974
$3,333

14.9%
358,974
$9,249

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

9.1%
123,077
$785

7.2%
123,077
$1,160

15.1%
282,051
$2,619

11.7%
282,051
$7,267

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

0.0%

VC / PP #1

Total Employees

Public Investors

0
$0

0.0%
0

$0

0.0%
0

$0

$0

0.0%
0

$0

0
$0

0

0.0%
0

0

0

0

22.1%
529,915
$13,653

100.0%
1,000,000
$3,500

100.0%
1,230,769
$8,000

100.0%
1,353,846
$8,640

100.0%
1,712,821
$16,140

100.0%
1,871,795
$17,380

100.0%
2,401,709
$61,880

$0

All Investors &
Employees

F. D. %
F. D. # Holding
F. D. $ Holding

Note:

Inputs are highlighted, like this.

0.0%

$0

0.0%

$0

0.0%

$0

$0
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Table 9
Financing Process
A. Preparing for a Financing Transaction
1. Identify your goals and financing requirements
3. Management team
2. Business plan
4. Professional advisors
B. Sources of Financing
1. Start with sources of capital known to the company
2. Seed capital
3. Venture capital
4. Institutional investors
5. Government sponsored/subsidized financing
6. Strategic or corporate partners
C. Risk V. Reward
1. Debt
4. Personal guaranties
2. Equity
5. Technology rights
3. Pledge of corporate assets/stock
6. Management and control
D. Financing Process
1. Timetable
4. Disclosure/offering documents
2. Due diligence
5. Director and stockholder approval
3. Clean-up of corporate records
and insider transactions
E. Securities Laws
1. Federal laws
- Registration of securities
- Exemptions from registration
- “Safe harbors” - Regulation D
- Accredited investors
2. State (“Blue Sky”) laws - Registration of securities
- Exemptions from registration
- Limited offering exemptions
3. Use of sales and advertising literature
4. Brokers, dealers, and finders
F. Equity Financing Terms and Conditions
1. Investment agreements
5. Registration rights
2. Representation and warranties
6. Antidilution rights
3. Restrictions on transfer
7. Conversion rights
4. Preemptive rights
8. Puts, calls, and mandatory redemptions
G. Tax Considerations
1. Subchapter S
2. Section 1244 stock
3. Stock for services - Section 83(b)
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